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PREFACE

This translation is a severely abbreviated version of the
1,200-page Chinese original text.

The principles I have followed

in deciding what to omit and how to summarize the author's original
argument are set out in the translator's introduction.

Professor

Chou may not, of course, be held responsible for the infelicities
of style, distortions and errors which must inevitably appear in a
work which has gone through the double process of translation and
abridgment.
I have assumed that readers of this text already have some
basic knowledge of Chinese political and cultural history.

Hence

I have pruned rather drastically from Professor Chou's original
text material not directly relevant to economic phenomena.

1 have,

however, appended a dynastic table keyed to Professor Chou's peri
odization of Chinese economic history.
Special Chinese terms for economic institutions have, whereever possible, been translated into English equivalents and ex
plained at their first occurrence in the text.

The English terms

are cross-referenced to their Chinese originals (with ideographs
placed next to the transliterations)

in the glossary-index.

I have

also appended a separate list of Chinese weights and measures.
Given the wide variation in Chinese measures with identical names
over space and time, the English equivalents of these terms should
be taken only as approximations.
Though not included in Professor Chou's original text, I have
added what 1 hope is a representative selection of traditional
style woodblock illustrations of economic activities, taken from
Ming and Ch'ing dynasty illustrated encyclopedias, so as to provide
a pictorial equivalent of the kind of Chinese perspective on

Chinese economic history given by the text.
Finally I would like to thank Professor Chou for graciously
consenting to the publication of my translation.

My thanks also to

the undergraduate students in my senior seminar at Western Washing
ton State College during the last two years who have given me
highly useful comments on earlier drafts of this translation.
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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Given the paucity of works in English on Chinese economic
history, particularly for the earlier periods, there is perhaps no
particular need to offer elaborate justification for a translation,
even in abbreviated form, of a work which has for more than a dec
ade enjoyed so wide a popularity on Taiwan and among many foreign
students of Chinese economic history.

It is, however, necessary

to indicate the several audiences to which this translation is ad
dressed and the limited uses to which it may prudently be put.
The first draft of this translation was made in sections week
by week for my undergraduate seminar in Chinese economic history
during the fall of 1972.
It was to serve in lieu of a current
textbook survey which did not at that time exist.'
I also hoped it
could illustrate one of the modes of understanding China's economic
history now current within the Chinese Intellectual sphere, as op
posed to one of the Western points of view toward non-Western eco
nomic experiences which are all too accessible to students in our
part of the world.
Subsequently, it occurred to me that such a work might also
serve as useful supplementary reading in my own, and perhaps in
other people's, survey courses in pre-twentieth-century Chinese
history, introducing Chinese economic history from a particular
Chinese perspective in a way similar to what Derk Bodde's transla
tion of Fung Yu-lan's Short History of Chinese Philosophy does for
Chinese intellectual history, though on a considerably more modest
scale.
This translation may perhaps also be of some use to students
of the Chinese language who are interested in learning the vocabu
lary of economic history through reading all or part of the
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original Chinese text.

I hope that this greatiy abbreviated ver

sion preserves enough of the substance of the original to serve
as a guide to or at least as a set of detailed hints as to the
original's content, and that hence it can ease the student's
path through it without doing so much of the work for him as to
tempt him completely away from the original Chinese version.
Finally, this translation may be of interest to economists
and economic historians who, for linguistic reasons, lack direct
access to the original and who wish, in some of their reading
at least, to minimize the inevitable distortion of Chinese
perspectives which takes place when Chinese works are filtered
through alien sensibilities in monographic works by Westerners.
All three of the above potential audiences should, however,
be aware of the limitations of this translation lest they judge
Professor Chou's work as inadequate on the basis of its short
comings.

I trust that the subtitle, A Translation in Precis,

adequately indicates these limitations.

The order and the major

elements of Professor Chou's argument have been preserved, and all
of his chapter headings have been retained.

In the process of re

ducing the 1,200 pages of the Chinese original to about one-sixth
of that amount, however, literal or close translation (at least to
the degree that any translation can be considered literal) much of
the time had to give way to summaries.

Even in these summaries,

I have attempted to preserve something of the idiosyncratic flavor
of the original and nearly all of its judgments and the mode of
understanding on which they are based.

I have also left out most

of Professor Chou's bibliographic apparatus, for the most part con
sisting of lists of books at the end of each section, except for
general indications of whom he is quoting at certain points.

In

almost all cases a reader would have to know Chinese to effectively
exploit these sources.

For those readers it should, however, be

relatively easy to use this translation as a key to Professor Chou's
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original and the bibliographic apparatus it contains.
The two-volume'^ original on which this translation in precis
is based has been virtually the standard work in the Republic of
China on Chinese economic history since its publication in 1959.
It was reprinted in 1970, and a one-volume abridgement appeared in
4
1973.
Its preeminence is, no doubt, partly due to the quasi
official standing of its author and to the somewhat delicate status
of its subject, it being necessary for writers on Taiwan to avoid
even the appearance of using Marxist interpretations, particularly
in economic matters.

The work, however, is quite capable of

standing on its own merits, and its quasi-official status renders
it sufficiently archetypical to be in itself of interest to the
foreign student who wishes to discover the range of viewpoints ex
tant within the modern Chinese intellectual community.
It will be evident from the very first page that Professor
Chou is actively committed to the system of political economy built
around Sun Yat-sen's concept of People's Livelihood (i^^itmin
sheng), the third of Dr. Sun's Three People's Principles
san min chuyi).

Such an attachment must seem almost quaintly ar

chaic outside of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

How seriously,

after all, are the economic principles of Henry George (the inspir
ation, unacknowledged in this work, for most of Dr. Sun's own eco
nomic ideas) taken in the West these days?

Indeed on Taiwan it

self, avowal of the Three Principles has, especially in recent
years, become for most people, a pro forma exercise designed to
show one's political respectability rather than evidence of a
deeply held ideological position informing the whole of a writer's
viewpoint in whatever he writes.

To some extent this is true even

of Professor Chou's work, though he appears to make more whole
hearted use of Sun's worldview than do most contemporary serious
Taiwan scholars.

Nevertheless People's Livelihood is not suffi

ciently profound a concept to dominate a work so wide in scope as
Chou's

and, whever necessary, he simply rises above principle so
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as to do justice to a particular topic.

He is in this respect

more fortunate than his compatriots within the People's Republic
of China who are obligied by their governing authorities to apply
the Marxist“MaoiSt orthodox ideology deeply to the whole course of
their studies.

Because Marxism-Maoism is far more ambitious than

Sunism, this results in distortions far more severe than do the
more eclectic nineteenth-century liberal doctrines of Dr. Sun.
In particular, Chinese Marxists have far greater difficulties
than does Professor Chou in accepting the very considerable accom
plishments of the traditional Chinese economy, and while this at
titude of acceptance occasionally leads Professor Chou into a per
haps excessive complacency,^ this is not necessarily to be des
pised.

It is likely rather nearer the truth than many of the

libelous statements made during the last generation about even
China's more remote past by respectably patriotic Chinese Marxists.
At heart it is also psychologically healthier than the Marxist
position and hence more likely to lead further toward the truth in
future investigations.

Most schools of psychology tell us that a

patient cannot begin to plumb the truth of his own nature until he
has fully accepted a priori his own worth as an individual.
for the individual, so for society.

As

Whatever else is right with

it, Marxist China has yet to accept, in its own terms, the worth
of China's pre-Marxist past.

Whatever else is wrong with it.

Nationalist China has so accepted its past.
To be sure, neither Chou nor his mentor Sun sees China's tra
dition entirely in that tradition's own terms.

Both must ulti

mately be placed in the camp of the Westernizers in that most
agonizing of nineteenth- and twentieth-century China's intellectual
dilemmas, the clash between Westernizers and Purifiers of the
Chinese tradition.

But even in their own terms, the Western

economists' and economic historians' very claims to universality
prevent any serious assertion by either Chinese or Westerners that
a Chinese economic historian is in some sense betraying his own
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culture if he applies the "laws" of economics to its history.
There is nothing peculiarly Western about these laws except for
the historical accident of the region where they were discovered.
As one of the greatest of modern economists, Ludwig Von Mises,
asserts, "the a priori sciences," among which he includes econom
ics, "aim at a knowledge unconditionally valid for all beings en
dowed with the logical structure of the human mind."^ At this
level there is no room for what Von Mises dismisses as the "polylogical" approach, there are no more grounds for asserting a
peculiarly Chinese economic science than there were for Hitler to
assert the existence of (and cruelly persecute) a pecularly Jewish
science or, for that matter, for Marxists to assert the existence
of (and, when they can, persecute) a peculiarly bourgeois econom
ics.^
Economic history and what for lack of a more currently fashion
able term must be labeled political economy are, however, quite an
other matter.

It is evident that there must be an idiosyncratical-

ly Chinese economic history, though the narration of its course and
the analysis of its inner logic must never contradict the laws of
valid economic science.

It may initially be less or not at all

evident that there can be one or more idiosyncratically Chinese
versions of political economy, but to deny this would be to assert
that political science and political philosophy are sciences in
the same a prioristic sense as are logic or economics.

The range

of behavior in the realm of politics, the range of variant values
that underlies the many varieties of political philosophy alone
guarantee at least the potential existence of many political econ
omies in all but the simplest of human cultures.

Of course, a

particular political philosophy may require use of modes of eco
nomic activity which economic science determines cannot achieve the
ends at which they aim.

All this means, however, is that not all

things are possible to attain within any given political system no
matter what its partisans may claim.

8

6
It is in his political economy that Professor Chou may justly
be labeled idiosyncratically Chinese and Chinese of a particular
sort for which the label “neo”traditiona1" is appropriate.
unfortunate that such a label
aura of the “reactionary."

It is

in these times carries with it an

I should have preferred to use the

words “radical" or “revolutionary," or at least have substituted
the word “new" for the prefix “neo-,“ but the former would have
been inaccurate and the latter would have been awkward.

Though he

is in many respects a man of the twentieth century. Professor Chou
shares with the mainstream of traditional Chinese political econo
my an abiding concern with the ethical norms of equality (or at
least equity) and harmony^ and the assumption that it is the duty
of a wel1-organized state to attempt to realize these ideals in
the life of the society it governs.

This traditional benevolent

statism is in some measure accentuated by Professor Chou's alle
giance to the Kuomintang's ideal

(typical of most of the left- and

right-wing movements aiming at national liberation and development
which have characterized our century) of using the power of the
state to make or at least encourage the creation of a modern in
dustrial society.
Hence Chou applauds Emperor Wu of Han for the purity of in
tent of his statist policies, but while Chou deplores their ex
cesses he does not ascribe them to this inherent statism.

He

clearly implies that the Kuomintang would not have gone so far,
particularly in frustrating the legitimate activities of merchants.
A disciple of the “Austrian" school of economists might deny the
economic efficacy of even the more limited Kuomintang interven
tionism, but in doing so he would simply be exposing one of the
differences between his own and Professor Chou's political economy.
For Chou state intervention is an ethical

imperative.

Chou's statism is, however, also balanced or at least rendered
ambivalent by its logical opposite:
faire.

an attraction toward laissez-

Of course, something akin to laissez-faire seems actually
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to have been present within both the Confucian and Taoist tradi
tions, and this trend is faithfully reported by Chou.

This tradi

tional anti-statism appears to have been reenforced in Professor
Chou's mind by his exposure to the Western classical economic tra
dition.

Hence he depicts the early Confucians, particuarly Menc

ius, as overt advocates of laissez-faire and concludes that philo
sophical statism is a Han and post-Han distortion of this aspect
of the original Confucian tradition.
This tendency to view the thinkers of the classical period as
more "modern" than their successors during the imperial era is, of
course, an old habit among modern Chinese intellectuals, conspicu
ous at least since K'ang Yu-wei, and was, as Joseph Levenson has
argued, a stage in modern Chinese intellectuals' transcendance of
their tradition.Chou's tendency to occasionally take too liter
ally such putatively early literary sources as the Chou Li
(The Rites of Chou)

is another aspect of the earlier stages of

this transition but one which appears, particularly among scholars
on Taiwan, to be coming (with some justification) back into fashion
in recent years.
Also reminiscent of the traditional historiography is Chou's
tendency on occasion to practice "appropriate concealment" (
hui),^ ^ as by separating discussion of some of the key flaws

of

Wang An-shih's reforms from his narrative of them and celebration
of their and Wang's virtues.

Of greater significance, though much

of it is lost in this necessarily abbreviated version, is Chou's
retention of the traditional practice of knitting the narrative
together with extended quotations from all relevant primary
sources.
Giving due weight to its weaknesses, Chou's neo-traditional
point of view nevertheless retains the virtue of enabling him and,
through him, us to see the past in terms more nearly congruent with
its own values than can be done through currently more fashionable
points of view.

If he misses insights obvious to the latter, the
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converse is also the case, and in many situations he allows us to
see the same seeming novelties as does the latter, but domesti
cated into the normal fabric of Chinese history.

A good example

of this sort of shift in perspective is the issue of land tenure.
Mark Elvin asserts that manorial ism and serfdom were key aspects
of the Sung land system.

These two labels seem to jar us with

their novelty when placed in an explicitly non-feudal context.
The institutions which these terms represent seem less odd and
can be more easily accepted as normal parts of the Chinese economy
during certain periods in Chou's treatment.

Chou's treatment of

manors and their tenants thus helps us place Elvin's view of these
phenomena within a fully Chinese context.
Of the limited number of general economic histories of China
available in English, only Mark Elvin's book is comparable in cur
rentness, scope and detail of treatment to even this translation
in precis of Chou's work.

Though it is a highly controversial

work, based largely on only one of the two main opposing schools
of thought among Japanese students of key aspects of Chinese
12
economic history
and has so far met with a mixed reception among
economists and economic historians of China, Elvin's book is never
theless an important addition, and indeed the only one in English
since E. Stuart Kirby's I95A work, to the literature in the field.
In many respects, including its most controversial conceptual

inno

vations, it represents a significant advance from Chou's work, and
thus at least its main ideas ought to be available to readers of
this translation, particularly undergraduates for whom this is
their first sustained exposure to Chinese economic history.

Hence

I have appended a precis of the main line of Elvin's argument.
Particular attention ought to be paid to Elvin's view of the nature
of Sung-Ming "manorial ism" and "serfdom," the most controversial
elements in his work, and his concept of a "high level equilibrium
trap" which he asserts kept late Ming and Ch'ing China from break
ing through to an industrial economy.
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To complete the survey of the range of contemporary views of
China's economic history, I have also appended a translation in
precis of a Chinese work contemporary with Chou's and typifying
an orthodox Chinese Marxist view of the course of economic history
of the imperial era.

To place this work within a larger frame

work, it should be noted that the currently orthodox Marxist view
of ancient China's economic history makes Shang and Western Chou
the Marxist Slave Society stage of development; the Spring-Autumn
period of Eastern Chou considered the transition between Slave
Society and Feudalism; the Warring States the first, fragmented
stage of Feudalism; and Ch'in-Han the beginning of the two-milienia
long epoch of Centralized Feudalism, within which "sprouts" of
capitalism eventually appeared well before and independent of the
intrusion of Western capitalism into Chinese economic life.
Detailed comparison of the views of Chou, Elvin, and Fu and
Li is an exercise perhaps best left to the reader.
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NOTES TO THE TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION
1.

Last spring saw the appearance of Mark Elvin's The Pattern of
the Chinese Past (see Appendix A), the first book-length eco
nomic history of China in English since E. Stuart Kirby's In
troduction to the Economic History of China in 1954. As will
be argued below, however, Elvin's work reflects somewhat monolithically the point of view of only one school of Japanese
historians of the Chinese economy and hence cannot be viewed
as preempting the field.
The few other extant English-language general economic histo
ries of China were all either out-of-date or too limited in
scope or concept to merit consideration as texts in such a
course. Mabel Ping-hua Lee's The Economic History of China
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1921) is out-of-date
both factually and conceptually, giving little sense of China's
continuing economic development after classical antiquity. Chi
Chao-ting's Key Economic Areas in Chinese History (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1936) was a fundamentally new contribution in
its time and is still well worth read.ing but, given its focus
on hydraulics as the determining factor in both economic and
political change, it is a monograph rather than a general eco
nomic history. E. Stuart Kirby's book, cited in note 1, is,
as its title avows, merely a bibliographic introduction to its
subject rather than the general' economic history he promised
(p. 14) to eventually produce but which has never appeared.

2.

Some sub-chapters have been compressed, some are rather closer
to the length of the original.
I have also compared my text
with Professor Chou's own one-volume Chungkuo chingchi shih
kang f j^j
(Out 1 i ne of Chinese Economic History)
(Taipei: Huan-yu ch'upanshe, 1973).

3.

Four paperbacked volumes, two volumes in hardback.

4.

Cf. note 2 above.

5.

In his preface to Chou's Chungkuo chingchi shih kang Chang
Kuo-wei^|_^
fairly summarizes the moral underlying Chou's
narrative: One may judge the health of a society's economy by
its results. "For the last thousand years or so the land of
China has nourished an incomparably large population, and
there has been a somewhat equal distribution of wealth. This
demonstrates the ta 1 ents and wisdom of the Chinese people" (p.
4).

n
6.

Ludwig Von Mises, Human Action (New Haven:
Press, 19^9), 57.

7.

Von Mises, 5, 6, 75"89.

8.

HsUn Tzu aptly made this point: "When men acquire something,
they never get only what they desire and nothing more; when
men reject something, they never rid themselves only of what
they have and nothing more." Burton Watson, tr., Basic Writ
ings of HsUn Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963)>
153.

9.

The Chinese terms are chUn p'-^ and ho;^t? respectively. Yang
Lien-sheng has argued that these two Ideals underlie all legi
timate traditional Chinese economic statecraft. Cf. his Excursions in Sinology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I969),

Yale University

231-233.

10.

Cf. his Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. Vol. II: The
Problems of Historical Significance (BerkeTey: University of
California Press, 1965).

11.

Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, "The organization of Chinese official
historiography," in W. C. Beasley and E. G. Pulleyblank, eds.,
Historians of China and Japan (London: Oxford University Press,
1961), 49, 51. One example of perhaps unconscious "appropriate
concealment" practiced by Chou is his treatment of Wang Anshih's field survey and equal-tax law.
In the section dealing
with Wang's reforms, Wang is praised for spending only twelve
years on the field survey as compared with eighteen years re
quired for a similar cadastral survey in Napoleonic France,
but only in the later section on Sung taxation is it mentioned
that only half of the land had been in fact surveyed during
those twelve years.

12.

Cf. the discussion of these schools in Evelyn Sakakida Rawski,
Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 2^0, n. 68.

13.

Originally prepared for a panel on Elvin's work which I led at
the Northwest Regional Seminar on China, held at the University
of British Columbia on November 3"^, 1973.
I should note that
the consensus of the participants was considerably harsher to
ward Elvin than the judgment expressed here.
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Section I
PREFACE

An Overview of China's Economic History
Subjective idealism, whether Chinese or European, boils down
to spiritualism.

Pre-Marxist materialism boils down to the reduc

tion of man to a thing, as it fails to recognize that not only does
the natural environment (sunspots, China as a continental rather
than a seacoast-dominated geographic entity) act on man, but that
man reacts on his environment too.

The same is true of the school

of social or economic materialism founded by Marx.

At best, ma

terialism provides the objective element in history; the spiritual
element must remain history's motive force.
interact in history.

Mind and matter must

In earliest times the material forces predom

inated in man's history, but the trend has been for the immaterial
forces to grow in strength with time until now they can (as in the
accomplishments of modern science) reshape the material forces
themselves.

Only the historical viewpoint of Sun Yat-sen's

"People's Livelihood" adequately synthesizes the strong points of
spiritualism and both varieties of materialism, making them in
separable facets of itself, the center of human history.

It sees

human progress as a spiritual process, but one inextricably linked
to continuous improvement in material production.
According to Sun, mankind's search for its livelihood is the
basis for social progress and is the center of history.
seek sustenance.
scarce sustenance.

Men first

Government arises to assure just distribution of
With sustenance assured, culture can appear.

Hence economics is the foundation for both government and culture
and determines their nature.

Marx erred in not noting that tools,

though the basis for economics, are themselves the products of
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human volition in the search for the People's Livelihood.

Hence

only Sun's philosophy avoids the partiality of the other three
Views.
The Stages of Chinese Economic Development
All economic development rests on the interaction of natural,
social, and technical factors.

The natural factor, predominant in

earlier epochs, steadily yields to human intervention.
determines a people's character.

Environment

Social organization is linked to

the political structure, which in turn affects the economy.
all economics is in some sense political economics.
what has put men above the animals.

Hence

Technology is

Werner Sombart judges economic

ideas, economic organization, and technology to be the three most
important factors in studying economic history,
China is somewhat unusual for its physical

isolation, not only

from the rest of the world, but from some of its own frontier re
gions, like Sinkiang and Mongolia.

Hence its economy, like other

aspects of its culture, evolved in isolation.

Its economic center

has tended to shift south and east from the Wei River-Yellow River
area to the Yangtze.
Exploitation of mineral deposits has not been important until
the recent industrial age.

Given a static technology, population

has tended to vary in proportion to the dynastic cycle.

Only

technological progress offers hope of escape from this Malthusian
trap.
Since ancient times the Chinese impulse has been to organize
society in accord with what was viewed as the dictates of nature.
Confucianism reenforced this.
by later generations.

Confucius himself was misinterpreted

When he said righteousness was for the

"gentleman" (chiintzu) and profit for the "mean fellow" (hsiaojen) ,
he meant "ruler" and "common man," respectively, not "good" and
evil

man.

Mencius' statement that producers must nourish rulers

has been similarly distorted by later Confucians who have also
formally discriminated against "secondary" merchants in favor of
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“primary" farmers.

The Confucian motto was to use the past to

transform the present, as in their perpetually unsuccessful ad
vocacy of a return to the well-field system.
Kai-shek put Sun's land reform proposal

Not until Chiang

into practice in 1952 was

the two millenia old land question finally solved.
Chou feudalism was organized on the model of an enormously
extended family.

So too, with some differences, was the imperial

system since Ch'in-Han times, though the trend was to centralize
power in the hands of the emperor and his non-related personal
servants, like the eunuchs.

There has also been a tendency for the

official class to become the greatest landed and commercial capi
talists and to perpetuate their power through the various examina
tion systems.
Chinese science, though now backward, was quite developed
through the middle ages.

Chinese thought was most fertile during

the late Eastern Chou and Han whose writers also forged many works
purporting to belong to high antiquity.
were founded then.

Astronomy and medicine

Metallurgy, hydraulics, salt manufacture showed

great progress in the epochs of the Warring States Ch'in and Han.
T'ang saw mathematical advances, and Sung built much on them.

In

addition to obvious contributions to world culture like the compass
and gunpowder, Han China exported silk cultivation, and Sung and
Yuan contributed porcelain and movable-type printing.
Progress halted only in Ming and Ch'ing.

Since then the

scientific and industrial revolutions have come at the initiative
of the West.
cial

Economic development is now a function of man's so

initiative, and henceforth we must look to man's efforts as

the key to future progress.
There are various ways to periodize Chinese economic history.
One is to start with high antiquity (everything up to SpringAutumn), move to middle antiquity (Spring-Autumn to the coming of
the West in the nineteenth century)and conclude with modern times
(since mid-nineteenth century).

Another method is:

prehistoric
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to Hsia (founding period); Shang-Western Chou (feudal monarchy);
Spring-Autumn and Warring States (monarchical period); Han-Ch'ing
(imperial period) .
This book treats the prehistoric through Hsia as the mythical
period; Shang-Western Chou as the founding period of the Chinese
economy; Spring-Autumn and Warring States as the metamorphosis of
the economy; Ch'in-Han up to Wang Mang as the period of its flour
ishing; Eastern Han, Chin, Northern and Southern Dynasties as the
age of troubles of the economy; Sui, T'ang, and Five Dynasties as
the period of reestablishment of the economy; Sung as the period of
the economy's renewal; Liao, Chin, and Yuan as the period of the
economy's destitution; Ming as the period of the economy's revival;
Ch'ing as the period of the modern economy's fermentation.

An Outline of the Evolution of the Chinese Economy
The Chinese people have been welded together from diverse
local groups over the past five thousand years but largely by
peaceful means rather than conquest.

Though nomads have had to be

fought off in the north since Ch'in-Han, there has been steady ab
sorption of agricultural peoples to the south, and these southern
ers have become fully integrated with the Chinese people.

Nomad

invaders of the north have also been assimilated.
Internal migration from north to south China usually proceeded
gradually and for economic reasons to take advantage of favorable
conditions for agriculture in the south.

External migration to

the northern frontiers was usually artifically induced by govern
ment policy, and such emigrants were on the front lines of the
mi 1lenia-long process of assimilating nomadic peoples, as, for
example, the three centuries of struggle with the Hsiungnu in
Ch'in-Han times.

But by the time the Hsiungnu were driven off,

Han was too weak to repopulate the northern frontier and there
after until Sul-T'ang, successive waves of nomads engulfed much of
northernmost China.
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The T'ang reunification was based on an agriculturist-nomad
alliance,

T'ang soon broke with and defeated its Eastern Turkic

allies and, like Han, filled empty areas in the north with farmers.
T'ang weakness after the An Lu-shan Rebellion allowed the Khitan to
enter the north like the Turks and others before them.

The Khitan,

like the Jurched after them, were soon sinicized, even though they
conquered much of north China.
The trend toward greater scope of barbarian conquests, which
began in 755, was not reversed until the founding of Ming in 1368.
The Mongols were expelled before they had been much sinicized. Th i s
allowed them to remain nomads confronting China from their original
homeland right through the Ming period.

Subsequently the Manchus

were able to take advantage of late Ming decadence to conquer
China, obliging the Chinese agriculturists to devote two centuries
of time and blood to absorbing them.

This absorption, however,

was eventually all but complete; only a few thousand now remain
who call themselves Manchus.

The great size and long tenure of

the Ch'ing finished the job of politically absorbing frontier
peoples.

Most remained culturally unassimilated.

The long peace

and consequent great growth in population during Ch'ing removed
the necessity for official pressure to induce migration; natural
forces now made people move.
It has taken five thousand years since the Yellow Emperor
founded our civilization, but in blood and culture all nomads have
now been absorbed into our agricultural people.
As Chiang Kai-shek has written in Chungkuo chihmingylin
(CHINA'S DESTINY), after the Three Kingdoms period China's

This formula which ignores the existence of nomadic and
sedentary non-Chinese within China and which furthermore asserts,
contrary to common knowledge, that "all nomads" (what about seden
tary non-Chinese?) have lost their identity within the Chinese
majority is typical of but not unique to the Kuomintang world view.
(EHK)
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economic center moved from the Yellow River to the south and east.
The closure of Central Asia after the fall of the Yuan ruined the
cities of the west, and the coming of the Europeans eventually
raised the power of the cities of the east.

Until the Republic,

the tendency was for the wealth of the southeast to nourish the
soldiers of the northwest.

Now all parts of the country patrioti

cally support the entire nation.
The earliest period saw the basic techniques (stone, then
copper tools, animal domestication, sericulture, agriculture, fi
nally building of palaces and walled cities) established.

The

founding period (Shang-Western Chou) began with the natural economy
of feudalism, evolved to the beginning of the use of iron tools,
saw the evolution of the first monetary systems and the beginnings
of monarchical methods of government.

The age of metamorphosis

(Spring-Autumn and Warring States) was characterized by intellectu
al freedom, political conflict, the influence on all aspects of
economic life of extensive use of iron tools, replacement of the
well-field system by private property in land, hydraulic works,
rise of commerce, commercial urbanism and increased use of money.
In the flourishing epoch (Ch‘in-Han), the first stages of a
national economy appeared once feudalism had been more fully tran
scended by the Ch‘in-Han imperial system.

Constant warfare during

the age of troubles (late Han through Northern and Southern Dy
nasties) retarded the economy.

North Chinese agriculture weakened;

the money system was thrown into disorder.

The barbarian invasions

of the north shifted the economic center to the south, while econ
omic influence gradually sinified the northern barbarians.

The

Equal Fields systems and shifts in forms of private ownership which
appeared during this period were to have varying consequences for
the future.
The age of reestablishment (Sui, T'ang, and Five Dynasties)
saw a broadening of the economy as compared to that of Ch'in-Han.
Population increased, cities grew bigger, hydraulic projects were
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of wider scope, new handicraft industries appeared (e.g., cotton
weaving), coal came into use as did new metallurgical techniques.
There was increased use of porcelain, tea, and sugar to improve the
everyday standard of living.

Fiscal resources increased.

Print

ing developed. Increasing the reach of the national culture.
Grand Canal united north with south.

The

Seaborne commerce with India,

Arabia, Annam, Korea and Southeast Asia became important as it had
never before been.

The tea and salt trades were tied to the govern

ment's fiscal system.

Ever-normal granaries were established.

The

An Lu-shan Rebel 1 ion was only a temporary setback midway through
this period.
The age of renewal

(Sung) saw difficulties in the north, but

under Sung seaborne trade was encouraged to make up for this.
Navigation by the stars, sun, and compass came into use.
played a role in the Sung-Chin wars.

Gunpowder

Movable type printing ap

peared.

Wang An-shih's policies affected the economy to no small

extent.

It is one of the great tragedies of Chinese economic his

tory that the innovations of this period did not bear consequences
similar to those of modern Europe's economy.
The fiscal policies of the Mongols had grave effects on the
economy of the age of destitution, but technological

innovations

continued, especially in methods of warfare (the cannon), paper
money was broadly used, and overseas and overland commerce with the
outside world continued to develop.
The age of revival

(Ming) saw the return of Chinese control

over the economy and the end of the previous era's state management
of the economy.

That taxes were now paid in cash and salaries to

aristocrats were no longer paid in land, shows the growth of the
money economy.

Overseas trade continued to develop.

The age of fermentation (Ch'ing) made little contribution to
the economy.

But for the Manchu conquest the Chinese economy might

have continued to grow.

In the West, the age of the industrial
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and democratic revolutions eventually tied the whole world together,
but the Western pioneers retained their initial advantage while the
Manchus stagnated until loss of the Opium War in 18A2 began to
rouse the Chinese people to catch up.
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Section I I
THE MYTHICAL PERIOD: FROM THE PREHISTORIC TO THE HSIA

Outiine
Details of the history of the 2,000 years from the Yellow Em
peror to the founding of Hsia are obscure, but this period set the
stage for the later feudal order.

Material life was characterized

by hunting, fishing, herding and the use of stone tools.
organization was based on family ties.

Economic

The division of labor had

begun and warfare occurred, but the economy was localistic and
elaborate government had not yet appeared.

Various animals, like

the elephant, now restricted to the south, were then common in
north China.

Evidence for Economic History from Mythical Accounts
Evidence is derived from excavated artifacts (usually fragment
ed) and from literary sources (often recorded in distorted form
much later).

Stone tools found in association with Peking Man

(ca. 400,000-500,000 B.C.) and elsewhere in northwest China indi
cate that Paleolithic life was very primitive.

Though the use of

fire was known, early man's life appears to have been barely dis
tinguishable from that of the animals.
found widely in China.

Neolithic stone tools are

Pottery appeared.

The site of Yangshao,

in Kansu, yields the most notable artifacts.

The earliest Neo

lithic remains apparently date ca. 5,500 years ago, a few hundred
years before the Yellow Emperor.
Literary sources permit little to be said about political or
ganization.
ical period.

Even in Confucius' time little was known of the myth
Many border peoples of later times claim descent

from one or another of the tribes mentioned in literary accounts
of mythical times.

This shows that despite differences in ways of
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life, all the peoples of modern China are blood relatives.

The

China of mythical times constituted present-day Shensi, Shansi,
Honan, southern Hopei, eastern Kansu, and northern Anhui.

Society and Economy
Society was organized collectively along clan lines and econ
omic life revolved around nomadic gathering, fishing and hunting,
especially in the hilly and wooded west.

To the east, in the cen

tral plain, a more settled agricultural existence was possible on
the fertile loess soil.

Literary accounts permit only a vague gen

eral account of the life of these times, as in the various later
accounts of culture heroes like Shen Nung, who was said to have in
vented agriculture to make up for the growing scarcity of wild
animals.
In the process of inventing material culture, culture in gen
eral was evolved, thereby distinguishing man from the animals.
Agriculture not only produced a larger and more stable population
but reverence for the ancestors who pioneered this more profitable
way of life was also engendered, and this characteristically Chin
ese trait further distinguished our ancestors from the surrounding
peoples.
Bronze appeared early.
Emperor.

Tradition ascribes it to the Yellow

This is probably too early, but bronze had likely appear

ed by Hsia times.

Some unadorned bronzes excavated in Kansu (tra

ditionally the Hsia homeland) may be of Hsia origin.

Tradition

holds that Yii, Hsia's founder, had nine bronze tripods cast.

Commerce, Science and Technology
Tradition ascribes the first markets to Shen Nung, and estab
lishment of weights and measures to the Yellow Emperor.

Yao is

said to have regulate dthe division of labor and consequent barter
among practitioners of the trades.

Salt was easily manufactured

along the east coast and would have been ideal as an object of
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trade.

The calendar was said to have appeared by the Yellow Em

peror's time.

Writing, already well developed by Shang times, must

have appeared earlier.
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Section I I I
THE FOUNDING PERIOD: YIN-SHANG AND WESTERN CHOU

Out!ine
The thousand years of Shang and Western Chou constitute the
founding period of Chinese economic history.

The feudal economic

institutions then established were influential long after.

Feudal Polity and Economy
Shang's economic influence much exceeded its political reach
(centering in northern Honan), covering much of the area of modern
China.

Western Chou more or less controlled politically much of

North China.

13,700,000.

Traditional sources estimate its population at
Though its political capital was in the Sian area west

of the great bend of the Yellow River, Western Chou's cultural and
economic capital was in the Loyang area, amidst the fertile loess
plain.

Under Chou feudalism, Shansi concentrated on agriculture.

Hopei and Shensi, dominated by non-feuda1 I zed barbarians, saw de
velopment of commerce.
Pre-Shang feudalism was more an ethica1-political bond among
local leaders than an economic institution.

Shang's feudalism,

based on conquest, was (according to the literary sources) a cen
trally directed militarized hierarchy.

It served as the model for

the later more extensive Chou conquest-feudalism.

Western Chou had

a systematic hierarchy of fief and sub-fief holders.

Each lord's

land was divided into his personal land and that parcelled out as
sub-fiefs.

The whole system was organized as a complex family,

each lord owing allegiance, tribute and service to the king as the
family's head.

The king was to periodically check up on the lords

and punish them for various offenses.

In Chinese feudalism, the

king had more power than in the later European variety.
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Shang's initial clan-based society evolved toward a privateproperty-holding family system, especially after P‘an-keng's reign
(tr. 1403“1373 B,C.).

This was because of the greater complexities

introduced into the system of property distribution by the increase
of wealth.

The Land System and Agricultural Labor
Before P'an-keng's reign there were frequent shifts of the
capital because agriculture was still not fully evolved and was
still somewhat mixed with pastoral ism.
ly agricultural economy.

Late Shang had a more pure

Because of the ubiquity of omen-casting,

the pr iest shaman' s power in some ways was greater than the king's.
Priests were the chief repositories of knowledge, and their posi
tion the most conspicuous example of the beginning of the complex
division of labor characteristic of a high civilization's economy.
During Western Chou the status of agricultural labor was some
where between that of tenants and slaves.

The class struggle be

tween them and the lords which Marxists postulate was somewhat
mitigated by ethical norms limiting the degree of their exploita
tion.

The only full slaves were prisoners of war, criminals,

certain palace servants, artisans (who held a special position as
valuable "property") and certain officials (e.g., minor aristocrats
undergoing punishment by being enslaved to particular official
roles).

But slaves were of minor economic importance.

Though aristocrats did not directly participate in production,
they supported it through government, war and religion.

The values

embodied in these activities, later to be systematized by the Confucians, were the prerequisites for a settled high civilization.
There seems to have actually been a well-field system, but it
must have varied considerably by area and time

as agriculture

progressed, even though the original name for the system was re
tained.

The classics affirm that the original well-field system

operated to assure economic justice for the cultivators.

Some
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modern scholars, like Hu Shih, assert that the well~field system
was simply an invention after the fact by utopian Confucians.
Others, like Hu Han~min, assert that it was in general use during
Western Chou.

It is most likely that even originally only some of

the land was divided to resemble the character for “well" ( ^
ch_in£), with a commonly-cultivated public field in the middle.
arrangements lacked the public field.

Some

Others simply divided the

land according to the logic of irrigation channels.
Han dynasty Confucians* detailed descriptions of the system as
the basis for an elaborate social security network are merely exer
cises in imagination designed to protest against the unsatisfactory
systems of tenancy of their own time.
various political persuasions
system as a utopian ideal.

Sung and Ming

writers of

made similar use of the well-field

As such, the concept of the well-field

has remained an imperishable part of Chinese economic thought.
Given the fact that oxen were extensively used in sacrifices,
Shang probably did not make frequent use of them as agricultural
draft animals.

Early Shang agriculture was likely based on the use

of fire to clear land.

Irrigation techniques were probably lacking.

Hence, until P'an-keng's time, cultivated lands had to be frequent
ly shifted, as their fertility was quickly exhausted.

In Shang

times most peasants were still organized within a clan framework.
Some captured agricultural peoples may have had a servile status
vis-a-vis their conquerors, but probably retained their clan organ
izational base among themselves.

The large numbers of animal

sacrifices and oracle records of large-scale hunts show that pas
toral ism and hunting were still

important parts of the Shang econ

omy.
That Western Chou was more exclusively agricultural

is shown

by surviving documents outlining their ceremonials which followed
the seasonal rhythms of agriculture.

Specific officials, accord

ing to works like the Chou Li, were assigned to supervise specific
aspects of agriculture.
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In Western Chou times man's domination over nature was more in
tensive than earlier.

More use was made of the loess plain of the

middle Yellow River valley which is exceptionally fertile when as
sured a reliable water supply.

Hence, despite its successes. West

ern Chou agriculture was more vulnerable to drought, as frequent
references in the Odes aff!rm.

Initially, Western Chou's impulse

was to respond to such disasters by blaming them on human sins and
to pray for relief.

Eventually, other methods were added to this;

it became the ideal goal to attain one year's surplus out of three
years' production.

Irrigation began to be introduced.

It is pos

sible that bronze agricultural tools began to be used, but there
were still no draft animals.

Insect plagues were met by lighting

fires at night, a method still used in north China.
In general, according to such sources as Kuan Tzu, agricultural
labor discipline was much tighter than earlier.

Common cultivated

crops were various kinds of millet, rice, wheat, beans and hemp.
Sericulture was highly developed.
in decline.

Herding, fishing and hunting were

Judging from references in the Odes, the peasants' life,

though harder than the lords', was still relatively free.

Even when

taxes in kind were blurred into the traditional labor dues, a por
tion of the harvest remained with the cultivator, thereby distin
guishing him from a slave.

Division of Labor and Scientific Techniques
Division of labor only began to grow fixed in Shang-Chou times.
Feudalism tended to make various callings hereditary.

Government

used and hence supervised a variety of artisans.
According to literary sources, mathematics was one of the sub
jects in an aristocrat's education in Western Chou times.

A math

ematical treatise attributed to the Duke of Chou (but probably no
earlier than the Warring States), uses an approximate value (three)
for £j_ in calculating a circle's circumference.

Iron, of revolu

tionary import in all phases of life, was (as in other civilizations)

29

a logical outgrowth of the higher stages of bronze technology. There
are casual
common)

indirect references to iron (implying that it was already

in the Odes and Tso Chuan, hence it must have appeared dur

ing Western Chou.
Eastern Chou recognized seven distinct alloys of bronze, each
used for different purposes.

Shang and Chou both had carved jade.

The invention of wine is traditionally ascribed to the chief
minister of the Hsia's founder.

Wine became more common later as

the development of agriculture yielded more abundant raw materials
for its manufacture.
Shang bronzes.

Wine vessels are the most common surviving

The Shang is traditionally said to have been de

posed because of the last emperor's excessive drunkenness.

By Chou

times many varieties of wine (all grain based) are listed in surviv
ing sources.
Shang was capable of constructing large palaces in cities with
an area of ten square 1i.

By Eastern Chou large buildings were

found even in the capital cities of local states.
tery were well developed by Shang times.

Weaving and pot

Western Chou introduced

bricks and tiles for building.

Commerce and Communications
Contrary to popular etymology, the dynasty name Shang
not the source of the word merchant (
characters are the same.

is

shang), even though the

The potential for international trade was,

however, present by Shang, given its connections with surrounding
peoples.

Shang used cowrie shells for money and later carved stone,

bone cowries and cast bronze cowries were used to supplement the
money supply.
According to the traditional sources. Western Chou had strictly
regulated markets under constant official supervision to keep
prices honest and quality high.
the Duke of Chou's influence.

This ethical bent is ascribed to
Money was still relatively scarce in
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what was still a largely natural economy.
to be used as money.

Cowrie shells continued

By at least 52h B.C. cast metal money is re

liably reported to have been in existence but not in significant
amounts.
Even traditional accounts seem to limit pre-Shang Chinese cul
ture to just southeastern Shansi and northwestern Honan, an area 500
to 600

from west to east and 300 to AOO

Shang's territory was somewhat broader.

from north to south.

Its founder was said to have

moved some 1,000 J_i_ from the east to defeat Hsia.

Shang's cowrie

shell money came from the coast.
Western Chou's territory was wider still.

The Chou conquests

extended to the east coast, though not much farther to the north
and south than Shang's territory.

There were quite a few military

campaigns through this territory thereafter and even in peacetime
many hunting expeditions and royal progresses through the realm.
There was also regular trade with allied states.

Legends exist

describing a visit by the ruler of Ylieh in the south to the Duke of
Chou and later a visit by King Mu (1001-946) to the "Queen Mother of
the West" in Persia.
expedition.

Trade is said to have had a part in the latter

There may after all be something to these stories,

though they are unverified by other authorities.
One motive for building the eastern capital near Loyang was to
establish a center of political control at a center of communica
tions.

The Odes describes Chou's roads as being arrow-straight.

There may have been post stations established along them.
more extensive use of chariots than Shang.

Chou made

There were road and war

chariots as well as goods carts used by the common people.

Road

chariots were highly ornamented, much more so than Shang's.

The

sedan chair was also used.

Chou boats were larger than Shang's and

a new use was found for them by joining them together to make float
ing bridges.
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Taxation and Fiscal

Institutions

According to traditional sources, Shang also used the wellfield system, with the produce of the public field, amounting to oneninth, being given to the government.

In addition, a “tribute" in

kind of various special products was also levied.
Western Chou's system had five taxes placed on the lands within
the king's own territories, with local lords having analogous ar
rangements:
(1)

The field tax was apparently an adaptation of the Shang

public field tax to meet a situation where the public field itself
no longer actually existed.
linked to a labor tax.

It was supposed to total 10^.

It was

There was also a market tax and miscellane

ous taxes on non-agricultural activities.

All of these were appar

ently subsumed under the category of field tax.

Unlike the Shang

system, an attempt was made to collect a nearly constant amount each
year, rather than a fixed percentage of a year's production (which
was impractical with the disappearance of the public field).

Local

officials were supposed to strike an average of several years'yield
as the base for a constant tax.
(2)

Labor service tax.

This continued to be levied until Sung.

In Chou times this was supposed to be three days per year in good
years, less in bad crop years (one man from each family to serve).
Except for aristocrats, all able-bodied men were liable from age
twenty to sixty (fifteen to sixty-five in rural areas).

Not very

burdensome in Chou times, it became so when commuted to a capita
tion tax in Han times and thereafter.
(3)
chants.

The pass (or gate) and market taxes were levied on mer
The former varied in rate in different areas.

type of transit tax on goods.

It was a

According to Mencius, the market

tax began as a way to finance government supervision of mercantile
activities in the market so as to prevent conspiracies in restraint
of trade.

Market stalls rather than goods were taxed.

In addition,
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the government's fiscal needs were also served.
(4)

The military tax was in addition to the others and was

levied at all levels of the feudal hierarchy in chariots, supplies
and men.
state.

The size of the levy varied by time, locality, and size of
There were exemptions based on age, size of family, number

of dependents, etc.

The garrison fields system of later eras de

scended from this system.
(5)

Fines.

These were assessed for breaking various rules,

e.g., for leaving fields uncultivated, for not sticking to one's
hereditarily assigned task, or for failure to pay any of the above
taxes.
Tradition ascribes direct supervision of agriculture and trade
to specific categories of officials as far back as Hsia.

The Chou

gives detailed lists of central and local officials of this type,
including supervisors of currency, tax collectors, etc.
the most important of these was the ssu-k'ung
al1-trades local official

^ ^

Perhaps

, a jack-of-

in charge of public works (waterways,

roads), whose existence is certified for Eastern Chou by contempor
ary accounts.

The central bureaucracy supervised the collection

and storage of tax commodities, and had a corps of accountants to
keep track of income and outgo.
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Section IV
THE AGE OF METAMORPHOSIS: SPRING-AUTUMN AND WARRING STATES

Outiine
Politically this era witnessed the transition from monarchical
to imperial organization; economically from feudal to national
forms; socially, intensified dominance of Chinese over barbarian
culture.

Economic Thought
Economic thought flourished as in no other era, influenced by
and influencing economic reality.

The Confucians advocated the

limitation of desires and hence demand but also called for measures
to fulfill legitimate demand. The
state should also limit itself,
making sure thereby that the
people would have enough.

No

ascetic despising "profit," Con
fucius (K'ung Tzu) simply subord
inated it to the drive for sagehood, at least for the ruling
class.

Commoners had to seek

profit to earn their living.

The

Sung Neo-Confucians misunderstood
this distinction and thereby
hindered the further development
of economic thought.

Nor did

Confucius despise merchants,
numbering several among his
disciples.

Denigration of mer

chants dates only from Han.

Fig. 1

Confucius (Ming illus
tration)
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Confucius argued that the state's wealth was based on assuring
wealth for the people.

Hence taxes should be low, equitable, and

remitted in bad years.

Not only should taxes be equitable, but

wealth should be equally distributed.

This has remained a constant

ideal of Chinese economic thought ever since.
According to Confucius' disciple, Tseng Tzu, labor applied to
land in accord with each piece of land's nature will yield suffi
cient wealth for a man to support his parents, if all concerned also
practice frugality.
of filiality.

This, he judged, was the common man's version

The early Confucians, like most of their contempoi—

aries (except for the Taoists), affirmed the dignity of labor and
hence the basic equality of all the divisions of society.

It was

only after Han that manual labor was no longer viewed as having
dignity.
Meng Tzu's (Mencius') economic
ideas were more extreme than Confu
cius' because of the more critical
situation of his generation.

It

was now more necessary than ever to
enrich the people so that the state
might survive.

To do this, mer

chants should be encouraged, and
only conspiracies in restraint of
trade should be punished by the
state.

Contrary to his later repu

tation, Mencius was actually a
strict free-trader.

In refuting the

agrarian collectivist Hsu Tzu (Hsti
Hsing) he also worked out the inner
logic of the principle of division
of labor.
Fig. 2

Mencius (Ming illus
tration)

In saying that the ruler

is fed by the farmer and the farmer
ruled by the ruler he was
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illustrating this principle and not (as later commentators make it)
setting the ruler in a position morally superior to the farmer.
Hsun Tzu's economic ideas differed somewhat from Mencius'.

He

emphasized that human desires are innate, are not moral and are
insatiable.

Strife is caused by the fact that goods are scarce and

desires many.

Strife leads to disorder and poverty.

be tamed and limited by ritual

(1 i) to avoid this.

Desires must
Hence rulers

and commoners both seek profit but by different and equally natural
routes.

It is appropriate for rulers to let commoners follow the

division of labor.

If farming and trade are encouraged, both state

and people will be enriched.
Taoist economic thought was entirely negative, an unqualified
laissez-faire based on the doctrine of wu-wei, as opposed to the
Confucians' qualified laissez-faire which allowed government inter
vention to assure popular welfare.

Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advo

cated extinction of desire; Yang Chu yielded it free reign.

Lao

Tzu looked back to the simple societies of extreme antiquity as his
ideal.

Consequently his and Chuang Tzu's influence has been a

negative one, retarding economic growth, as has been Lieh Tzu's
fatalism and antipathy to the man-made.
The Mohists resembled the Confucians in their ethical bent
their emphasis on economic equality and the division of labor.
They differed from the Confucians in their statism and extreme
utilitarian1sm.
Kuan Tzu was the first Legalist and also an economist of great
historical

influence.

A commoner, he spent his youth in trade.

As chief minister of Ch'i his policy was to achieve wealth and
power (fu ch'iang) for his state.

Confucius approved of him.

Kuan Tzu disapproved of taxation because it weakened the
wealth of the people and caused them to dislike government.

In

stead he favored a national monopoly on sale of salt, iron, forest
products and ores to meet governmental expenses.

In the case of
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salt he could take advantage of
Ch'i's control of the coastal salt
pans to exact monopoly profits
from its sale in foreign as well
as domestic trade.

Since even

housewives and farmers had to have
a certain amount of iron, a gov
ernment monopoly on iron and other
ores was bound to be profitable,
even though its processing and
manufacture was left in private
hands to disguise the state's
monopoly profit and hence obviate
popular resentment.
The state should also, ac
cording to Kuan Tzu, monopolize
the trade in grain whose price
Fig. 3

ment.

Kuan Tzu (Ming illus
trat ion.

would be kept steady by judicious
buying and selling by the govern

Its profits from this trade would allow lower taxes and also

control the prices of other goods which bear an inverse relation
ship to the price of grain.

In addition, the quantity of money in

circulation ought to be kept in proportion to the amount of goods
for sale so as to keep prices stable.
The mass of the people must be left no alternative to agricul
ture which is the ultimate basis of the state's wealth and power.
Trade is the other pillar of the state's power.
tracts the world's merchants,

If a state at

it can control the world's politics.

The sumptuary regulations Kuan Tzu had Ch'i establish were not to
denigrate merchants (as was the motive of Han and Ming) but to
avoid jealousy among the different classes.
The object of foreign trade was to amass cash by exporting
goods in short supply elsewhere, in Ch'i's case salt and iron.
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Profit from trade could be used to buy abroad goods which are in
short supply at home and thereby attract more people to the state
by making life there more comfortable.

Foreign trade could also

be used to trick other states into activities unprofitable to them
and their subsequent poverty used to attract their people to one's
own state.

This was to use knowledge of the laws of supply and

demand to achieve political profit.

By artificially jacking up

prices of grain, all the surplus grain from smaller nearby states
could be drawn into Ch'i, thereby causing famine in these countries
even in good crop years.

Later reformers made profitable use of

Kuan Tzu's economic principles, though most later thinkers were
blinded to his insights by their own prejudices against commerce.
Li K'uei

(470-380 B.C.) was a Wei civil official noted for his

economic ideas.

He is said to have greatly increased agricultural

productivity by discouraging exports and by keeping prices level
through government granaries' buying and selling countercyclically
according to elaborate calculations of average consumption patterns.
He greatly influenced Shang Yang who was born in Wei while Li's
methods were in use.
Applied in Ch'in, Shang Yang's methods made it the most power
ful of the Warring States.

These methods involved encouragement of

agriculture by establishing private property in farmland, propor
tioning taxes to productivity, encouraging migrants from abroad to
open new land, and keeping merchants' activities under strict con
trols so that they could not exploit farmers.
Han Fei had little to say on economics.

As a student of Hsun

Tzu, he believed that human nature was evil and primarily sought
profit and hence he emphasized legal controls over this instinct.
The agrarians, like Hsu Hsing and his disciple Ch'en Hsiang,
celebrated the virtue of simple agricultural labor for aristocrat
as well as commoner.

They would declare all goods of equal value

in their homogeneous collective agrarian society.

Mencius, their
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contemporary, criticized them for not recognizing the reality that
different goods do in fact have varying values and hence prices.
No complicated civilization could avoid chaos in applying their
theories.

Nevertheless, their emphasis on the dignity of labor was

wholesome and it is regrettable they have historically had so little
influence.
Yen Tzu of Ch'i, a contemporary of Confucius and representative
of the political school, shared his emphasis on ethical controls
over the state's economic activities but put even more emphasis on
frugality.
Merchants made a great contribution to ancient economic thought;
though little of their work has been preserved, except in the econ
omics section of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history.
Chi Jan lived slightly later than Confucius.

He held that

wealth was the basis of a state's military and hence political
power.

Famine should be anticipated and provided against.

He

foreshadowed modern Western theories of long-range economic cycles
with his assertion that famine could be expected every twelfth year.
Hence government intervention in the grain market could keep prices
from wild fluctuations.

Both government and private merchants

should sell goods when prices are high and buy them when prices are
low.

This, he argued, would stabilize prices and maximize the

wealth of both government and merchants.
Po Kuei believed in applying the strategic insights of Shang
Yang and Sun Wu to business.

In a good harvest year grain prices

will be low, Po reasoned, but because of high purchasing power
goods prices will be high.
grain and sell goods.

Hence the good businessman will buy

He should do the reverse in bad crop years.

The Economy's Metamorphosis
By this time Western Chou's extended family style of politi
cal organization had broken down, just as ordinary extended fam
ilies tend to fragment after the passage of three or four
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generations.

The most successful states now picked advisers for

their talent, not their family connections.

By Warring States

times centrally controlled regional governments began to replace
fiefs and sub-fiefs.

The 1,700-odd more or less equal fiefs of

Western Chou were consolidated into less than a hundred states, with
most of the power, economic as well as political, concentrated
among some ten of these.
These consolidations also assimilated most of the barbarians
within metropolitan China.

The nine "provinces" into which most

ancient documents divide metropolitan China (all of modern China
except Mongolia, the far southwest and Kwangtung-Kwangs0 were not
political units but natural economic units with a wide range of
climate, terrain and resources.

It was this wider China which was

now sinified and was to come under centralized imperial rule by the
end of the Warring States period.

The Land System and Agricultural Economy
In Spring-Autumn times land was still the most important re
pository of wealth and measure of political power.

As the land had

become concentrated in the hands of a few great states, it could
only be managed by dividing it into sub-fiefs whose rulers could
directly supervise and collect taxes from it.

This sub-fief aris

tocracy came to hold effective sovereignty over the land, and to
the peasants remained only usufruct over the land.

Without power

over the land the people could not be trusted to take interest in
cultivating the public fields and hence the well-field system
d i sappeared.
V^e may view Spring-Autumn's land system as a transitional one
between the well-field system of Shang-Western Chou and the War
ring States' free private land system.

Population increase was

pressing against the available supply of land.

More sophisticated

technology required greater expertise by farmers.

The rise of

manufacture and trade lowered the status of agriculture and allowed
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commercial wealth to gain control of land.
ward private property in land.

Hence the trend was to

Politically induced mass movement

of peasants from place to place broke old customs.

The shift from

taxes in labor to taxes on land also encouraged private property in
land.
This was happening to some degree everywhere and not just in
Ch'in where Shang Yang's reforms explicitly called for private
property in land.

Reformers like Kuan Tzu claimed that private

property in land was necessary to assure popular prosperity and
hence the popular obedience which was in turn the basis for a
state's political and military power.
Though most agricultural techniques in Spring-Autumn times did
not much differ from those of Western Chou, the seeds of the much
greater changes of Warring States times were present.

Iron was be

ginning to be used, and by the late Warring States era iron plows
enabling deep plowing were common.

It is not known, however, if

they were drawn by animal or man power.
Large scale artificial hydraulic works also became common and
were used to avoid both drought and flood.

Canals hundreds of

miles long connected important rivers and opened much new land to
agriculture.

Large dikes, built and maintained by farmers under

government direction, helped lessen flood dangers.
Human and animal manure was extensively used for fertilizer
by Warring States times.

The use of different crops on different

soils was also understood as was the correct time to plant various
crops.
During times of scarcity, grain was lent to the peasants from
the granaries of the rulers and aristocrats.

Kuan Tzu advocated

keeping up prices of grain to keep the peasants from being victim
ized by merchants and hence assure a strong agriculture.

He also

advocated strict controls by the government over those who lent to
farmers at interest.

Kuan Tzu wanted the government to keep track

of agriculture at all stages of production so that it could make
sure taxes were being paid honestly, have a quantitative basis for
estimating relief needs in bad times and could make sure rapacious
merchants were not monopolizing the grain supply, a danger to the
state should war break out.

Kuan Tzu also wanted the government to

maintain its own granaries for lending grain to the peasants before
harvests were in.

These granaries were to buy in the market counter

cyclically so as to maintain steady average prices.

Science and Technology
Pebbles and fingers were used for simple calculations in the
earliest times.

By Spring-Autumn times all of the simple arithmet

ical operations could be performed.

The casting of the milfoil

stalks is an early example of practical arithmetic.

Later, bundles

of sticks were used, with the sticks laid out to represent the
place values in a decimal system, and zero was represented by the
absence of a stick.
Military needs stimulated leather making for armor, the devel
opment of metallurgy and the design of machinery.

Specialization

increased the number and precision of the tools in various crafts.
By Warring States times workmen were no longer solely dependent on
their home states for employment, and this served to greatly stimu
late invention.
The coastal areas of Ch'i, Wu and Yen produced enormous aixDunts
of salt.

Prospecting for mineral deposits on the basis of the

surface soil's nature became a highly developed art.
was often used in the mines.
bronze implements.
for metals.

Servile labor

There were a wide variety of iron and

This indicates the existence of a great demand

Large labor forces were involved in smelting, and many

private fortunes were made.

Dyeing and weaving were also increased

in importance by the growth in population.
profits from its cloth exports.

Ch'i earned great
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Commerce and Money
Commerce flourished as the feudal system decayed.

In Spring-

Autumn times commerce had not yet much penetrated into the villages
but concentrated on supplying luxuries for the aristocracy.

There

were regular markets in the cities and interstate trade took place
but largely on a barter basis, though some metal money was in use.
Official salaries and taxes were usually paid in grain and cloth.
By Warring States times the use of money became much more
prevalent, but even then and for some time thereafter grain was
often used to pay official salaries.

During the Warring States era

lending at high interest was prevalent in urban as well as rural
areas and even the state engaged in it.

The search for wealth

became ubiquitous, and writers like Ssu-ma Ch'ien asserted that the
lust for wealth was part of human nature, though he and other
moralists deplored this and eventually forced the lust for wealth
out of reputable men's overt ambitions.
Ch'i had the most developed commerce of the Warring States era,
and this was based on its earlier preeminence in trade.

Naturally

well endowed with resources and having a large population, it also
had benefitted from Kuan Tzu's reforms.

Agriculture, weaving, and

salt manufacture were its chief activities and the basis for its
commerce.

Ch'i merchants were numerous and rich enough by Kuan

Tzu's time to rival the state in power.
In Ch'u, in addition to agriculture, metal mining was well
developed, especially of gold.
swords.
ores.

Ch'u was also famous for its iron

Its commerce was based on its gold, iron, copper and tin
Commerce in Eastern Ch'u (formerly Wu) became well devel

oped, based on salt and copper.

Western Ch'u was well placed to

serve as a transit area for commerce.

Southern Ch'u's commerce

in hides, wood, pearls, and other commodities was funneled up to
the middle Yangtze commercial centers of Shouch'un and Hofei in
modern Anhui province.
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Ch'in originally had a purely agrarian and herding economy
which served as the base for its commerce.

Its extensive and natur

ally well defended territory had easy riverine communications with
the states to its east and with the barbarians on its other sides.
Hence it enjoyed a great transshipment trade in all directions.
Though Shang Yang's reforms had placed commerce secondary to agri
culture, his third-century B.C. successor, Lu Pu-wei, was himself a
rich merchant who encouraged trade and under whose auspices was put
together one of the most useful practical compendia of the era.
The First Emperor later deposed Lu, lumped merchants with criminals
and exiled both to the frontiers.
Small, crowded, and with few natural resources, the state of
Lu nevertheless had an extensive commerce based on cottage industry,
especially weaving.

This was even truer of the Eastern Chou ter

ritory centered around Loyang, the greatest commercial center.
The economy of Yen and Chao was centered around agriculture
and salt manufacture.

Yen traded with Ch'i to the south and with

the barbarians of Liaotung to the north.

Teng could trade with

Ch'i to the east, Chou to the west and Ch'u to the south.

Its

merchants operated all over metropolitan China.
Commerce remained less important quantitatively than agricul
ture during Warring States times, but in certain places, as in Ch'i,
it was of considerable magnitude.
Although metal money was present in Western Chou, only in
Spring-Autumn and later times did a three-tier money system become
elaborated.
jade.

The most valuable objects were precious stones and

The next tier was formed of uncoined gold.

Rare in Western

Chou, it became more common in Spring-Autumn times and was plenti
ful enough to be used as the accounting unit in interstate trade
by the Warring States era.

The most numerous money was cast in

bronze, most often in the shape of a knife, though other shapes
were used in different states at various times.

Eventually,

pierced round bronze coins became most
common, and strung together they remained
the dominant smali coin all through the
succeeding imperial era.
Credit appears along with trade and
usually predates money, but it receives
its full development only when trade and
money are flourishing.

The earliest ref

erences to credit involved the lending of
grain by both state and private creditors.
By Warring States there is evidence of
credit for both consumption and capital uses.
Communications
The states of Eastern Chou times,
though spanning two great river valleys,
enjoyed increasingly regular communica
tions.

By Warring States timeseven the

states of the Yangtze valley were in ever

Money

closer touch with the states to the north.
Frontiers with the barbarians to the north and south were pushed
out to virtually the points held during most of the succeeding im
perial era.
According to the Chou Li. roads and bridges were supposed to
be maintained by the officials and trees were to be planted by
their sides.

The people were supposed to maintain rest houses at

intervals along them.

With some exceptions these regulations were

observed during this time.

Armies

required

main in the field for any length of time.

supply routes to re

The Golden Ox Road

(chin niu tao ) between Shensi and Szechwan was built by Ch'in as
part of its conquest of Shu.

It is said but not proven to have

been a covered road, a new type of road with a kind of wooden roof
over it for protection against landslides and erosion in mountain
country.

45

Privately operated hotels appeared by Warring States times for
the convenience of traveling merchants.

Postal rest houses for

official couriers (on foot, riding chariots or later on horseback)
existed and by Warring States times accommodated travelers as well.
There were several canals big enough to carry boats and hence to
serve transportation needs in several places along both major river
valleys.

They were also used for irrigation.

Horseback riding was the most significant improvement in trans
portation methods.
Autumn times.

According to Han Fei, it was present in Spring-

By Warring States times the adoption of barbarian

costume greatly increased the efficacy of cavalry which became
numerous, much reducing the importance of war chariots.
ian wheeled traffic became much denser.
boat from Ch'in to Chin.

But civil

Grain was being shipped by

During the Warring States era, on one

occasion Ch'in sent large boats down the Yangtze from Szechwan,
each carrying fifty men and three months' provisions.
ed 300 j_i_ per day.

They travel

The overseas voyages of the Ch'in dynasty were

made possible by Warring States era connections with Southeast
China and Vietnam developed during Ch'u's earlier expansion to the
South.

Tax Systems
Tax rates were increased over the 10^ which the traditional
sources say was constant from Hsia through Western Chou.

In

Spring-Autumn times rates varied, and reached as much as two-thirds
of the crop in some states at some times.

Mencius accused the War

ring States rulers of imposing taxes like brigands.

The rulers

themselves recognized that taxes were getting out of hand.

With

the spread of trade and money it became possible to begin to col
lect land taxes in cash.

In the Kuan Tzu, tax receipts were al

ready calculated in cash and later on in Wei were actual ly col lected in cash.
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Mercantile taxes were already a significant part of Ch'i's
revenues in Kuan Tzu's time.

Frontier taxes were important enough

for Mencius to also complain about them.

The number of tax col

lectors increased significantly as did the percentage of taxes
which they kept for their own enrichment.

Hence it was possible

for both the people and the state treasuries to be simultaneously
impoverished.
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Section V
THE FLOURISHING PERIOD: CH'IN-HAN

Outiine
The 438 years from Ch'in through Eastern Han represents the
culmination of the trends of the Warring States era as first crys
tallized by the Ch'in empire.

The new national economy establish

ed by Ch'in might have progressed indefinitely but for the excessive
burdens Ch'in placed on the people and which led to its overthrow.
The economy remained in confusion for five decades after Ch'in's
fall, but by Emperor Wu's time the
new forms of a national economy
had been restored under Han
auspices.

Wang Hang's reforms,

rational though they were, were
too badly executed to succeed.
Eastern Han's economy was pat
terned on that of Western Han,
but ultimately was hampered by
its narrower sphere of control.

The Economic Successes and Fail
ures of Ch'in Unification
Even in Warring States times
the competing powers realized the
inefficiency resulting from their
political and military quarrels
and the resulting lack of stand
ardization of weights, measures,
and written languages, and they

Fig. 5

Han Wu-ti (Ming
i11ustration)

made tentative attempts at unity in such matters.

Hence the unity
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the Ch'in conquest imposed completed a natural process already under
way.

By formally abolishing the old states and ordering mass mi

grations, Ch'in undermined both local patriotism and the basis for
the old aristocratic system.

It separated political from economic

power whereas feudalism had conjoined them.

Private property in

land and capital were now clearly distinguished from public admin
istration.

Regional

systems were removed.

impediments to the road, waterway and monetary
Gold was established as the standard of value

and round bronze cash was settled on as the standard ordinary cur
rency.
Although its changes proved to be irreversible over the long
run, over the short run Ch'in placed itself in the position of
enemy of its own people.

Aside from the enormous casualties of the

wars of unification and then the wars on the frontiers, there were
many lives lost in the great building projects of the new dynasty.
Taxes rose precipitously to pay for these projects and to support
the large number of government servants who were not directly en
gaged in production.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien estimated that half the popula

tion was ready for rebellion by the last years of Ch'in.

Hence

even the uninf1uentia1 commoner Ch'en She was able to set off a
local rebellion which quickly engulfed the entire empire.

The Unification and Extent of the Ch'in-Han Economic Realm
In size Ch'in was midway between Shang-Chou and Sui-Ch'ing
China.

Its 40 chun and 800 hsien were the local and regional

economic centers.

Han was of comparable size, but its administra

tive units were more various to accommodate the quasi-feudal res
toration which accompanied Western Han, and they were also more
numerous at the most local level.
Thirty of Ch'in's forty chUn were conquered from its rivals.
Han's boundaries extended past Tunhuang to the northwest and into
northern Korea in the northeast.

The forcing of the Hsiungnu out

of the northwest in Wu-ti's time was expensive in both blood and

■>
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treasure and had to be repeated with varying degrees of success
several times during the next few centuries.
of the Hsiungnu was eventually assimilated.

The southern branch
Sinkiang was held dur

ing the latter part of Western Han but lost during Eastern Han.

The Policy of Emphasizing Agriculture After Han's Unification
A number of writers all through Western Han advocated concen
tration on agriculture.

Farming had been disrupted during Ch'in's

unification wars and the disorder which accompanied its fall.

Some

Western Han writers advocated the forcible return of vagabonds to
the land.

Some called for more indirect measures, such as accept

ing grain as payment for government grants of perquisites to the
rich and as fines to avoid punishments.

This would allow the gov

ernment to reduce the land tax in kind, leaving more grain in the
hands of the farmers.
Early Western Han saw many imperial exhortations to encourage
agriculture, and special officials were appointed in each prefec
ture for this purpose.

For a time taxes were reduced to 1/15 and

later to 1/30 of the crop.

Population growth was encouraged by

calling for earlier marriages and fining spinsters thirty years or
older.

Rural security was encouraged by urging people to sell

weapons and buy oxen.

Five years of free rent on government land

was offered to those without land, with the option of then return
ing to their native place without penalty.
A number of new types of specialized iron tools came into gen
eral use with government encouragement.

Notable among them was the

ox-drawn plow which greatly increased productivity but also render
ed agriculture vulnerable to plagues affecting cattle.

Poor famil

ies and regions were still dependent on hand-drawn plows.
New planting methods came into use.

One was planting in

straight lines in the depressions between furrows and pushing the
furrows into the depressions as the plants grew so as to reenforce
their roots against wind and drought.

Another was planting in
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regularly spaced square depressions so as to facilitate irrigation.
The latter technique appeared in Eastern Han.
Several great irrigation canals were built under state aus
pices, including one near the capital over 300 j_i_ long which took
several tens of thousands of men three years to build.

The amount

of irrigated land and hence productivity increased significantly.
In addition to measures to encourage population growth in gen
eral, Han moved large numbers of people, especially workmen and
rich merchants to the capital so as to build up its population base
for defense purposes.

In addition, criminals and paupers were

transported to the frontiers to help guard against barbarian incur
sions.

But periods like Wu-ti's thirty years of war drastically

reduced the population, as did Wang Mang's usurpation.

Eastern

Han's population never qu<>)te rose to the level of Western Han.
After Wu-tl's time, the proportion of land which fell

into the

hands of rich men and officials greatly and steadily increased and
so did the number of poor landless peasants.

Through grants of

public and uncultivated land as well as by encouraging migration
the government tried to alleviate this problem but without signif
icant success.

Scholars like Tung Chung-shu advocated limiting

private estates and the number of their tenants and dependents,
but the disapproval of estate owners was too great for such poli
cies to be carried out.

Wang Mang's attempt to restore a pure

well-field system ended in disaster.

Some later scholars, ad

mitting the impracticality of the well-field system, called for
restricting right over land to usufruct, abolishing the right to
buy and sell land.

During Eastern Han the garrison fields system

was extensively used within the country as well as on the fron
tiers, partly to curb rebellion and partly as a system of rural
relief.
Farmers incurred short-term loans in seed, implements, oxen,
foodstuffs and money from the state.

The latter engaged in coun

tercyclical trade, but less (so said the critical Confucians) to
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stabilize prices than to assure adequate supplies for its frontier
outposts, thereby reducing supplies for the interior of the country.
Hence countercyclical trade was abolished soon after its introduc
tion in the first century B.C.

Some local officials illegally lent

government funds at interest.

Long-term loans were more indirect,

usually involving the grant of public lands to the impoverished
with a term of tax exemption.

Grants of forest and marsh lands to

villages were also made to encourage a wider range of crafts.

Han Science, Technology and Management of Manufacturing
Mathematics flourished.

The use of fractions was understood.

More exact values of £_i_ were calculated.

Earlier works on mathe

matics were collated, and several new ones embodying some new meth
ods of calculation were composed.

Chang Heng invented a device

which could detect the presence and direction of earthquakes.

He

is also said to have invented a mechanical bird which could fly.
But the society of that period gave no particular encouragement to
inventors.

A hand-operated waterwheel for irrigation was invented.

Doctors practiced surgery using wine as an anaesthetic.
silk and paper were invented.

Damask

Wall and palace building was done

on a great scale, beginning with Ch'in and continued by Han.

Im

perial tombs were so large and so richly furnished that construc
tion of an emperor's tomb had to begin upon his ascent to the
throne.
used.

Decorated and inscribed

tiles and bricks were extensively

True porcelain probably appeared by Han, based on techniques

which had been evolving since \hang, now supplemented by glassmak
ing techniques for adding the glaze which probably came from West
Asia.

The word for porcelain did not, however, appear until Wei

and Chin times.
Industry was not as well developed during Han as in late War
ring States times.

This was especially true of the salt and iron

industries which became state monopolies in Wu-ti's time.
precedent limited the land tax.

Dynastic

Hence military expenses to fight
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the Hsiungnu could only be raised through the profits from these
monopolies.

Adminstrative abuses limited the state's profit and

jacked up prices, but these abuses do not prove the principle of
state monopoly was wrong.

The state also maintained large estab

lishments of artisans in both the capital and provinces to supply
the palace with luxury goods.

For a time the state even maintained

a monopoly over the manufacture and sale of wine but eventually
settled for a sales tax instead.

Han Commerce and Money
Commerce soon recovered from the bad effects of the decade of
civil war which followed Ch'in's fall.
market.

Han unity opened a national

Salt and iron dealers became as wealthy as the nobility

and, according to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, grievously exploited the people,
in part through manipulation of currency which was privately coined
without state control.

Private trade reached its peak in Wu-ti's

time and then inexorably declined as Wu-ti conscripted merchants
and their capital

into service of his military campaigns rather

than let the merchants make great profits out of such activities
as was earlier done.

Wu-ti's successors favored agriculture over

commerce, as did Wang Mang and his Eastern Han successors.

Mer

chants were now compared to robbers and were blamed for rural pov
erty, though in fact they were not powerful enough to cause such
mischief.
money.

One writer went so far as to advocate the abolition of

Western Han's overt repression of merchants was less ef

fective in limiting commercial growth than the pervasive contempt
of Eastern Han which became the norm thereafter and had much to do
with China's eventual failure to continue to progress economically
into the industrial age.
Sang Hung-yang, a high fiscal official of Wu-ti's court, was
responsible for the state monopolies in salt, iron, and alcoholic
beverages, and a scheme for a centrally administered wholesaling
operation which bought and sold countercyclically.

It replaced
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the former merchant-dominated system for forwarding tribute to the
capital.

But the state's needs for funds and collusion between

officials and merchants sabotaged the system's countercyclical aims
and hence obliged most of the people to sell cheap and buy dear.
In the famous debate on salt and iron in 8l B.C. Sang argued
that frontier defense against the Hsiungnu required the revenues
from these monopolies.

Internally, the monopoly system supported

such aids to agriculture as hydraulic improvements.
possible necessary imports.

It also made

The resulting increase in commerce

made all goods more generally available and hence raised the level
of life of farmers as well.

Sang's Confucian opponents in the de

bate argued that his policies actually undermined agriculture, the
fundamental occupation, which ought to be directly supported.
chants can only profit by buying cheap and selling dear.
means,

Mer

This

the Confucians argued, that the people must sell cheap and

buy dear.
the people.

Hence the merchants'

interest runs counter to that of

The state monopolies obliged the state to adopt the

merchants' methods and hence exploit the people.

Indeed, they

argued, private merchants would still profit excessively as govern
ment purchases would tend to drive up prices.

They also opposed

government controlled coinage as more harmful to the masses than
free private coinage.

Buying off the Hsiungnu would be cheaper

and less harmful to the domestic economy than expensive attempts
to conquer them.

The virtues of a true king, they concluded, would

ultimately evoke a virtuous response even from barbarians.

Con

versely, if the state seeks profit so will the people who will be
drawn into nonfundamental activities.
And yet Sang's policies must be judged a success.

They sup

ported the frontier wars and made possible domestic relief.

Wang

An-shih approved of them and so did Sun Yat-sen.

Unfortunately,

when Wu-ti died. Sang lost his chief protection.

The opposition

of the Confucians and his own family's speculations brought about
his execution and that of his family.

Commerce took place in political centers, centers of produc
tion, communications junctions, and foreign trade centers.

Emperors

encouraged the natural tendency for men of wealth to settle in the
capital, Ch'angan, lest they get into mischief in the provinces.
Ch'angan lost its earlier commercial predominance when the capital
was moved to Loyang.

Ch'engtu was Szechwan's commercial center and

an important foreign trade entrepot.

An official of Wu-ti‘s reign

said that his greatest regret was not ever having seen Ch'engtu,
ample testimoney to that city's great development.
lived and were buried like aristocrats.

Its merchants

Lintzu in Shantung was

noted for its wealthy salt manufacturing houses.
was over 300,000 even in Warring States times.

Its population
Loyang was a great

communications junction even before it became Eastern Han's capital.
When Chang Ch'ien visited Ta Hsia in West Asia he found Chin
ese goods already present there, but the policies of Wu-ti and his
successors greatly increased China's foreign trade in the course of
the many wars against the Hsiungnu.
came from Central Asia.

New plants, like the grape,

China was in indirect touch with Rome

through Persian merchants.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus sent a mis

sion to China via Annam and attacked Persia in an attempt to open
direct links to China.

There was also trade with India, Korea and

Japan.
Han nominal feudalism (su feng) gave the revenue of a terri
tory to its nominal ruler but political power to a centrally ap
pointed official.

Because such rulers were more interested in

profit than wholesome government, they allowed merchants to become
powerful enough to make high profits from trade within these fiefs
and by charging high interest to poor farmers within them.

Up un

til Wu-tl's reign Han permitted free private coinage in the fiefs
which was dominated by merchants and officials.

Wu-ti banned such

coinage, though it continued illegally for some time.
Ch'in's dual monetary system (gold and bronze) was modified
by early Han to allow free coinage because the excessive weight of
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Ch'in money proved inconvenient.

But the new coins were too various

and usually too light to maintain their face value.

Initial govern

ment attempts to replace these coins with standard government issue
were not successful.

Finally, after experiments with coins of vari

ous weights of metal, Wu-ti managed to issue a coin of sufficient
value and convenience to stay in circulation and was able to ban
local coinage and collect and melt down all unofficial coins. Aside
from a period of monetary confusion during Wang Mang's usurpation,
this coin remained standard all through the Han.

Han Communications
Wen-ti had abolished the requirement for travelers to show
passes at boundaries, thereby freeing communications on the network
of official roads which had been begun in Ch'in times.

There were

guard stations on these roads every ten 1i, each with a five-man
garrison.

In all there were 29,635 such stations by the end of

Western Han.
1i♦

Rest houses with spare horses were placed every thirty

Private parties could use these facilities by payment of a

fee.
The Yangtze was navigable downstream from Szechwan east, and
from its middle sections east easily navigable in both directions.
There were transport canals in the lower Yangtze region and others
connecting Ch'angan with the Yellow River.

By Wu-ti's time ship

ping was using the Gulf of Chihli to Korea and the northern fron
tier.

The coast route from Chekiang to Fukien was also in use.
Overland, indirect communication with Rome was possible, and

direct links with Japan and with India via Southeast Asia were
opened.

Wu-ti had fleets of tower boats in the northeast and off

the coast of Chekiang.

He annexed the areas of modern Canton and

Hanoi as trading outposts, and Chinese were trading as far as
Madras in India, though apparently not in Chinese vessels.

The

throne closely supervised this trade through eunuch overseers.
Traders came from as far away as the Red Sea and by late Eastern
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Han an envoy from the Roman empire came to Loyang.

Contact with

Japan brought that country out of the Stone Age by Eastern Han
times, and migration of Chinese from Korea in the Three Kingdoms
period gave the Japanese a genetic connection with the Chinese race.

The Han Tax System
There were four kinds of tax:
tion, and miscellaneous.

land, artisan-merchant, capita

Kao-tsu reduced the land tax to 1/15, but

this was an idle gesture as the central government was not yet pow
erful enough to get local authorities to forward much of the tax
they collected.

Hui-ti reduced it to 1/30, at which level

it re

mained for the rest of the dynasty, except for a short time at the
beginning of Eastern Han.
All men from age fifteen to fifty-six were liable to pay the
capitation tax in cash.

Some rulers reduced or waived it, but

others increased it from its standard rate of 120 cash.

Hui-ti

ordered merchants and slaves to pay at double the normal rate.
Wang Mang put a head tax of 3,600 cash on slaves.

Originally males

from age seven to fourteen were to pay twenty cash which Wu-ti
creased to twenty-three.

in

In addition there was a tax in lieu of

labor and military service of 300 cash paid by males from the age
of twenty (later twenty-three) to fifty-six.
Prior to Ch‘in-Han times commerce was insufficiently developed
to require a very complex tax structure.

During Han commerce was

heavily taxed, particularly the salt and iron trades but also wine,
commercial carts and boats, and commercial capital.
lower the high Ch'in tax rates.

Han did not

Wu-ti placed the salt and iron

trades under state management where they intermittently remained
thereafter.

For a short time Wu-ti collected twenty cash as tax

for each 1,000-cash string issued by government in payment for
goods so as to put some of the tax load onto profiteering mer
chants, but this proved too difficult to collect.
evidence on the short-lived liquor tax.

There is little

Taxes were also levied on

market stalls and on yoods crossing local government boundaries,
the latter designed to pay the maintenance of border guards.
Miscellaneous taxes were of little importance.
capital was 120 cash per 10,000 cash of capital.
creased it to 10^.

The tax on

Wang Mang in

There was also a tax of twenty cash per thou

sand on the value of livestock, a tax on money lent at interest,
one on fish caught, and one on official property lent to the people.

Contrast of the Good and Bad Aspects of the People's Livelihood
in Han Society
The Ch'in oppression was followed by a decade of chaotic civil
war which disrupted agriculture and the crafts and reduced city
populations by 70^.

After Liu Pang won out, he proclaimed a gen

eral amnesty and encouraged refugees to return to their homes by
urging local officials to treat them leniently.

Hence by Wen-ti's

reign, Han's golden age had begun, aided by the court's frugality.
Officials practiced magnanimity.
Abundant harvests kept grain
prices low and life in the village
peaceful.

This early Han pros

perity continued up to Wu-ti's
ascent to the throne, a period of
some seventy years.

The eighty

years after Kuang-wu's restora
tion of the dynasty, though good,
were not as perfect as the earlier
era of prosperity.

Hence of Han's

AOO years, only seventy can be
considered truly prosperous.
Wu-ti had to fight the
Hsiungnu for thirty years.

East

ern Han was never free of wars
against the Hsiungnu, Hsien-pi,
or the Yi rebels in the Southwest.

,
Fig. 6

.
/...
Han Kuang-wu (Ming
illustration)
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The nomadic Hsiungnu had inherent military advantages over the ag
ricultural Chinese.

Hsiungnu raids devastated agriculture, requir

ing expensive relief operations and expensive support for defense
armies sent to the north.

In some parts of North China, where draft

animals and horses had been plentiful, horses were now conscripted
and fields left to waste as the population declined.
saw barbarians settle in Chihli and Shansi.

Eastern Han

An Eastern Han writer

describes harvesting being carried out by women and girls, the
horses and men all

having gone west to fight the barbarians.

The subtropical climate and difficult terrain of the South
were alone sufficient to cause high casualties among the unacclimatlzed northern troops.

Men died of poisonous plants and insects

before they ever saw the enemy.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien judged that all the

taxes of Szechwan were insufficient to finance a successful cam
paign against the Southwestern Yi.

But such sacrifices were neces

sary to keep these and the northern barbarians from overwhelming
Chinese culture.

They made possible sinification of the South and

maintenance of contact with Central Asia, Korea and Japan.
Wu-ti's desperate attempts to raise revenues for these foreign
wars encouraged official corruption.

By Eastern Han official

positions were as a matter of course being sold to raise money.
Unscrupulous rich men bought offices as a way to make still more
money.

In the process they diverted money and talent from legiti

mate commerce, thereby helping delay China's evolution of an in
dustrial economy.

This noxious custom began under Wu-ti as did

the practice of allowing the well-off to buy absolution from crimes
by contributing grain to the state.
mined public morality.

These abuses greatly under

By late Eastern Han office buying had be

come so ubiquitous that even able men who had demonstrated their
talents had to buy their positions.
public life or committed suicide.

Many of the best men left
A contemporary aphorism went:

"Straight as a sage, die in a ditch; crooked as a hook, enfeoffed
as a duke."

The gap between rich and poor grew wider and more
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obvious.

We know that such a society must be on the brink of revo

lution.
From Wu-ti's time on luxury grew ever more conspicuous from
the Court on down.

If the emperor kept a thousand women in his

harem, an aristocrat would keep several hundred and a rich commoner
several dozen.

By Eastern Han moralists were complaining about

there being 5,000 to 6,000 women in the imperial harem and the bur
den they placed on taxpayers.

One Eastern Han ruler placed a surtax

of ten cash on each mou of land to finance palace building.

Imper

ial tombs required tens of thousands of laborers, used up much
valuable agricultural

land, and took years to build.

Rich merchants

lived and died with a scale of expenditure commensurate with that
of the great aristocrats.
For commoners, the time of peace and plenty ended with Wu-ti's
thirty years of war and the accompanying rise in taxes, conscrip
tion and exploitation by the great merchants.

The pressure of

foreign wars let up for a time under Wu-ti's immediate successors,
but before long the consequences of domestic corruption were impov
erishing the masses as much as before.

Within a century after

Eastern Han's inauguration famine and banditry were rife.
The official Han histories abound with references to slaves of
various types.

Government slaves were usually criminals or war

prisoners or palace eunuchs and servants.
freedom restored by the state.

They could have their

Private slaves were usually sold

into bondage during hard times and worked as servants for rich
households.

They usual ly remained servile.

The sources allude to

tens of thousands of slaves in Court service and great families
holding hundreds or even thousands of servile retainers.

Since

most did not take part in production, the loss to the people's
livelihood was significant.
"it is nevertheless likely that only a small proportion of
the total Han population was of servile status (EHK).

60

The Economic Disaster of Wang Hang's Hsin Dynasty
The ideological and political ferment which led to Wang Hang's
usurpation had its roots in the increasingly unsatisfactory econ
omic situation since Wu-ti's time even though the outward forms
this ferment took in Wang's hands were expressed in terms of yinyang and five-elements superstition.

Born in kS B.C. the nephew of

an empress, Wang and his family dominated the court during the reigi
of his cousin. Emperor Ch'eng, and he was brought up in the palace
by his aunt.

He stood out as a scholarly and modest exception to

his family's otherwise licentious behavior.

In 8 B.C. he became

head of his family and the dominant power at Court.
A.D. he ruled as emperor of his own Hsin dynasty.

From 9 to 23
Pretending to

rule as a sage in imitation of Shun, Yu and the Duke of Chou, his
power actually rested on the women of his family, and he was pre
pared to use bad means to achieve his ostensibly noble ends.

His

superstitious practices eventually alienated the Court, and he was
without effective support when the Liu clan challenged him militai
ily.

He was particularly condemned for his lack of a constant

policy.

He not only frequently changed officials and their titles

but also the money system, impoverishing thereby the merchants and
artisans.

He was also accused of excessive taxation and encourag

ing official corruption as well as of engaging in ruinous and un
successful foreign wars.
Wang's military adventures flowed from his egomaniacal refusal
to acknowledge that any border people could remain outside his
sovereignty.

He stirred up the enmity of the Hsiungnu after they

had been quiescent for more than a generation and had allowed
peace to return to the northern frontiers.

His ten years of war

in the north and his campaigns against the southwestern barbarians
were both unsuccessful and economically ruinous.
Wang's monetary policy was the most conspicuous example of
his economically disastrous policies.

His frequent changes in the

value and style of the currency were designed to fit his own
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abstruse theories and not
the actual needs of the
people.

Hence despite

strict punishments, his
coins did not circulate
and were replaced in prac
tice with illegal private
coinage.

His twenty-eight

different denominations
of money eventually evoked
contempt, the more so as
his attempts to coerce
their use were impossible
to enforce.
Wang's land reform
went well beyond what had
been called for by earli
er reformers, a simple

Fig. 7

Money during Wang Mang's reign

limitation of the size of private holdings, and by fiat he nation
alized all land with the aim of restoring the ancient well-field
system.

Private sale of land was forbidden.

or fewer men could hold more than 900 mou.

No family with eight
Surplus land along

with government land would be distributed so that each family (one
man and one woman) would get 100 mou.

Slaves, relabeled "private

dependents," (ssu shu) could no longer be bought and sold.

Vio

lators of these edicts were to be exiled to the farthest frontiers.
But violations were numerous from the first.

His critics objected

that private landownership was now too deeply established to be
overturned even by a Yao or Shun.

Within three years Wang was

obliged to back down.
Wang also imposed excise taxes on salt, iron goods, liquor
and a variety of other goods.

For grain lent to the people, 3%

per month interest was to be charged.

Wang's aim to displace
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private profiteers was admirable, but he failed because he and his
local officials had to rely on these very profiteers to administer
the policy.

Wang's government and he himself were also covetous.

He accumulated enormous amounts of gold in his treasury.

But be

cause his administration was too disorganized to pay salaries regu
larly, officials were tempted to practice corruption.

Wang's in

ability to enforce his harsh punishments only brought his whole
regime into discredit.

f
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Section VI
THE AGE OF TROUBLES: LATE HAN, WEI, CHIN, SOUTHERN AND
NORTHERN DYNASTIES

Out!ine
This period of over three centuries was largely one of dis
order and disunity.

Agriculture and commerce suffered.

increased and became still more unjust.

Landlordism

In the southern dynasties,

the politically powerful great landed families dominated commerce
and manufacture as well as agriculture.

The barbarian invasions of

the north threw that region's economy into disorder, left many agri
cultural areas desolate and ultimately evoked the Hsienpi's re
sponse of instituting the equal-fields system.

The Late Han Military Disorders and Socio-economic Vicissitudes
Refugees fleeing the barbarian attacks in the north were
caught up in the consequences of the Yellow Turban revolt and the
various local uprisings linked to it.
and agricultural areas devastated.

Communications were blocked

The political battles in the

capital involving the eunuchs and then Tung Cho's usurpation dev
astated the entire region surrounding Loyang.

To cope with local

disorder, the great landed families organized private armies and
the empire was divided into warlord satrapies, with all loyalty to
the central authority soon dissipated.

Even nominally loyalist

local armies were privatized in the course of these local wars.

IT

#

Enormous numbers of refugees fled the Yellow and Huai River ...
valleys into the lower Yangtze, Szechwan and southeastern Man
churia.
lords.

Many came as dependents, virtual serfs, of great land
Others went into hitherto unsettled frontier areas and

remained out of the control of the southern dynasties for a

>.
4
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considerable time.

In 157 A.D. the population was 56,500,000.

By

280 it was only 16,000,000, though this did not include refugees,
bandits, local armies and others.

Registered agricultural land had

been reduced to one-fourth of the peak Han level.
the Huai valley were totally depopulated.

Whole regions in

The destruction and

emptying of cities, cutting of roads, and Tung Cho's unsuccessful
recoinage all helped paralyze trade and manufacture.

Soldiers in

the local armies were recruited from among ex-bandits, barbarians
and ordinary commoners.

They became professionals, hereditarily

limited to the military life and hence unavailable for productive
labor or taxation.

The number of those of servile status grew

enormously, and they were now used largely for agricultural work.
This continued to be the case until the T'ang.

The Three Kingdoms' Economy
The late Han famines had driven up the price of grain.

Hence

each of the three kingdoms which succeeded Han placed great empha
sis on economic policy as the base for securing their rule.

In

the north, Ts'ao Ts'ao successfully used the military colony sys
tem.

Commoners either volunteered or were conscripted to work

public fields under the supervision of afmy officers.
agricultural official

The chief

in each locality reported directly to the

Ministry of Agriculture, by-passing the local officials.

The

numerous refugees of the north were easily recruited for these
military colonies.

Government funds were used to purchase draft

animals and finance irrigation works.

The soldiers used in these

military colonies gradually merged with the civilians and good
order and a slowly increasing population resulted.
Shu-Han and Wu lacked this system.

Shu-Han was sufficiently

prosperous and its government received enough revenues from the
salt and iron trades, so that it did not require the military
colony system.

Wu constituted a natural economic unit.

Politic

ally it was dominated by a few great landowning clans at whose
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sufferance the Sun clan ruled.

Hence its government lacked the

power to institute military colonies.
The lines of commerce between the three states remained open
as each lacked products the others could provide.

Shu traded across

its southwestern boundaries, and its silk reached as far as the
Roman empire.

Though Wei's commerce was the least extensive of the

three it did trade with the Hsienpi and the Japanese.
extensive domestic and foreign trade.
Roman merchant came to its shores.

Wu had an

On at least one occasion a

There were complaints that lux

ury goods were so numerous in Wu as to interfere with the produc
tion of necessities.

Wu's fleet was large and had a greater variety

of vessels than Han.

Unable to match Wei's land power to the north,

Wu used its fleet to expand its commerce and territory to the south.
Vietnam, a part of China since Han, contributed a variety of prod
ucts.

Sun Ch'Uan, Wu's ruler, probably learned much about South

east Asia from the Roman merchant whose name was transliterated as
Ch'in Lun, though unfortunately the emissary who accompanied the
Roman back home died on the way.

Nevertheless, after putting down

a Vietnamese rebellion. Sun used Vietnam as a base for a ten-year
long naval expedition which used vessels capable of holding one
hundred men each and which may have reached as far as India.

An

expedition numbering 10,000 armored men was also sent to Taiwan
in 230 A.D.
records.

This is the earliest mention of Taiwan in Chinese

Another, but unsuccessful expedition was sent to the

Phi 1ippines.
The severe decline in population in Wei made it impossible to
collect the traditional 1/30 land tax, even though it was official
policy to base the state's revenues on agriculture rather than
commerce.

The tendency was to shift from a field to a household

tax, a system perfected by Western Chin.
tax so as to stimulate production.

Wu also reduced the land

Like the other two, Shu also

had a special class of officials to collect the tax in grain.
Metal money, debased by the several political authorities.
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no longer circulated effectively and was replaced by grain and
cloth.

Wei attempted to make grain and cloth official money, but

when insiders monopolized these commodities, it was obliged to re
issue Tung Cho's unsatisfactory coins.

Shu issued a similar coin

and Wu one twice as heavy which was recalled because it failed to
gain circulation.
Liu Hui, who lived either in Wei or Chin times, calculated the
circumference of a circle by inscribing ever more many-sided poly
hedrons within a circle.

He also developed a method for indirect

measurement of height and distance.

Liu-Sung's Tsu Chung-chih Im

proved on Liu Hui's calculation of jpj_ as 3.1^» to arrive at the
accurate figure of 3.1^15926, a degree of accuracy not matched in
the West until Valentinus in 1563.
The Chin Economy
Chin relaxed Wei's legalist controls and allowed free rein to
the great clans who monopolized land and servile labor and also
much of the coinmerce, including the lucrative trade with Southeast
Asia.

Their wasteful style of life, epitomized by the "Pure Talk"

group, established a pernicious model for gentlemanly behavior for
the next millenium and more.

The military colony system was taken

out of military hands and placed under local officials who took
over

70^ to 80^ of the crop and thereby became great landlords.

Members of other influential and rich clans could use their politi
cal power to control the scarce supply of labor and their wealth to
buy up land the price of which had been driven down by the shortage
of labor.

Each commoner family was supposed to be allotted 100 mou

of land in lifetime usufruct.
Field and household taxes were combined on the assumption that
each household of equivalent size had the same amount of land.

But

as there is no evidence that Chin ever so distributed land, one may
assume that this system was followed because it was easier to count
households than to measure land.

Though there is no hard evidence
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on the weight of taxation, Ma Tuan-1 in is likely right in judging
such a system to be harder on taxpayers than a tax directly on the
land.

This system also encouraged keeping large households to

gether and hence gave a tax advantage to great clan estates over
small peasant holdings.

Partly to compensate for this, Eastern

Chin collected a higher tax, a larger proportion of which was placed
directly on the land, but the great landowners could still dodge
most of their tax load.
Though commerce revived with the Chin unification, it again
slumped in the north with the renewed barbarian invasions.

The

south's commerce continued to thrive, and with Eastern Chin the
political center moved to coincide with this new southern economic
center.
Japan.

Trade relations were maintained with Central Asia and
An anonymous late third-century ironic "Paean to the God of

Money" (ch'ien shen 1un) whose product, cash, substitutes for all
the moral virtues, testifies to the spirit of the times when the
lust for wealth dominated even the court.

Such selfishness was a

natural reaction to the decades of chaos since late Han.
The Southern Dynasties' Economy
Eastern Chin's successors. Sung, Ch'i, Liang, and Ch'en, all
had their capitals in Chienk'ang [Nanking].
were taxed.

Hen rather than land

Hence household registers were very important.

tocratic tax avoidance heavily burdened the masses.

Aris

In one ten-

year period during Ch'i, the number of those on the tax registers
dropped by nearly half.

Yellow (bamboo) registers were kept for

those who had migrated from the north in Eastern Chin times. White
(paper) registers were for southerners.

Southern aristocrats

eventually got themselves transferred to the yellow registers
which carried more privileges, while commoners were shunted to the
white ones.

Ch'i and Liang continued to collect taxes according

to the population.
taxes on land.

Ch'en (557-89) shows evidence of basing its

This was the source of the tax system of T'ang.
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From Eastern Chin through Ch'en, transactions made by contract
had to pay ^00 cash tax for each 10,000 cash worth of business done,
with 300 paid by the seller and 100 by the buyer.
without contract paid a

tax.

Transactions

Sung had a tax of 10^ on fish,

firewood, and other items which was very burdensome.

Ch'en had a

wine tax and Sung a liquor tax.
The imperial clans of these dynasties took a direct role in
the commerce of the major cities.

Their officials followed suit,

as did the great landed clans in their nome areas.

Yangchou, to

become the chief economic center of T'ang times, was already very
important.

Canton was a rich entrepot for foreign trade.

wan's Yichou was also very prosperous.

Szech

Trade with Southern and

Western Asia was more extensive than in Han times and could regu
larly use the southern sea route as could the continental South
east Asian trade.
Pawnbroking, based on precedents going back to the SpringAutumn era, appeared in Ch'i times.

Ch'i used monasteries as its

agents for refugee relief in times of famine and flood.

Such re

lief work also got monasteries involved in pawnbroking, though not
initially for profit (as was the case in T'ang-Sung secularized
pawnbroking) but rather as a service to poor commoners.
Sung issued the first dated coins but was unable to come up
with a coin of appropriate weight to forestall private coinage.
For a time private coinage was legalized, but this only led to
still more debased coins.
coins.

In early Liang only a few cities used

Liang's official coinage started in 502, was unsuccessful

and was replaced by a still more unsuccessful iron coinage in 523By 556 the state legalized the circulation of old coins as well as
its new bronze issue.

Early Ch'en continued this practice, but

its coins were rapidly melted to make private coins of lighter
weight which circulated at the same face value.
cy continued in use, especially in the south.

Commodity curren
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The Northern Dynasties' Economy
Han Kuang-wu, the founder of Eastern Han, had invited the
southern branch of the Hsiungnu within the frontiers.

Their north

ern branch was later driven west into Europe by the Hsienpi. Even
tually the Southern Hsiungnu became the dominant force in the
northern frontier provinces, though they were increasingly sini
cized.

During the fourth and fifth centuries they and four other

barbarian groups succeeded one another in an irregular series of
sixteen kingdoms holding various parts of the north.

Their incur

sions completely upset the agricultural land system, especially
during the first generation of invasions.
south were set off.
darkest confusion.

Great migrations to the

The period from 383 to ^39 was the time of
Not only was agriculture thrown into chaos, but

all the major cities were destroyed and their merchant inhabitants
fled south.

Trade virtually disappeared from the north for over a

century, as did the use of money.

Money was not coined again until

Northern Wei and did not come into general use until late in that
dynasty.
The old Han clan structure was also destroyed and hence the
social structure imposed by the Toba peoples of Northern Wei dif
fered greatly from that of southern China.
The Buddhist church became a great social force, strong enough
to avoid taxes, for the first time during the Sixteen Kingdoms era.
Where Southern Liang had 2,846 temples, Wei and Northern Ch'i had
40,000.

The number of monks and temple fields grew inordinately.

Northern temples became as privileged and profit seeking as south
ern landed families.

By the time of Northern Ch'i's Wen-ti, monks

were said to be more numerous than laymen.
begin to lessen until Sui.
to avoid taxes.

Their numbers did not

Many monks took the tonsure as a way

Aristocrats also used this device.

The equal-fields system was the basis for Northern Wei's
ability to reunify the north, just as the military colonies enabled
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Ts'ao Ts'ao to so do earlier.

The equal-fields system was the most

successful version of the kind of reforms Confucians had been urg
ing since late Han.

The ultimate Confucian aim, however, had been

to restore the ancient well-field system, whereas the Northern Wei
system appears never to have had such pretensions.

Unlike the

other barbarians. Northern Wei had earlier established its own
version of the military-colony or garrison-fields system.

This

later served as the base for the equal fields, first established in

485.

Every adult male, free or unfree, was to receive forty mou,

every woman twenty mou.

A family would also receive thirty mou for

each ox it possessed, up to four oxen.
prime quality land.
greater amounts.

These figures refer to

Less desirable land would be distributed in

Additional land was to be distributed for growing

mulberry, hemp and for home sites, though less of the latter was to
be given to unfree people.

Only these latter types of land could

be kept in perpetuity. The rest was to be returned to the state for
redistribution at age seventy.

Mulberry land was to be sold should

it come to exceed a family's quota.
Ma Tuan-1 in believed this system was designed less to cut down
the power of great landed families than to attract farmers to de
populated areas.

Northern Ch'i and Northern Chou used variants of

the Wei system.

Northern Ch'i limited the number of unfree persons

each officially ranked aristocrat could enroll for land distribu
tion.

Northern Chou distributed more land per person and had no

regulations for unfree persons.
During the I50 years from Northern Wei through Northern Chou,
the equal-fields system revived agriculture and enabled the north
ern dynasties to exceed the southern dynasties in wealth and power.
Northern Wei continued to use the garrison-fields system as well.
Aristocrats could maintain and even expand their holdings through
grants of equal fields to their unfree dependents and animals.
Officials also got land grants, and larger ones than commoners.
The pao-chia system of local government was linked to the equal-
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fields land arrangements.
Before the equal-fields system, taxes may have risen as high
as 80!^ on occasion.

Aristocrats avoided taxes which were assessed

by household rather than by field.

Under the equal-fields system

taxes were also assessed by head, using the population registers of
the pao-chia system, but these were difficult to keep accurately.
To meet government crises, taxes were often collected in advance.
From Northern Chou on the trend was toward assessing the taxes on
land.

By late Northern Chou those without land were not to be

taxed.

The northern dynasties' market taxes were light.

Salt and

iron were intermittently left free of regulation during Wei but in
the end made a significant contribution to state revenues.
Commerce not only failed to develop but actually regressed
after Han.

Many areas were reduced to barter as only the old Han

coins remained to circulate.

After 298, as north and south came

into closer contact and life in the north became more secure, com
merce revived.

During Northern Wei Loyang revived as a great econ

omic center, comparable to Chienk'ang in the south.
wrote of Loyang's marketplaces:

A contemporary

"Whatever the central lands lack

is all brought from the western frontiers."

This foreshadowed the

great international trade of Sui and T'ang.

Official coinage first

began again in the north in 495 but had great difficulty competing
with private coinage.

Northern Chou fell before it could fully re

place Northern Ch'i's coins with its own still not fully accepted
coinage.

I
►
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Section VI I
THE AGE OF REESTABLISHMENT: SUI, T'ANG, AND FIVE DYNASTIES

Outiine
The period from 58O to 755 witnessed the economic equivalent
of a dynastic revival.

The following period, from 756 to 96O, was

one of renewed warfare and consequent reversion to economic depres
sion.

The preceding Six Dynasties era had been a period of regres

sion, the localized economies of the great landed estates somewhat
resembling the manorial economy of late antiquity in Europe.
The Sui-T'ang restoration was worthy to be called a golden
age.

Nevertheless, though quantitatively greater, it did not,

economically, represent a qualitative advance over the centralized
agrarian empire of Han.

During Sui-T'ang times a reinvigorating

mixture of Chinese with northern barbarian blood and customs oc
curred.

Sui's enormous expenditures on public works give evidence

of the size of the treasury available to it.

These public works

made possible T'ang's economic revival.
The An Lu-shan rebellion was the economic watershed of T'ang.
The period prior to this was one of prosperity and cultural ef
florescence.

After the rebellion, despite a new tax system, the

former prosperity was never quite recovered.

T'ang's tenure was

extended for a century, but it was succeeded by the disorder of
the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.
The Influence of Taxation Methods on the Chinese Economy
Sui did not last long enough to evolve a distinctive tax sys
tem.

T'ang, in its first generation under T'ai-tsung and again

after 755» made notable changes.

T'ang reestablished the equal-fields system.
version had disintegrated by Sui times.

Northern Wei's

Under the T'ang system 20%

of the land allotments were permanent; the rest reverted to the al
lotment pool at death.

Taxes were assessed by head rather than

directly on the land and paid in kind in grain, cloth, and labor
(twenty days per year, twenty-two days in years with intercalary
months), and the latter could be partially or totally commuted into
an additional tax in cloth.

If twenty-five days of service were

required, other taxes were partially remitted; if thirty days, all
other taxes were remitted.

Service was never to exceed fifty days

annually.
But this system presupposed the success of the equal-fields
system.

The elite undermined this system by amassing too much land

through imperial grants to officials and favorites, buying up the
alienable 20% of allotments, and having land allotted to aristo
cratic dependents and, consequently, the tax system had eventually
to be changed.

The tax load on the fewer people who remained out

side the tax-avoiding great manors became inordinately high even
before An Lu-shan's rebellion added its burden to rural life.
Yang Yen, the creator of the double-tax method, came from an
old scholarly family in Shensi.

In addition to instituting the

double tax, he kept revenues from going into the emperor's private
treasury and clearly separated the imperial household expenditures
from the state's fiscal administration.

Talented but inhumane, he

persecuted his rivals in office and was himself driven from office
and then killed on his way to exile.
Under the double-tax system, instead of collecting taxes dur
ing the eighth or ninth month, they were now to be collected in
two installments, in the sixth and eleventh months, and local and
capitation taxes were to be subsumed in these two installments.
These taxes were not assessed on households because census regis
ters had been too greatly disordered by the An Lu-shan rebellion,
but rather in proportion to the amount of cultivated land in each
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district.

Despite opposition from those used to the centuries-old

former system, the new arrangement succeeded in returning fiscal
power from the regions to the Court, though it required periodic
modification, including a sharp rise in the quantity of commodities
to be paid as taxes in kind so as to make up for a fall in commodi
ty prices.
Lu Chih, the new system's leading critic, argued that the old
system had much clearer criteria:

possession of fields by a clear

ly defined household having men of the proper age.

Capital, the

basis for the new system, was much harder to measure precisely be
cause it could be more easily hidden.

As the tax was calculated in

cash but paid in kind, the actual rate could vary with prices and
the honesty of officials at various levels.

Lu did not advocate

abolition of the reform but its modification, particularly the cal
culation as well as the assessment of taxes in kind, not cash, and
broader time limits for its collection.
Most later writers approved of the reform, Ma Tuan-1 in observ
ing that it was the only alternative to reestablishment of the
equal-fields system.

According to the principles of fiscal theory,

the double-tax system was simpler than the one it replaced, and it
was progressive because the amount collected varied in proportion
to the amount of capital an individual possessed.

It also treated

farmers and merchants equally, introduced the practice of taxation
in cash, and introduced something akin to modern budgetary controls
on the state.
Yang Yen was the first in our nation's history to call for a
precise accounting of government income and outgo.

He got Emperor

Teh-tsung to return to the early T'ang practice of putting tax re
ceipts in the Left Treasury, where they were accessible to bureau
cratic audit, rather than in the imperial treasury which was not
accessible to the bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, Yang's idea of a

budget was never put into actual practice.

The old assessment

rates were kept under the new tax system and were not regularly
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adjusted to accord with actual expenditures.
The Sui-T‘ang Land System and Agricultural Economy
Until late T'ang, a somewhat modified version of the Northern
Dynasties' equal-fields system continued to be used, but the system
was undermined by increasing dominance of the economy by the great
families and the monasteries.

Initially Sui had no difficulty ex

tending the equal-fields system to the south as the registered pop
ulation was at first small compared to the amount of statecontrolled and formally ownerless land.
T'ang restored the equal-fields system in 62k.

Its version

differed from earlier systems in that minors, unfree persons and
livestock were not granted land.

The amount of land distributed

was the same regardless of the size of the household, and a flat
20^ could be retained as private property regardless of the use to
which it was put.
in the system.

In 713 monks and unfree persons were included

Men of rank were allowed to keep as private proper

ty three to five hundred times more land than commoners.
tion, officials received large amounts of office land.

In addi
By mid-

T'ang over 14,000 official families qualified for such land and
their number was still growing.

Commercial, artisan families, and

unfree households qualified for half the amount of land granted
ordinary households.

Unfree households appear to have been re

garded as mere human capital, their lands actually belonging to
their masters.
The system broke down well before the An Lu-shan rebellion,
mainly because the long peace had allowed the population to grow
beyond the limited amount of land available for redistribution.
The amount of allotment land was reduced still further by aristo
cratic preemption.

Various forms of the garrison-fields system

were tried to restore a measure of equity in the use of those
fields still nominally under public control, but these lands
tended to be preempted by military officers by means analogous to
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those used by aristocratic civilians.
The T'ang manors resembled the Roman campagna or the estates
created by the sixteenth-century English enclosure movement, except
that management of the Chinese manors was more decentralized than
the latter.

The manorial system had originally developed out of

the old feudal economy, and though a portion of the peasantry was
now free, the great manors were so nearly self-sufficient entities
that the system still resembled an offshoot of a feudal economy.
The structure of the system was exceedingly complex.

Nominal

ly there were public and private manors, but many of the former
were actually the private property of the imperial family, though
managed by public officials.

Cultivators were either fuii slaves

or tenants referred to by a number of labels incorporating the word
“guest" (k'o).

Absentee owners were represented by resident mana

gers, references to whom are still found in Five Dynasties and Sung
times.
Private estates were owned by officials, the relatives of the
imperial family, and military men as well as by great aristocratic
cians, ail of whom used their politically privileged positions to
amass more and more land.

Rents on these estates were as much as

ten times the tax rate on non-manorial land.

Private estates were

in part worked by sieves who could be bought and sold with the
land.
Buddhist and Taoist temple estates fell midway between the
status of private and public manors.

They enjoyed political priv

ileges, like tax exemptions, and were used as tax-avoidance insti
tutions by aristocrats and hence flourished despite periodic at
tempts by the state to limit their growth.

It was only after the

persecution of the 8A0's that temple manors went into decline.
Like feudal serfs, tenants on private manors owed iabor ser
vice as well as rent in kind to the lords of the manors.

Local

place names were often derived from the names of the owners of the
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local manor.
As rural prosperity returned during the early seventh century,
cooperative societies appeared as early as Sui.
was the Hsin-an Association in Anhui.

The first of these

There is no evidence that,

as one theory holds, such organizations originated in T'ang-Sung
times as a result of commercial and religious contact with India.
Sui Wen-ti also set up Righteous Granaries to receive contributions
of extra taxes from the rich to be used to relieve the poor during
bad times.

The system gradually lost its voluntary character and

by Sung-Yuan times became just another head tax.

Its level of ad

ministration rose from the village to the prefecture and hence be
came more remote from the people, more subject to corruption, and
less likely to actually carry out relief when needed.
The great development of commerce during T'ang resulted in the
spread of usury into the villages.

Peasants could lose their lib

erty as well as their land and moveable property to usurers.

By

manipulation of the rent of official lands, local officials also
participated in this usury.

From the late eighth-century attempts

were made to anticipate bad years and lend grain from government
granaries to the people.

Attempts were also made to limit the in

terest charged by private lenders, to remit debts after a given
time and/or a given amount over the original principle had been
paid, and to prohibit private lending.
Governrnent-run Ever Normal and Righteous Granaries were used
to mitigate usury, a network of the former being set up early in
the eighth century to attempt to keep grain prices level.

The

T'ang Righteous Granaries were financed solely by taxes and lent
grain at interest rather than merely providing relief as was done
during Sui.

These two institutions were all but ruined by the

An Lu-shan rebellion and never reached their potential because of
corrupt administration.
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Sui-T'ang Communications
It was an improvement in communications, the construction of
the Grand Canal, that made possible the new epoch of Sui and T'ang.
This new epoch is analogous to sixteenth-century Europe's new era
of commercial capitalism which was a consequence of the new commun
ications links with America.

In addition to international trade

routes, the Sui-T'ang economy drew great strength from the opening
of the Grand Canal.

The canal changed the context of the south's

economy.
In Han times still a region of much land and few people, the
south had developed greatly during the Age of Disunion, and the
Grand Canal further stimulated its commerce to make it the dominant
commercial region by T'ang-Sung times.

Running north to south, the

canal linked the great natural waterways flowing from west to east.
The two Sui emperors connected the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers,
and early in the ninth century the canal was extended south to the
Hangchou region.

The canal made possible adequate supplies for

Yang-ti's invasion of Korea.
The canal made possible use of the south's resources to support
the capital in the northwest.

The amount transported increased

from 200,000 tan to over 7 million tan every three years by the
eighth century.
Road building was also energetically pushed, notably an
eighth-century road linking Canton with Yangchou to facilitate for
eign trade.

A network of eight major trunk roads fanned out from

Ch'angan to each major region, with post stations at regular inter
vals.

As the roads were originally designed to transmit military

news, these post stations were administered by the Board of War.
These stations were equipped with spare horses, or boats along
waterways, and could house and feed messengers and officials in
transit.

There were 1,639 stations, placed every thirty 1i.

Private travelers were not supposed to use the system.

There were
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seven major routes leading across the frontiers to the northeast,
northwest and southwest.
$ui-T'ang Commerce
Sui Yang-ti greatly valued the products imported along the land
routes from Central and Northern Asia.

Three major routes branched

off from Tunhuang reaching by land and sea to the Mediterranean.
The diplomatic preliminaries to trade with Japan were initiated.
By the end of the seventh century T'ang had reduced much of
Central Asia and Korea to tributary status.
these areas filled the great city markets.

Traders and goods from
Unfortunately, at the

local level, the anti-commercial practices of the great manors
hindered the full commercialization of the countryside.

Canton,

filled with Arab and Persian vessels from the Persian Gulf, was the
great foreign trade entrepot.

Much of the trade with Japan origin

ated in Yangchou and proceeded by way of the coast to Liaotung and
Korea.
The south played a more important role than the north in for
eign trade.

In the south, Chinese silk was exchanged for precious

stones, ivory, and other commodities; in the north tea was ex
changed for animal products.

Since the first century foreign ves

sels had given up the coastal routes for direct runs across the
open sea, taking advantage of the seasonal monsoons.

Chinese

vessels had been trading with the Persian Gulf at least since the
fifth century and dominated the trade as far west as Ceylon.

Chin

ese settlers were beginning to appear in Southeast Asia.
Politics and economics mutually influence each other.

Up

until mid-T'ang a laissez-faire policy was followed; thereafter
policy turned anti-commercia1 and economic development was hindered.
The early T'ang military victories helped secure commerce,
particularly with Central Asia.

Commercial law became more form

alized, with penalties prescribed for not using standard measures
and attempts to set up monopolies.

Contracts were required for
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the sale of slaves and livestock.

These laws, far more detailed

than those of earlier periods, were retained in later eras.
T'ang entered a period of decline after the An Lu-shan rebel
lion, with the central government losing much of its power to re
gional warlords who often passed their power on to their children.
Such local particularism hindered communications and hence commerce.
The wealth of south China could no longer be funneled into the
north.
The weakened central government resorted to confiscatory taxa
tion of commercial capital.

Merchants viewed the tax collectors as

bandits and trade was stifled.

Forced sales to palace officials at

arbitrarily low prices ruined even small merchants and artisans in
the capital.

The limited excise taxes associated with Ever Normal

Granary operations were replaced by excessive direct excise taxes
after the rebellions ruined the old system.
The state supervised only the larger markets serving areas
with 3,000 or more households, but many smaller markets at river
fords and other natural trade junctions flourished.

The structure

of commerce grew more complex, with warehouses and shops now more
formally organized under private auspices.
The major cities were the capitals, Ch'angan and Loyang, Pienchou (K'aifeng) at the confluence of the Yellow River and Grand
Canal, Yangchou at the confluence of the Yangtze and Grand Canal,
and the great seaports Canton, Chiaochou, Ch'Uanchou and Mingchou.
As the capital, Ch'angan was the communications hub, and Sui
Wen-ti restored to it the glories of Ch'in-Han times.

Though

virtually barbarized during mid-T'ang by the large number of for
eign merchants residing there, the city recovered by late T'ang
from the wounds of An Lu-shan's rebellion.
Loyang was rebuilt by Sui Yang-ti, using two million corvee
laborers each month.

He moved several tens of thousands of mer

chants there from all over the empire.

It was the secondary
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capital in T'ang and Sung times.
Yangchou was the most flourishing city, the entrepot of the
seacoast salt trade, the communications link between north China
and Canton's foreign trade, and hence the residence of many foreign
merchants.

The city suffered much during the late T'ang troubles,

and though it remained important during Sung it never recovered the
primary position it held during T'ang.

It was also an important

manufacturing city, noted for its bronze, cloth, hats, wood imple
ments and cane sugar, the latter product first imported from India
in T'ai-tsung's time.

In addition to being the chief junction be

tween the Yangtze and Grand Canal, it was the temporary capital in
Sui Yang-ti's time and was much celebrated for its beauty and
thriving urban 1ife.
Canton was the main port for foreign trade.
idents were more numerous than those of Yangchou.

Its foreign res
Over 100,000

foreigners were said to have been killed there during the late
T'ang disturbances which greatly affected foreign trade.

Its com

mercial wealth made it a magnet for grasping local officials.
Sui-T'ang Science and Technology
Sui had bureaus specializing in such sciences as astronomy
and calculation of the calendar, and T'ang expanded them.

Mathe

matics was one of the six subjects taught in the T'ang National
Academy.

Mathematics reached its greatest degree of importance

during T'ang.

Definitive editions of the earlier mathematical

classics were compiled under state auspices.

A mathematics exam

ination was instituted in Sui times and continued by T'ang.
From India came the concept of zero (indicated by a dot) to
give place value to numbers, and the use of sand-boards to write
out calculations.

Scholarly pilgrims from Japan introduced Chin

ese mathematics into their new schools.

The long forms of Chinese

numerals for use in commerce first appeared in Sui-T'ang times,
not during Sung as was long believed.
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A water-powered armillary sphere was invented.

It revolved

once a day and indicated the passage of fractions of a day by
mechanical wooden men who beat on drums and bells.

This served the

same function as later Western clockwork mechanisms.
In addition to the great fleet of canal barges used in the im
perial progress along the Grand Canal, Sui technology was able to
build a great five-storied warship capable of carrying 800 soldiers.
The technique of carving words on boards was begun in Sui times for
imperial orders, and this represented the beginning of printing
technology which was applied directly to printing by late T'ang and
Five Dynasties times.

The great palaces built in Loyang were of a

size and complexity unknown since antiquity.
The scale of operations of individual workshops was no greater
than during Han.

In the cities, workshops of the same trade were

clumped together in particular districts known as hang, with the
workshops often both making and selling their products.
hang or t'ung-hang became a synonym for street.
twelve such hang.

The name

Ch'angan had

Within a hang each establishment had its master,

with apprentices and hired laborers working under him.

Each hang

had a head who led its members in religious worship and was its
representative before the government.
There were some large government and private business estab
lishments engaged in trades like weaving, dyeing and wine making
to meet imperial household needs.
large-scale state enterprises.

Mints and armories were also

Some of their skilled workmen were

conscripted for twenty-day annual terms from artisan families as
their share of the labor service tax.

Others were hired.

Some of

the less skilled workers were official dependents owing the state
fixed periods of service during a portion of each year.
The center of silk production tended to shift from the Yellow
River valley to the lower Yangtze during late T'ang as a conse
quence of the disturbances in the north.

Cotton, originally from
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Central Asia and South Asia, was becoming rather common.

The tech

nique of printing on cloth began during T'ang, and a variety of
special weaving and dyeing techniques were practiced.
Porcelain manufacture developed greatly in both north and
south China from its pre-T'ang roots.

Printing, of which an ex

ample from Tunhuang in 868 A.D. is still extant, was well developed
in the two capitals, in Szechwan, Yangchou and Hangchou.
Sui-T'ang Money
Sui Wen-ti's initial recoinage was successful.
of appropriate weight and honestly labeled.

The coins were

Systematic recovery of

old and private coins was made at all excise tax stations.

But bad

regional coinages, Yang-ti's devalued coins and a renewed upsurge
of private coining ruined the currency system by the end of the
dynasty.
T'ang's recoinage in 621 was initially successful, but the
dynasty was later plagued by competition from private coinage and,
from the ninth century, by a coin shortage.

Government edicts pro

hibited coin exports from the country and from individual prefec
tures.

It was also ordered that one string equal 850 cash rather

than the black market rate of 800.

None of these measures allevi

ated the ills of the monetary system.
“Flying money" was a system of mercantile notes of exchange
which evolved to get around the inconvenience of sending direct
cash payments over long distances and the prohibition against
sending cash across even regional boundaries.

Issued by large-

scale private interests and government treasuries, this flying
money was also known as “convenient exchange."
As these certificates gradually circulated more widely as a
substitute for ready cash, hard money disappeared from circulation.
When government edicts forbidding the use of this paper for money
were ignored, the state determined to monopolize its issuance.
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but the state paper cou d not command sufficient popular confidence
to effectively displace the private paper. This practice was the
origin of later banking institutions and "flying money" the equivalent of modern checks.
The Economy During the Age of Disunion of the Five Dynasties
The land tax was increased and collected ruthlessly to meet
the demands of military expenditures.

Despite periodic attempts at

reduction, taxes on salt and the raw materials for brewing wine
were also kept high and the death penalty exacted for black market
sales of more than a certain minimum of these items.
The political dislocations did not destroy trade opportunities.
Overseas trade continued from places like Fukien.

North-south

trade within China was also maintained, with southern tea being
sold in the north and used to finance southern military prepara
tions.

Hostilities, however, periodically blocked communications

within China.
Four of the five dynasties of the north had their capital in
Pienliang (K'aifeng), already a densely populated commercial cen
ter, and its walls were extended outward to accommodate its com
mercial growth.

Its riverine communications with the east and

south were also perfected.
Trade with northern barbarians like the Khitan and the Koreans
flourished.

There were formal horse markets on the former's

borders and trade missions to Korea to barter cloth for bronze.
The Nine Classics were printed under government auspices dur
ing the Latter T'ang.

Porcelain came into wider use.

As during late T'ang, bad coins continued to circulate il
licitly in the south.

In other areas, T'ang's old official coin

age still circulated, but private melting of these coins because
of the value of their metal content reduced their quantity suf
ficiently to hinder their circulation.

Melting of coins
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flourished despite government edicts forbidding the practice.
Society and People's Livelihood
Sui Wen-ti eased the burden of taxation on land, wine and salt,
and labor service.
istration.

Ma Tuan-1 in praises the frugality of his admin

Yang-ti completely reversed his father's policies.

His

Korean invasions, palace building, and construction of a great fleet
of enormous canal boats to transport the court so burdened the
nation that he was overthrown.
The casualty rate among his corvee laborers often approached
50%, and the agriculture of whole districts was in consequence

ruined for want of timely labor.

Yang-ti alienated even his

courtiers, who were mostly northerners with families and estates
remaining in the north, when he moved the capital to Yangchou and
abandoned the north to the numerous rebels who had sprung up.
Sui's fall was entirely due to Yang-ti's profligacy with the
people's wealth.
T'ang T'ai-tsung's humane administration established the basis
for the dynasty's prosperity,

Hsuan-tsung' s reign up until the An

Lu-shan rebellion was the most prosperous era of T'ang, looked
back upon with nostalgia by both poets and historians.

The poet

Tu Fu described the K'ai-yiian era (713-^2) as one in which both
public and private granaries were overflowing.

There were networks

of inns for the convenience of commercial travelers.
All this prosperity ended with An Lu-shan's rebellion and the
succeeding nine years of related uprisings.
drastically and communications were blocked.

Production dropped
The dominance of the

manorial system increased and the ruin of the equal-fields inten
sified,

The registered population dropped from A9,000,000 to

17,000,000.

The state sold increasing numbers of ordination cer

tificates for monks, gaining revenue over the short run but cut
ting its tax base over the long run.
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Though after 780 the refcms of Liu Yen partially restored the
state's finances, the earlier glories of T'ang were never fully re
stored.
In the midst of a great drought in eastern China, an ex-salt
seller named Huang Ch'ao raised a great rebellion in 875.
encompassed Shantung, Honan, Anhui and Hupei.

It soon

Eventually Huang

raided south to Fukien and Canton and then back up to the Ch'angsha
area.

Huang alternately fought and feigned negotiating his sur

render.

Failing to push north of the middle reaches of the Yangtze,

Huang moved downstream to Hangchow.

By 88O he had renewed his

strength and struck north again across the Huai to Loyang and, a
month later, to Ch'angan itself.

There he proclaimed a new dynasty.

Huang had acquired a spurious reputation for humaneness, but
once in the capital his bandits showed their true nature.
looted and filled the streets with corpses.

They

The T'ang emperor had

fled to Ch'engtu, but loyalist forces rallied, drove the discredit
ed Huang from the capital, but then began looting themselves.

This

allowed Huang to successfully reoccupy the city and impose a re
newed bloodbath on its inhabitants for initially welcoming the
T'ang forces.

By 883 Huang's own depredations had ruined his base

for supply, and a loyalist force led by Li K'o-yung again drove
him from the capital.

Huang escaped into Honan while the loyal

ists once again delayed pursuit to carry on looting, but by 885 he
was finally run down after causing a decade of chaos and the death
of some eight million persons.

Accounts of Huang's conquest of

Canton and murder of foreign merchants there even made their way
into the Arab histories.
The life of the people continued to be bitter during the Five
Dynasties.

According to one contemporary story, it would not rain

within a hundred JJ_ of the capital because even the rain feared
taxes and would not approach so close to the city.

Though no ac

curate figures are available, the evidence indicates that the pop
ulation continued to shrink as a consequence of the ongoing dis
order .
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Section VIII
THE AGE OF RENEWAL: THE TWO SUNG DYNASTIES
Outiine
The period from 755 to the fall of Northern Han in 978 was one
in which China was divided among numerous warlord states whose econ
omies varied widely.

The degree of economic development enjoyed by

any area depended on the degree of peace and good order imposed by
its government as well as on its previous level of development.
Hence Fukien, Canton, Szechwan, and the Ch'ien-t'ang region
(that southern part of the lower Yangtze centering on Hangchou) re
covered and prospered while Yangchou, which suffered repeated dis
orders after Huang Ch'ao's rebellion, continued in a depressed
state.

Much of the Yellow River valley also quickly recovered from

the late T'ang troubles.

The southeastern states were particularly

well insulated from the northern military disorders and their trade
flourished.
Pienliang (K'aifeng) became the great entrepdt of north-south
trade.

For this reason the Sung founder was obliged to use it as

his capital, as adequate supplies for the centrally controlled army
he created to end the Five Dynasties' cycle of military usurpations
could not be adequately accumulated at Loyang or Ch'angan.
Because of winter freezing, the main waterways were only open
half the year, and the Sung state carefully organized the trans
port system to compensate for this, sending salt from the north to
the south on what would otherwise have been the empty barges which
had been rushed north with the year's supply of southern grain.
Chenchou replaced Yangchou as the southern entrepot of the canal
network.
Northern Chou had melted down over a third of the Buddhist
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images, imported copper from Korea and forbidden the manufacture of
copper implements so as to gain enough bronze for its coinage.
Silver was also in extensive use as money.
The rulers of several of the states preceding Sung were close
ly connected with trade and the protection of trade.

The townsmen

of the Yangtze valley were demanding peace and unity even before
Sung reunited the north and realized it needed the supplies of the
south even to maintain itself in power in the north.

Hence Sung

was able to rapidly unify north and south.
Thereafter a monetary economy spread rapidly throughout the
empire.

Even the state's fiscal operations were soon monetized.

Both army and bureaucracy thenceforth were paid salaries directly
by the central government.

No longer, therefore, could locally

supported armies serve as the privileged base for warlord power.
The pre-T'ang decentralized bureaucratic powers were replaced by a
centralized fiscal, military and sovereign power and the bureaucracy
was professionalized.
monetization.

All this was the consequence of the economy's

Sung's centralization may be said to have been based

on popular demand for reform and for progress on the basis of peace
and good order.
The Current of Economic Thought of the Two Sung Dynasties and Wang
An-shih
The heart of Wang An-shih's famous reforms was his aim to en
rich state and people.

The twelve items in his reform encompassed

reform of the state structure, the state's taxation and social
controls over society, the military and educational systems.

To

understand why more than half of these items involved economic and
fiscal matters it is necessary to examine the background of the
age.
Sung's founder had accepted a weaker position on the frontiers
as the price for preserving central control over the armies and
thereby preventing the sort of coup which had originally given
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the throne to him and his predecessors during the Five Dynasties.
If Khitan suzerainty over the Yen-Yun territories of the north
had not been conceded, the dynasty might have had to flee south
much earlier than the second quarter of the twelfth century.
Emperor Shen-tsung (r. 1068-86), who smarted under the humilia
tion of paying tribute to the Khitan, viewed fiscal reform chiefly
as a means of amassing military power to avenge this shame.

The

fiscal demands on the Sung state were large and rapidly growing.
By Ying-tsung's time (r. 1064-67) there were over 24,000 officials
in the bureaucracy.

Military expenses in the north ate up two-

thirds of the budget which was chronically and drastically out of
balance.

The main reason for such chronic deficits was the in

equality in the application of the land tax and the consequent re
duction of the amount collected in taxes.
Edicts were unable to halt the trend toward concentration of
land in the hands of the elite, its avoidance of taxes, and what
some contemporaries described as the reduction of tenants to the
status of slaves, subject to whipping and private corvee.

Wang

An-shih took it as his task to reform this desperate situation.
Born in 1021 into an official family in Kiangsi, at the age of
nineteen Wang was orphaned and he, his mother and elder brother
were impoverished.

After his period of mourning, he passed his

chin-shih examinations, entered local office and won the patronage
of Ou-yang Hsiu.

Thereafter Wang rose steadily in office, con

tinuing to win the admiration and support of influential men like
Ou-yang and Ssu-ma Kuang.

By 1060 he was advocating better pay

for minor local officials as the basis for reforming fiscal policy.
Ying-tsung's short reign (1064-67) largely overlapped Wang's period
of mourning for his mother.
The new emperor, Shen-tsung, called him to Court in 1068 and
the next year, at age forty-nine, Wang became chief minister.

He

had the emperor's full support for the fundamental reforms he now
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proposed.

Wang's reorganization of the central fiscal agencies, his

equal tax and "green shoots" plans were begun that year.
By the following year massive opposition, led by such former
supporters of Wang as Ssu-ma Kuang and Han Ch'i, had begun, but
Wang forced these men into retirement and kept the now fearful em
peror on his side to begin the pao-chia and voluntary labor service
reforms.

In 1071 he converted the Broad Grace Granary fields into

capital for the Ever Normal Granaries and the following year re
formed the examination system and the national university.

The next

year he instituted the market exchange reform, horse-breeding system
and equal-fields tax reform, thereby completing the bulk of his re
forms .
In 1074 Wang temporarily left office as drought intensified
opposition to his reforms.

But his proteges maintained the reforms

and the next year he returned to power.

Within another year, how

ever, dispirited by the death of his son, Wang again left office af
ter over seven years in power and at age fifty-six was not again
to hold office.
Though in retirement, he retained the emperor's favor.

Nevei—

theless, Wang lived a simple life visiting monasteries, writing
poetry and editing the San Ching (Three Classics).

In IO86, an

guished at the death of Shen-tsung and at Ssu-ma Kuang's abolition
of the reforms, he took sick and died.

It may be said that he

never acted selfishly but rather for the public good, though he
did harbor resentment of his opponents to the very end of his life.
The nobility of his character and thought have always been vener
ated by posterity.
His goals were twofold:

first to enrich the state and

strengthen its armies, and second to encourage increased production.
Each goal was to interact with the other.

The base for all his

reforms was a new office he set up directly under the premier's
control to unify the hitherto separate three offices (revenue and
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population, budget, and salt and iron) which controlled fiscal pol
icy.

His aim was to make sure taxes were collected fairly, thereby

removing state-imposed obstacles to popular prosperity.
Within fifteen months, however, this fiscal coordinating re
sponsibility was returned to the secretariat (chung-shu-men-hsia,
the chief political authority of the central government) because of
the criticism of men like Han Ch'i.

Nevertheless, in this short

period it reduced waste by some k0%, something Ssu-ma Kuang had been
unable to do when in power at the beginning of Shen-tsung's reign.
The market exchange law was designed to remove the abuses com
mitted by the great shops established in the capital by rich mer
chants and aristocratic officials. First established in K^ifeng
and then in five other major cities, the market exchange offices
organized merchants into hang or guilds through which alone govern
ment purchases would be made.
were to be limited.

Interest rates on commercial loans ,

Though edicts had to be issued against exces

sive interest charged under the system, the fact that the rich
merchants opposed it indicates that it was of benefit to the poor
ones.
Wang's equal contributions law was similar to the reforms of
Han's Sang Hung-yang and T'ang's Yang Yen.

It attempted to modify

the requirement that regions send in the same tribute (i.e. tax in
kind) whether the year was good or bad.

It would do so by giving

a sum of cash and grain to the transport officials to use as capi
tal in buying and selling tribute goods within and among the six
major regions.

This would minimize transport costs and maximize

government receipts of taxes in kind.

This scheme was criticized

for encouraging official corruption which merchants could take ad
vantage of for profit, just as happened in Han Wu-ti's time when
the state attempted to buy cheap and sell dear.

But these were

not criticisms of the law, rather of the men who enforced it.
The "green shoots" law was designed to lend cash to the

9^

peasants in the spring and collect it back with interest in the fall,
using capital from the Ever Normal and Broad Grace granaries.

Bor

rowing was to be done by groups of ten households, with landlords
as the guarantors for their tenants.

No household was to be forced

to borrow and limits were set to the amount each category of house
hold could borrow.
terms.

Urban households could borrow on analogous

Five years after the system was begun the number of of

ficials supervising it in each circuit was increased from 200 to
500

so as to provide sufficient supervision and to minimize official

corruption.

The system lasted sixteen years in all.

It was de

signed to end the usury which had always been the chief inhibitor
of rural growth and prosperity.
Its critics argued that the interest rate charged amounted to
k0% annually in practice if not in law, and that such easy loans

constituted an unwarranted temptation to ignorant peasants to live
beyond their means.

Nevertheless, its early critics later called

for its reinstitution, proof of this reform's essential merit.
The field survey and equal tax law attempted to alleviate a
problem going back to the founding of the dynasty.

Ou-yang Hsiu

had asked for such a reform as far back as 10A2 and had actually
carried it out in a few localities.

The twelve years during which

Wang and his successors carried out half of this land survey com
pares favorably with the eighteen years taken for a land survey in
Napoleonic France.
Sung, like the many dynasties before it, called on the people
for a bewildering variety of labor service taxes.

These were for

both civilian and military tasks at the hsien and chou levels.
But the exemption of official, military and monk households en
couraged abuses and great hardship for those households unable to
obtain exemptions.

The better-off households which were respon

sible for such tasks were encouraged to split up or even turn to
banditry when ruined by the expenses of carrying them out.
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Wang's Avoidance of Labor Service law divided households of
property into five grades based on their wealth, and it imposed a
tax proportioned to their wealth in lieu of labor service.

Mon

asteries and official families were not exempted from this tax.
Men were hired to carry out the services with the revenues generated
by the tax.

An additional surtax could be collected to anticipate

flood or drought relief expenses.

In the greater K'aifeng metro

politan area, where the system was first tried, several thousand
men were hired to substitute for the former labor service.
Critics objected that well-off non-gentry households did not
benefit as much as the poorer non-gentry households by the indirect
subsidy the latter obtained when official and monastic households
were added to the tax rolls.

It was also argued that the men hired

were not as reliable as those formerly impressed into service, and
that the tax tended to not be effectively collected in bad years
whereas the old system had been enforceable even in bad years.

In

its favor, it may be argued that this was a progressive tax, capa
ble of increasing in proportion to the growth of the economy.
Wang also appointed officials to spread knowledge of irriga
tion and drainage techniques in each circuit.

Because he rewarded

these officials for concrete accomplishments, over 360,000 ch' ing
of fields were newly irrigated during his administration.
A guild exemption tax was also instituted in lieu of compul
sory contributions in kind to the Court by the various trades,
thereby ending, it was hoped, extortion of kickbacks by palace
servants.

The tea and salt trades were not much affected by the

reforms, having earlier been freed from government monopoly licensing.
In general, Wang favored free trade.

He increased the amount

of coinage by more than threefold and ended the prohibition on
manufacture of bronze implements and export of bronze cash.

That

these measures were opposed indicates the strength of reactionary
forces.
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Though Wang was unable to accomplish all his aims, his unques
tioned loyalty was reciprocated by Shen-tsung to the end.

Though

he was not able to much improve the lot of the people, the state's
resources were increased and these new resources were used along
the northern and southern frontiers more successfully than ever
previously.

That the reforms were basically in accord with the need

of the times is evidenced by their partial restoration even by such
opponents as Ssu-ma Kuang.
The reforms did run up against the interests of the great fam
ilies.

When Shen-tsung once observed that though the reforms dis

pleased the elite, they were of use to the masses, it was pointed
out to him that the elite were those used to govern the empire, not
the masses.

If before the reforms were instituted Wang had been

able to train cadres to propagandize them among the masses, he
would surely have been able to overcome the reactionaries.

Never

theless, his was a noble failure and his career a glorious page in
our history.
Land Distribution and Agricultural Credit Policies
Farming techniques did not differ from those of earlier times,
but credit and land measure methods did.

The first two Sung em

perors followed policies of tax abatement and agricultural relief
and thereby successfully raised the level of agricultural produc
tion.
Later emperors placed restrictions on the amount of land the
elite could own, but these laws proved unenforceable.

By mid-

Northern Sung tax-free elite estates comprised 1Q% of all arable
land.

The situation in Southern Sung was comparable and worsened

late in the dynasty.

There were official and imperial manors in

addition to privately held ones.

In late Sung many official manors

were sold to raise revenue for the state.
The agricultural population was divided into "master" and
"guest" households, the former being landed cultivators with a
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measure of capital, the latter being landless and often of servile
status.

In 1021 there were 6,039.331 master households and

2,638,346 guest households.

By 1080 there were 10,109,542 master

and 4,734,144 guest households, showing the increased degree of land
concentration in the hands of the rich and well-born. ^
•

The average household appears to have cultivated around 100 mou
in mid-thirteenth century and to have shouldered a heavy tax burden.
Guest households had to pay capitation taxes in addition to their
rent, and though they avoided corvee to the state they often had to
do various equivalent tasks for their landlords.
Wang An-shih‘s land survey was designed to measure all land,
grading it into five degrees of fertility.

Local residents were to

check the records, copies of which would then be filed locally as
the basis for levying taxes.

Ts'ai Ching, Wang's early twelfth-

century successor, claimed that these land records made it more
difficult for large landowners and local officials to cheat the
peasants in land sales and tax assessments.

The obsolescence of

these records by late Southern Sung contributed greatly to the de
cay of agriculturethen and the consequent fall of the dynasty.
Official fields had been accumulated from time to time by con
fiscation of the lands of disgraced officials.

In 1263 lands in

the lower Yangtze region held by private owners above the legal

Chou's figures, though they indicate an increase of
(from
43^ to 46^) in the percentage of guest households, may not neces
sarily support the point he wishes to make. The total number of
households in 1080 is so much greater than that of 1021 that it
must to some considerable degree reflect better reporting in 1080,
probabiy in part because of Wang An-shih's cadastral survey. Hence
the figures for the two dates are likely not sufficiently commen
surable to permit comparison of their component parts. Even for
the latter date evasion of population registration must have been
considerable. Cf. Ho Ping-ti, Studies in the Population of China,
1368-1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). pp. 26465. which notes that in 1102 20,000,000 households were registered
(a suspiciously large increase of more than five million over the
figures for I080), and that even this figure must be corrected for
"rampant" evasion of population registration. (EHK)
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limits were purchased to serve as public fields.

Chia Ssu-tao has

always been accused of corrupt practices in buying this land.

The

administration of the system does appear to have allowed confisca
tion of smaller peasant holdings despite its original aim of reduc
ing large estates.

Hence though it aimed to increase state reven

ues from the rents received and thereby bolster military prepared
ness, its actual effect was to accelerate the dynasty's decay during
the years just before the Mongol conquest.
The long-term bad effects of rural usury obliged the state to
devise policies dealing with rural credit.

Most of Sung's fiscal

resources were based on taxation of commerce.

Tax receipts from

overseas trade increased drastically during the dynasty, especially
during early Southern Sung.
In early Northern Sung there were complaints that only 20% to

30^ of the arable land was being cultivated and that tax receipts
were consequently barely half of what they should be.
rates charged by the rich were extortionate.

Interest

One tan of grain bor

rowed in the spring had to be repaid with two tan in the fall.
Labor service was so heavy as to drive many farmers from their homes
either actually or through forging of official documents.
The consequent rural poverty stimulated government attempts
at reform even early in the dynasty.

Attempts were made to use the

various civilian and military government granaries for seasonal
relief, but these schemes were all ruined by the corruption of lo
cal officials.

Wang An-shih's “green shoots" law and, during

Southern Sung, Chu Hsi's attempts to set up local cooperative gran
aries to remedy this situation were the forerunners of modern
agricultural banks and constituted a glorious page in the history
of our country's agriculture.
All the various schemes for state credit emphasized lending
seed grain or oxen which would directly contribute to increases
in productivity.

Attempts were also made to mobilize local private
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capital for relief through various kinds of government guarantees.
Attempts were made to limit or eliminate interest on loans to suc
cor disaster victims.
Wang An-shih's and Chu Hsi's plans were designed to eliminate
the official corruption which had ruined all earlier attempts at
agricultural credit reform.

The latter was an attempt by Chu to

transcend the urban limits of earlier official granaries (like the
ever Normal and Righteous granaries) by placing cooperative granai—
ies right in the villages and to correct the major flaw of the
“green shoots" scheme, its administration by remote officials, by
having these granaries administered by the local gentry.
Under the general supervision of the hsien, Chu's system
grouped households into units of ten and fifty, with a granary for
each fifty households.

The local gentry was encouraged to contri

bute a granary's initial capital.

Loans were to be made carefully

and only to those who actually needed help.
limited or abolished during bad years.

Interest was to be

When capital had been in

creased tenfold, the surplus was to be applied to public use.

Ul

timately, interest would be limited to three sheng per tan of grain,
or 3%Chu himself tried this scheme in one area for a decade and a
half.

He advocated its use nationally on a voluntary basis, with

no compulsion exerted on the part of peasant households to Join a
cooperative granary.

Chu's model was widely imitated during South

ern Sung, but with the passage of time this system too fell into
disuse.
Science and Technology
Sung was China's golden age of mathematics.

The earlier

mathematical classics were printed by the late eleventh century
and reprinted during Southern Sung.

There were several mathemati

cians whose treatises were also published.

The eleventh-century
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mathematician Liu Yi worked out the equivalent of “Horner's Method"
which was not achieved in the West until I8I9.

The Northern Sung

mathematician Chia Hsien did work similar to the trigonometry of the
seventeenth-century Frenchman Pascal.

Ch'in Chiu-shao of late South

ern Sung was the first to use the symbol for zero and the simplified
forms of the numerals now used in commerce.

He also improved on the

formulas of his predecessors for extracting roots of numbers.
Gunpowder, known by Sui-T'ang times, was used for military pui—
poses in early Southern Sung to make smokescreens.

A late twelfth-

century device used true gun powder to fling projectiles more than
two hundred paces.
A “south-pointing carriage" was used in
Han-Wei times, but a true magnetic compass was
first used for navigation during Sung and was
then transmitted to Europe by the Arabs.

Pi

Sheng invented movable-type printing in the
mid-eleventh century.

Foot-powered paddle

wheeled boats had been In use since T'ang, and
though they played a notable role in several
early Southern military campaigns, they were
not, unfortunately, taken seriously by contempora ries.
The rocket, now being used to explore the
universe, was invented in early Northern Sung
and used for military purposes.

It was likely

transmitted to the West by the Arabs in the
thirteenth century.
Fig. 8 A south
pointing carriage.

The term “fire arrow"

goes back to Three Kingdoms times but must
have then referred to arrows shot from a bow.

Fire arrows as true rockets could not have preceded the late T'angFive Dynasties invention of gunpowder.

The fire arrows described

in an early Sung and a Ming treatise on military technology are
unquestionably true rockets.

Fig. 9

Crossbows

Porcelain manufacture flourished in several famous kilns, such
as the Chiin in Honan, the Lungch'uan of Chekiang, the Ko of Hang
chou, the Ju of Honan, the Ting of Hopei and the various Kuan (or
official) potteries in Fukien and Hangchou.
The amount of tea drunk had increased prodigiously since the
introduction of the practice during T'ang.
varieties produced, some very expensive.

There were now many
The state taxed and mo

nopolized the marketing of tea through several regional offices.
Relatively free trade in the commodity was not permitted until
after the middle of the eleventh century.
There were several centers specializing in the production of
various types of silk cloth.
Communications
Sung's area was more constricted than Sui-T'ang's, but its
communications network was highly developed.

The main difference

was that Ch'angan was the hub of the T'ang road system andK'aifeng
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of the Sung.

The roads west to Kansu and Szechwan were essentially

the same, as were the roads heading east and southeast from K'a ifeng
The routes to the north, northeast and northwest differed somewhat
from T'ang's.

After Sung's flight south the north-south roads were

cut until later eras saw the restoration of unity.
There were oceangoing vessels operated by both Chinese and
foreigners capable of carrying loads weighing 300,000 chin.

Equip

ped with watertight compartments, carrying large crews, weapons to
ward off pirates and even equipment for measuring the depth of the
water, they could navigate by the stars, sun and magnetic compass.
Unlike T'ang whose overseas commerce was dominated by foreign
ers, Sung overseas commerce was increasingly dominated by Chinese,
especially in the Indian Ocean.

By Yiian times Marco Polo could

travel in a Chinese vessel to the Persian Gulf, and Chinese merchant
vessels occasionally reached as far as Madagascar and the Red Sea.

Commerce
The early Sung emperors were sympathetic to commerce, allowing
no tax increase on it and occasionally reducing taxes as well as
removing taxes altogether on minor items.

During Northern Sung

certain valuable imported goods (different categories at various
times) had to be sold initially to special government bureaus which
then wholesaled them onto the private market.
Temple markets were highly developed.

In K'aifeng, one

temple's market ground could hold ten thousand people and markets
were held there five times each month.

The markets of K'aifeng

were numerous, large, and in certain trades witnessed very large
transactions.

Tea and wine houses were numerous and many people

ate all their meals in such places, never eating at home.
remained open well into the night.

Markets

Goods, including bulk products

like grain, came by water from most areas of the country to the
capital's markets.

Dishes cooked in the styles of all regions of

the country were available in the restaurants of the city.
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Foreign trade flourished more than in any previous dynasty.
To Canton as an officially sanctioned port of entry for foreign
trade were added Ch'uanchou, Hangchou, Mingchou, and Michou.

Trade

was engaged in with Korea, Japan, continental and insular Southeast
Asia, and Arabia.

Exports included gold, silver, strings of cash,

lead, tin, various kinds of cloth, and porcelain.

Imports included

spices, ivory, coral, various precious stones, and tropical hard
wood s.
Both foreign and Chinese merchants engaged in foreign trade
were closely regulated.

Exports of armaments or goods capable of

being manufactured into arms were forbidden to places like Korea.
Though Northern Sung frequently fought with Liao and Western
Hsia, trade with these states nevertheless flourished during peace
ful intervals.

Each state established tax offices on their mutual

frontiers and these served as marketplaces where spices, ivory, and
tea were traded by China for precious metals, wool and horses.
Liao attempted to bar trade with Sung in commodities in short sup
ply domestically, such as horses and sheep.

Trade with Western

Hsia also flourished, so much so that Sung had difficulty limiting
illegal private trade by managers of the official markets.
Though the early Southern Sung emperors frequently reduced or
remitted commercial taxes to ease the burden on northern refugees
reestablishing themselves in the south, local and transit taxes
continued to be collected illegally by local officials to an ex
tortionate extent, putting a great burden on the poor and contri
buting to the ultimate demise of the dynasty.
The capital, Linan (Hangchou), became as great a commercial
center as K'aifeng had ever been, its avenues and lanes crowded
with shops.

Both official and private trade, involving export of

grain and manufactured goods in exchange for horses and tropical
products, flourished with the barbarian states of the southwest.

The Monetary System
Bronze money continued to be used, supplemented b^j^ilver and
paper.

After banning inferior coinage, the Sung founder in 971

circulated a bronze one-cash coin similar to the eighth-century
T'ang issue.

From T'ai-tsung's time on dated coins were issued for

each new year period (n jen hao).
Early in the dynasty, because of localized bronze shortages,
large iron coins were issued in Szechwan and Fukien.

To support

this currency for a time it was forbidden to import bronze coins
into Szechwan.

The Fukien iron issue was soon withdrawn.

A mid-eleventh century attempt to debase the coinage by adding
a large bronze coin worth ten cash and a small iron coin worth onethird of a cash to the issue stimulated forgery and inflation.

The

amount of bronze cash continued to decline during Southern Sung,
causing broader use of iron cash.
Gold was scarce during Sung and silver gradually replaced it
as a monetary metal, with taxes frequently being collected in sil
ver.

The silver "shoe" of fifty ounces and worth one hundred

strings of bronze cash became standard nationwide.
As a "shoe" was often split up in actual use, by 1197 a new
standard was devised with each ounce of silver being worth about
two strings of bronze cash, but by 1200 the practice of alloying
baser metals with the silver ruined attempts to use it as a stand
ard of value.

Nevertheless, the use of silver as a monetary metal

continued to become more popular during the thirteenth century.
Sung's use of paper money represented a great advance in the
history of Chinese currency.

In Szechwan paper certificates in

itially called chiao-tzu (but known by other names at various
times) replaced the heavy and inconvenient iron money.
tificate expired three years from the date of issue.

Each cer
Initially

they were issued by sixteen rich mercantile houses, but disorder
caused by occasional failure to honor the certificates by their

sponsors led to takeover of their issue by the state early in the
eleventh century.

Thereafter their use gradually spread.

In early Southern Sung such notes were issued extensively (in
itially to the amount of 500,000 strings) under the label hui-tzu
and then kuan~tzu.

But overissue and the ease with which they coul

be forged greatly reduced their value despite imposition of the
death penalty for forgery and high rewards offered informers.

Ul

timately even local governments would not accept the notes even in
payment for taxes.
There were also various kinds of local note issues, but these
were not permitted to circulate nationally.

Government manipula

tion of the monetary system impeded circulation of the money and
caused much popular resentment against the dynasty.

Taxation
During its first two decades Sung was distracted from tax re
form by the need to complete the unification of the empire.

It

accumulated official fields from the holdings of the various states
it conquered and from their ruling families.

The rental it got

from these holdings, amounting to S0% of the crops they produced,
made a larger contribution to early Sung state revenues than the
tax on private land which amounted to only 10^ of the crops.

Prior

to Wang An-shih's land survey, records were so inadequate that
only a fraction of the taxes actually owed were ever collected.
T‘ai-tsung's policy of allowing renters to keep official fields as
their private property and giving them a three-year tax holiday
followed by a two-thirds reduction in taxes thereafter was insuf
ficient even to fully repopulate the region around the capital.
In addition to rent on official land and tax on private land,
there were taxes on buildings, a head tax and miscellaneous taxes
on livestock, silkworms, and salt.

Taxes were paid in grain,

cloth, cash and commodities, with the quantity of commodities vary
ing each year according to their market prices.
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No fundamental changes were made in the tax system until Wang
An-shih's land survey system was instituted in 1072 to record the
quantity and quality of all land as the basis for an equitable tax.
Unfortunately, when the reform was ended after twelve years, only
half the land had been surveyed.

Though reinstituted between 110^

and 1120 when the system was then again abolished, the old methods
of allocating taxes were reverted to.
By early Southern Sung all the old abuses had returned, exacei—
bated by the destruction of war.

Official corruption remained, as

always, and was one of the main causes for the failure of Wang's
reforms.
One of the main reasons for Sung's ability to unify the realm
was its policy of remitting commercial taxes.

These had reached

extortionate levels during late T'ang and Five Dynasties times.
Sung's goods in transit tax was only 2%, its tax of fixed businesses'
transactions only 3%.
Though the dynasty continued to limit commercial taxation into
the eleventh century, surtaxes for military needs and on goods for
palace consumption constituted important exceptions.

Such abuses

were especially prevalent during the times Southern Sung was under
military pressure.
Sung's salt laws were revised several times.

Originally salt

transport was handled officially, and hsien officia1s wholesaled it
to merchants.

But this placed a great transport burden on corvee

labor and in 1030, in exchange for payment of a fee at the capital,
private merchants took over transportation of salt.

This reform

not only cut down on the burden of corvee but reduced state ex
penses and allowed for more efficient market allocation of trans
portation resources.
In 10A2 the old system was restored because state revenues,
which had originally gone up under the new system, had then de
clined.

In 10^8 the system was again changed to allow merchants

107
to buy salt certificates regionally.

Abuses soon crept into this

system as well.
Wang An-shih moved from a state monopoly to a free enterprise
position, and Ts'ai Ching ultimately returned to the certificate
system though it soon suffered from the old abuses.

The monopoly

sales system failed in part because it controlled only a portion of
salt production and hence could not effectively eliminate a black
market, and in part because political conflict within the central
government led to frequent changes in policy before any one policy
could establish itself.
Early Sung used the latter Chou system of state control of the
production of.wine at the capital and provincial centers.

Private

production was permitted locaily but subject to government supei—
vision and taxation.

By T'ai-tsung's reign abuses appeared.

High

prices charged by state wineries and high taxes imposed on private
production led to tax dodging which the imposition of stiff punish
ments, including execution for violators, could not eliminate.
Severai regional state offices were founded to buy up and tax
tea production.

Free trade in tea was permitted in Szechwan,

Shensi and Canton, though their tea could not be sold outside these
three regions.

Elsewhere the state bought tea cheaply and sold it

in the producing areas to private retailers who had previously
purchased tea certificates at the capital.

By the 1070's this

policy, which both tempted the official tea plantation managers to
sell on the black market and threatened them with heavy punishment
if they did so, was tending to drive tea-producing areas out of
production.

There was a saying:

"The land produced not tea but

misfortune."
At the beginning of Sung local ferry taxes were abolished, and
the preceding era's tax on those who wished to hold high office
was restored.

The tax on the raising of aquatic products like fish

and ducks was removed, but these were taxed once they entered the
market.

A certificate had to be bought to validate sales of land
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and livestock.
Several excise taxes were collected as surtaxes, especially
during Southern Sung.

These surtaxes were first imposed to meet

extraordinary military expenses, but most were continued even after
military threats had abated.

The state also made a good profit

through its monopoly of the wholesale trade in incense.

Almost all

incense was imported and had to be initially sold by importers to
the state.
Sung's corvee system was based on its predecessor's.
ly officials and the military were exempt.
the chou and hsien levels.

Initial

It was administered at

Only men between the ages of twenty and

sixty were subject to it.
In 971 in the north corvee was limited to river conservancy
work during spring.

In the south the old practice of commuting

corvee to a tax in cash and grain was continued, and though the
cash tax was ended in 1011, the grain tax was continued.

In parts

of the southeast a cash tax was retained and, as it was linked to
the salt laws, was increased when the salt certificate system was
instituted.
Sung also conscripted commoner families for various civil and
military tasks at the local level.

This proved extremely burden

some as monks and elite households were exempted from service.
Wang An-shih's labor service avoidance law was designed to end
these abuses.

It was, however, abolished in IO86.

Society and People's Livelihood
So as to avoid the chaos of the preceding era of disunion.
Sung T'ai-tsu instituted a policy of centralizing power, in par
ticular he placed the main army under direct imperial control at
the capital.

Garrisons on the frontiers along with their officers

were regularly rotated back to the center.
This policy and the long period of peace led ultimately to a
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slackening of military efficiency.

To restore the army's effective

ness, Wang An-shih instituted a militia system to substitute for
mercenaries at the local level.

But after 1086 the end of the re

form led to a weakening of this militia, and Sung was no longer able
to match the power of Liao and Western Hsia on the frontiers.
it eventually fell to Chin.

Hence

The responsibility for the loss of the

north must be shared by both the centralized state, which could not
guarantee security despite all the taxes it collected, and by Ssuma Kuang and his faction

who took too narrow a view of their re-

sponsibi1ities.
It is evident that economic development and the political sys
tem are intertwined.

The Sung Shih (Sung History) concludes that

the central government was not in fact truly centralized.

The con

stant rotation of Its personnel made it certain that 80^ to 90^ of
the high officials never really knew their jobs.

Sung attempted

to centralize power and at the same time avoid the corruption which
centralization encouraged.

In practice, this meant that those with

responsibility were so constricted by regulations designed to avoid
corruption that they lacked power and those with power lacked re
sponsibility, a system certain to bring disaster to both state and
people.
Sung factionalism set the gentlemen against each other, leav
ing room for lesser men to take over.
An-shih's reforms.

This was the fate of Wang

If the great men who led the opposing factions

had been able to work together, the dynasty could have been saved
and there would have been hope for raising the level of the
people's livelihood,

j

The estrangement of Sung Neo-Confucianism from social needs
is also one of the reasons for the failure to maintain the people's
livelihood.

The quarrel between the war and peace factions at the

time of Northern Sung's fall ended with the latter traitorously
selling out both state and people.

'

Conflict with Liao continued from early in the dynasty until
the treaty of 1004 which made Sung the subordinate power.
additional territory was ceded to Liao.
ern Hsia in 1044 after six years of war.

In 1074

Peace was made with West
Renewed war in Shen-

tsung's time only increased the tribute Sung had to pay to Western
Hsia.
The deal with Chin in 1122 gave Sung only empty cities and
merely transferred its tribute payments from Liao to Chin.

The two

attacks by Chin in 1125 and 1126 beggared the capital and set the
stage for the loss of the entire northern half of the country and
a humiliating peace a decade and a half later.

The peace with Chin

in 1207 increased the annual tribute which had to be paid.
These successive defeats and indemnities had all to be paid
for by the people.

Military expenses also were a heavy burden on

the people, the south alone paying taxes of 70,000,000 strings
through a tax system which left hardly any items untaxed.
Even before the foreign disasters at the end of Northern Sung,
two great popular rebellions, led by Sung Chiang and Fang La, had
taken place largely because of bad social conditions.

Such popular

rebellions continued during early Southern Sung, led by men like
Li Ch'eng and Yang Yao.

THE AGE OF DESTITUTION: LIAO, CHIN, AND YUAN
Out Iine
The nine rulers of Liao reigned from 918 to 1125 over much of
Manchuria and the northern parts of Shansi and Hopei.

The Jurched

who founded the Chin rose in northeast Manchuria and eventually
controlled all of Manchuria, the Yellow River valley and part of
the Huai valley.

Their nine rulers reigned from 1115 to 1234.

Yuan's founder Temuchin ascended the throne in Mongolia in
1206 with the appellation of Chingis Khan.

He conquered Western

Liao, Western Hsia and joined with Sung to attack Chin.

His grand

son Kubilai ascended the throne in 1260, established his capital in
Yenching and adopted the dynastic name Yuan.
he conquered Sung and united China.

Sixteen years later

He then attacked Japan, Korea,

and various states in Southeast Asia, many of which sent him tri
bute.

His territory extended across Asia to Eastern Europe, to an

extent unprecedented in all antiquity.

Though he reduced this

great area to peace and good order with the aid of able officials,
his armies were constantly in action and the people much burdened.
Because it was compiled during YUan, long after the fall of
the dynasty, the economics section of the Liao Shih (Liao History)
is rather incomplete.

The economics section of the Chin Shih (Chin

History) is rather more complete, but as it put so much emphasis
on warfare, the Chin was not much interested in economic issues
and hence left few records on the subject.
By contrast, the Mongols who founded the YUan dynasty, although a
barbarian people without a recorded history before they entered
China, once in control of China used Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai's aid and
hence had much in their economic system worthy to record.

Because
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of the Mongols

great military successes their contributions were

especially numerous in the realm of economic connections between
China and foreign civilizations.
The Special Features of the Economy
Yeh-lii Chu-ts'ai (1190-12^3) belonged to the Liao royal Yeh-lu
clan.

Since his grandfather's time his family had served the Chin

court.

His father held high office and was learned in both Confu

cianism and mystical studies.

Ch'u-ts'ai was born when his father

was already old, and hence he was lovingly brought up in his fa
ther's scholarly tradition.

His greatness is measured by the fact

that though by blood a Khitan, he was in the mainstream of Chinese
culture.
A man of peace and good order, he could only bide his time
with scholarship during the decadent and corrupt last years of the
Chin dynasty.

When Yenching fell to the Mongols he was granted an

interview with Chingis because as a Khitan he was expected to be
thirsting for vengeance against their Chin conquerors.

His unwill

ingness to denouce Chin because his family had loyally served them
impressed Chingis and the khan kept him in his entourage.
With his talents as an astronomer, physician, and diviner
Ch'u-ts'ai gradually won Chingis' confidence and hence on hisdeathbed Chingis recommended him to his successor, Ogodei, who made
Ch'u-ts'ai chief minister.
Ch'u-ts'ai was deeply learned in Buddhism as well as secular
studies.

He was also the most important political figure of early

Yuan, the man who completed the process of assimilating northern
China into the Mongol empire begun by Chingis.
His career is documented in the writings of contemporaries,
his own collected works and in the Yuan Shih (Yuan History).

He

has also been much studied by modern Western and Chinese scholars,
beginning in detail with Bretschneider's work in the nineteenth
century.

He is first mentioned in the West in de Mail la's
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Histoire generale de la Chine in the eighteenth century.
Ch'u-ts'ai's most notable accomplishment was to establish the
principle that China had to be governed according to Chinese prin
ciples, the principles of the Confucian tradition.
quence, the Mongols were slowly sinicized.

As a conse

To begin with, during

the completion of the conquest of Chin, he had the Mongol policy of
annihilating resisting cities' populations rescinded.

He also res

cued and subsidized the numerous Confucian scholars whose work
helped sinicize the Mongol administration.

In the realm of fiscal

policy he persuaded Ogodei not to enforce the jokingly put forward
scheme of reducing China to pastureland and instead established ten
regional tax offices to collect the usual land and excise taxes.
So pleased was OgOdei at the revenues thereby produced that he
placed fiscal policy entirely under Ch'u-ts'ai's control.
He established a budget and ordered that the amount and type
of taxes had to be first approved by him before being levied.
Though some were still hurt, so honestly did he run his system that
he was universally hailed as a loyal and public spirited prime
minister.

His measures increased the strength of the dynasty \«hile

curbing the Mongol impulse to loot.
After his death he was slanderously accused of amassing private
wealth while in office, but these accusations were unjustified.
Like Sun Yat-sen, with whom he is comparable in honor, he did
leave a large private library.
Unfortunately not only did his successors fail to build on
the foundations he had established but let these fall into ruin,
thereby allowing YUan to fall into decadence.
Though China had had sea navigation since Warring States
times, the sea routes were never of crucial importance for inter
nal communications until Yuan times, when there was an enormous
increase in the use of coastal shipping to transport southern
grain to the north so as to avoid the expense and labor needed to
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maintain the inland waterways.

The sea transit route was eventually

reduced to a ten-day run to the north by going far enough out to
avoid shoal waters and take advantage of the prevailing winds.
route was not as safe as in recent times.

The

The wind and waves were

not dependable and ships and cargoes could be lost.

Specially con

structed grain freighters of two thousand tan capacity came into
use.
Special attention was also paid to river conservancy.
and regional bureaus were used to supervise such work.
River shifted its mouth to the north in 1344.

Central

The Yellow

In 1351 a seven-

month project using 150,000 corvee laborers restored it to its for
mer course, flowing into the Huai and then into the sea.

This pro

ject was, however, blamed for the rise in popular discontent which
preceded the fall of the dynasty.

The methods used by its manager

Chia Lu, constructing embankments of earth, stone, metal, wood and
straw, continued to be used by later generations.
Ylian s postal system was highly developed.

There were land

and water postal stations which supplied means of transport, food
and lodging for their users.

This network stretched from Korea

south to Annam, with 115 stations along the route from Annam north
to Yenching.

To the northwest there were stations strung out into

Sinkiang and southern Siberia.

The greatest number of stations

were in the lower Yangtze transportation centers.
Somewhat later a separate network of express courier stations
was established.

Traveling night and day, these couriers auto

matically had the right of way on all highways.

Ming and Ch'ing

used postal systems similar to Ytian's.
Hsien officials were responsible for bridge maintenance under
the supervision of the Board of Works.

A set annual schedule of

road and bridge maintenance was enforced, and interference with
the trees planted along rights of way was punished.
The Mongol military campaigns extended from Korea and Japan
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in the east to Eastern Europe in the west, from the Arctic Ocean in
the north to the Indian Ocean in the south.

This unprecedented

scope of activity led to numerous contacts between Chinese and for~
eign civilizations.
In addition to the famous official missions there were numer
ous merchants, craftsmen and adventurers from all over Europe who
spent all or part of their lives among the Mongols.

Many eastern

techniques were brought back to Europe by these anonymous travelers.
Silk and porcelain became familiar objects in Western Europe, and
these and other innovations served to stimulate progress there.
Chinese navigation techniques and gunpowder were also transmitted
to Europe by the Mongols as were the techniques of carved-board
and movable-type printing.

Eastern Europe received the Chinese

abacus.
Though Korea was reduced to tributary status, two seaborne in
vasions of Japan failed, and no political relationship with Japan
was established.

Nevertheless mercantile relations between Japan

and Yuan China were not broken and piIgraImages by monks from both
sides continued.
bute to China.

Many of the states of Southeast Asia paid tri
According to I bn Battuta, Chinese vessels domin

ated the trade between China and India during the YUan period.
The Liao Economy
Liao's acquisition of northernmost China gave it a base for
commercial growth under its state's supervision.

Its southern

capital (modern Peking) had three markets to serve its 300,000
inhabitants.

The main capital in Inner Mongolia had foreign mer

chants In residence, and cloth rather than cash was used for money.
All the other main cities had markets as well.
In addition to markets on the border with Sung, there were
markets adjoining the states in the northeast.
gold, cloth, furs and livestock.
lies.

Imports included

Salt and wine were state monopo

Fig.
10

Bronze casting
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An abundance of locally produced copper permitted coinage from
922 on.

To avoid private coinage, in IO63 the people were forbid

den to sell copper cash, and sale of copper cash to foreign mer
chants was strictly prohibited.
A land tax was instituted by T'ai-tsu and a census by T'aitsung.

After 1027 several types of partially or totally tax-exempt

public fields were established and coexisted thereafter with tax
paying private land.

The corv€e became especially burdensome for

the maintenance of the postal stations and was replaced by a taxsupported hired service system.

The Chin Economy
The Jurched had no commerce to speak of when they were still
a nomadic herding people of the north.

After conquering half of

China, however, their people engaged in some commerce.
As late as the ll60's most of Chin's coinage was engrossed by
the officials.

This obliged the population at large to resort to

barter or paper vouchers.
Ten items were state monopolies, including salt, wine, tea
and iron.

All tea was imported from Sung either as part of the

annual tribute or via the frontier official markets which were set
up after 1142.
After the capital was moved south in 1154 a more elaborate
paper money system was set up, with large denomination bills worth
from one to fifteen strings and small denomination bills worth
from 100 to 750 cash.

These were to circulate for seven years and

be used interchangeably with cash.
Overissue and an end to the use of expiration dates devalued
this currency and drove good cash into hiding.

An early thir

teenth-century reissue failed to solve the problem of devaluation,
and the practice grew of quoting all prices in terms of silver
rather than in terms of this increasingly valueless paper.
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Rent was paid to the state by the cultivators of official
lands.

Tax on private lands was calculated in terms of ox units,

with three oxen per unit.

Every unit of twenty-five individuals

was to have four ch' ing four mou^of land and pay no more than one
_tari_ of grain per year.

Using a variant on the pao~chia system, the

tax and corvee burden was to be proportioned to the size and wealth
of a household.
The Yuan Economy
Though Chingis had to be dissuaded from turning China into
pastureland, Kubilai put great emphasis on the encouragement of
agriculture through both state
supervision and the encouragement
of local Righteous and Ever Normal
granaries.
The official fields acquired
by the state during late Southern
Sung were used during Yiian to re
ward officials.

The Mongols also

adopted the Chin practice of con
fiscating peasant land and re
ducing its cultivators to the
status of agricultural slaves.
Estates containing as many as
80,000 households were in this
way given to court favorites.
Officials were given smaller es
tates.
tration)

Taxes on these did not

need to be forwarded to the cen
tral authorities.

estates, also tax exempt, expanded greatly.

Monastic

Though in I327 monas

teries were forbidden to buy additional land from the people,
this ruie was widely broken.
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Two attempts at a land survey so as to increase tax receipts
failed, largely owing to the interference of the Mongol aristocracy.
The unequal burden of taxation created many tax absconders from
north China and ultimately contributed to the downfall of the dy
nasty.
The Mongols ultimately came to use commerce as their initial
weapon of conquest and their military power only secondarily.

For

example, prior to the conquest of Southern Sung, the Mongols cut
off all trade across the border, but after a while they pardoned a
number of Sung merchants who had violated the prohibition, thereby
earning their gratitude and easing the task of their armies during
the subsequent military campaigns.
Yuan's international trade policy was to encourage the estab
lishment of tributary and hence trade relations with even remote
countries of the south seas.

The dynasty also received substantial

tax revenues from internal commercial taxes. There was a sales tax
«■ and a surtax on that as well as a tax on ship
of 1/30 (later 1/20)
building materials.

Tax farming by rich merchants was the method

used for collecting these taxes.
During the early years after the conquest of the south, for
eign trade was taxed at 1/10 (coarser goods at 1/15).

Eventually

shipping offices were set up in seven major ports and the only
foreign trade permitted was placed under government auspices, with
the state taking 70^ of the profit from each voyage.
Severe restrictions were placed on the hours of business in
the south.

All travelers had to have official documents without

which they were not to be accepted into inns.

Coastal residents

were not allowed to trade for cash with foreign merchants. Private
foreign trade was forbidden.

Violators were to be whipped and

their ships and goods confiscated.
tered.

All vessels had to be regis

Southern iron products were not permitted to be sold in

the north.
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Numbered among the merchants were Mongols, North Chinese (in
cluding Khitan and Jurched), South Chinese, and, most influential
of all, foreigners from Central and West Asia and Europe.

Though

among merchants there were adherents of all the major religions of
Eurasia, Muslims were most numerous.

Most of those Muslims who had

settled within China had gone into trade to make a living.

In ad

dition to priests like Friar Odoric, European merchants like Marco
Polo came to China.

The accounts of Chinese life written by some

of these men whetted a European interest in China which was to be
come more manifest in Ming times.
Yuan had state monopolies over salt, tea, wine and vinegar.
Ch'uanchou was the chief entrepot of foreign trade.

Marco Polo

considered it one of the world's two greatest ports.

For a time

the tax rate there was lower than in the other six major ports.
The state occasionally used its monopoly right to finance for
eign trade to earn revenues specifically for such needs as finan
cing the empress' palace establishment.

The new capital city be

came the focus of foreign and domestic trade and the center of
Industry producing solely for palace consumption.
population was as great as that of the city itself.

Its suburban
The other

major cities of the two river valleys and Canton also flourished.
Ibn Battuta wrote that Ch'Uanchou harbor held a hundred large ves
sels and countless smaller ones and that its Muslim merchants con
stituted a separate market.
Kubilal issued Yuan's first paper currency, one version backed
by silk and another in various denominations calculated in terms of
copper cash and strings of cash.

Later smaller denomination notes

proved impractical and were withdrawn.

Different forms of the

other notes were periodically reissued as they depreciated in val
ue.

Despite this depreciation such notes continued to circulate

to the end of the dynasty.
In addition to the local and national academies, YUan
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established a network of local medical schools with standardized
examinations of their graduates.

Kubilai estabiished a network of

regional astronomical observatories.

Mathematics also continued to

advance, with the invention of quadratic equations and a new tech
nique for performing iong division.

In the realm of military tech

nology, a cannon built by a Muslim technologist was used in the
siege of Hsiangyang in 1273.
State-owned workshops staffed by salaried artisans conscripted
by the authorities produced a variety of specialized goods, such as
multilayered lacquerware inset with precious metals, and clay and
cast-metal statues.
Artisans were conscripted for service with the armies recruit
ed locally during the conquest of North China, and later of South
China.

Most of these were skilled in making arrows, armor and

catapults.
YUan's Board of Works was responsible for all engineering
tasks, gathering materials and recruiting skilled workmen for these
tasks.

It controlled various subordinate institutions, most of

them in the north, which carried out a variety of specialized tasks
from smelting silver to dyeing silk.

The various segments of the

palace establishment also controlled enterprises, often with local
subdivisions, producing goods for their use.
At heart the Yuan treated China as conquered territory, to be
parcelied out in feudal fashion among the conquerors.
the source of great popular suffering.

This was

The Yuan institutions for

managing the various crafts greatly influenced Ming and Ch'ing
practice.
The Mongols always gave great weight to technical expertise,
*

at first for warfare and later, as they grew more sophisticated,
for the adornment of their women and for their personal luxuries.
Even in his early conquests Chingis spared captured artisans to
satisfy his and his aristocracy's love for ornate trappings.
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Originally prisoners of war and then a part of the armies, organized
groups of craftsmen eventually became a distinct caste within so
ciety.

Craftsmen were divided into thirty-two subdivisions, all

paid by and working for the state.

There are records of many such

artisan families who did exceedingly well in the Mongols' service.
Unfortunately the traditional Chinese distaste for technical ability
did not allow this high position for artisans to continue.

Other

wise our industrialization might have occurred two or three centur
ies earlier.
The early Yuan land tax resembled the T'ang system.

At first

it was a simple head tax, but when that produced insufficient rev
enue, a dual system was instituted.

A family was to pay a tax

either on its property or by head count, whichever was larger.
There were also taxes in kind collected in cloth and silver
which were destined for use of the court establishment.

These were

collected by the central government at different rates from various
categories of households.
Though its adoption of Confucian goals was vitiated by its
racism. Yuan was not without its accomplishments in such depart
ments as encouragement of agriculture, water conservancy and the
restoration of a measure of peace to the north.

But its racism

and harsh taxation caused much popular resentment.
Southerners especially suffered from discrimination.
were forbidden to possess weapons.
to ten classes:

Chinese

The population was divided in

officials, minor officials, Buddhist monks, Taoist

monks, physicians, artisans, hunters, commoners, Confucians, and
beggars.

Local officials were often foreigners, and they frequent

ly extorted excessive taxes from the people and offended opinion
by, for example, robbing the graves of the Sung imperial family
and its high officials.

Kubilai himself used several venal and

incompetent high officials, and his successors showed even poorer
judgment in their choice of men.
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Rents on the estates of the south were several times higher
than taxes, and tenants were treated like slaves.

Three-year tax

holidays for newly opened land were more than made up for by ex
tortionate surtaxes levied by local officials.
much harmed by the conscription of horses.

Agriculture was also

In the north these had

been used for both transportation and as draft animals.

The Mon

gols wanted these animals for their own use and as a precautionary
measure wished to deny their use to the Chinese.

Approximately

700,000 horses were conscripted between 1286 and 1328.
Many southerners were reduced to serf-like status on estates
extorted by officials.

Many northerners fled south as refugees.

Institutions like the Righteous Granaries existed more in name
than in fact.
So close to the margin of existence did the people live that
when natural disasters struck many were obliged to abandon their
families and join movements of resistance.

By the 1330's popular

rebellions began in several places in the south and central regions,
and the Yangtze valley was soon totally out of control.

These re

bellions were led by men of all classes, salt-smugglers, impover
ished peasants and priests.

So ended the Yuan hegemony.
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Section X
THE AGE OF REVIVAL: THE MING DYNASTY
Outl ine
The 275-year long Ming, with its first capitals in Nanking and
K'aifeng and its move of the capital to Peking during the reign of
the third emperor, was the first native Chinese dynasty to rule all
of the country since the fall of the T'ang.

Ming's founder, ob

serving the lessons of history, took the road of centralization.
The economy was progressive compared to that of earlier times.
Taxes were collected in silver rather than goods, and the aristoc
racy was paid in rice rather than land, and in mid-dynasty in part
in paper money.

The manorial system gradually fell into decay.

The Ming Single Whip tax system remained the basis for the tax sys
tem into Ch'ing times.
Ming centralization much increased the power of the eunuchs,
who greatly oppressed commerce.

Their heavy punishment of the

gentry was a fundamental reason for the fall of the dynasty.

The

seven voyages to the western oceans of Cheng Ho during the Yung-lo
era represented an important development in Chinese economic his
tory.

In addition, the fiscal policies of Chang Chu-cheng wrote a

new page in the economic history of Ming which was long discussed
by posterity.
The Contribution of Chang Chu-cheng to Ming National Planning for
the People's Livelihood
Chang was one of the great statesmen of the sixteenth century,
an age when internal and external problems reenforced each other.
The Ming manorial economy was more developed than during Yuan.
Many manors were tax exempt and peasant land was being encroached
upon, often voluntarily as peasants sought to avoid taxes.
consequence land was becoming less equally distributed, land

As a
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records were losing accuracy and government revenues were declining.
From the beginning inequities were built into the land tax.
founder's home area, among others, was very lightly taxed.

The
Several

areas in Chiangnan associated with the rebellion of Chang Shihch'eng were very heavily taxed.

The tax on confiscated and official

fields was higher than that on private land.
Compilation of a land register was undertaken early in Ming.
The more than 8,570,000 ch'ing then registered had declined by 1529
by half, but a new land census could only be carried out in a few
places.

In 1578 Chang's recommendation to carry out a land survey

was accepted.

This increased the amount of registered land from

over A.5 million to over 11.5 million ch' ing.

In addition to the

Single Whip system, Chang instituted several other reforms in the
collection system to end cheating by the elite.

His policy of for

giving delinquent back taxes by the peasantry evoked great approval
among the people.
Before the Single Whip system, there were so many taxes and
their types were so complex as to lead to abuses.
was a response to the objective needs of the times.

The new system
The relative

simplicity of the calculations involved in the system drastically
limited opportunities for tax avoidance by the rich and corruption
by local officials.

From the modern viewpoint it represented a

progressive tax system.

It was both simpler and cheaper to collect

than earlier systems, and constituted less of a burden on the
people.
Even before taking office Chang advocated frugal government,
arguing that this was the only way to assure a prosperous people
and hence the only true basis for warding off foreign threats.
When he took office the treasury held only enough revenue for three
months' worth of expenditures.

The assured revenues from the nu

merous central and local state-controlled weaving establishments
had in turn stimulated growth in state expenditures and led con
sequently to extraordinary levies on their production, even in bad
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times.
sion.

Chang sought to reduce these levies during times of depres~
He also drastically limited the use of the state post system

and thereby reduced expenditures and the burden on taxpayers.
Though the official histories have an ambiguous attitude toward
Chang as an individual, they could not but approve of his fiscal
policies.

He was praised for increasing the state's grain reserves

while lessening the burden on the people.

This enabled successful

pacification of tribal peoples in the north and southwest.
also criticized for having obstructed

debate within the Court and

for arousing thereby much resentment within government
eighteen years in power.

He is

during his

But though there is disagreement about

him, given the conditions during mid-Ming and thereafter, a man of
his strength of character was needed.

The Accomplishments of Cheng Ho's Voyages to the Western Seas
Though the south and east have a coastline, including islands,
of over 20,000 kilometers, our mentality has traditionally been
that of a continental power, with little emphasis on maritime de
velopment.
icant.

Only by Sung and Yuan did maritime trade become signif

The Yunglo emperor changed his traditional landlocked

policy for one which emphasized expansion both by land and sea.
Cheng Ho's seven voyages constituted a new and glorious page
in Chinese history.

Though not a new development, his voyages

were unprecedented in scale, distance covered and duration.

They

occurred nearly a century before the voyages of the great West
erners, Columbus and Vasco da Gama.

He carried an average of

27,000 men on each voyage, 400 men on each of some sixty large
vessels.

The length of the voyages varied from a year and a half

to two and a half years, and a supply station had to be set up on
the Malay peninsula to meet the needs of such long expeditions.
The first three and the sixth voyage were limited to the coast
of the Indian Ocean.

The fourth and fifth went to the Persian

Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian coast and East Africa.

The seventh also
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went to the Persian Gulf with side expeditions to the Red Sea.
Cheng was thirty-five when his first expedition departed in 1^*05
and fifty-two when the sixth returned.

He was an old man of sixty-

three by the end of the seventh expedition of 1432 which departed
3^tcr Yung-lo's death.

Estimates of the number of countries he

visited vary from seventeen to fifty-nine, largely because of the
political fragmentation of South Asia at that time.
One motive for these voyages was to search for the Emperor Hui
whom Yung-lo had deposed and who was rumored to have fled overseas.
Yung-lo is reported to have still been worried over this near the
end of his reign.

Another motive was linked to the traditional

impulse of a Chinese dynasty to have all peoples acknowledge its
suzerainty.

Naturally as a usurper Yung-lo wanted such symbolic

acknowledgments even more than had the founder.

Cheng Ho's seventh

voyage was to hasten tribute missions which had lagged in the five
years since the Hsuan-te emperor had taken the throne.

An economic

motive is reflected in the label given to Cheng Ho's fleet—"treas
ure ships."

Yung-lo, who had set up tax offices for overseas com

merce in Canton, Ch'uanchou and Ningpo, wanted to go beyond merely
receiving the profits from foreign merchants who came to China.
Yung-lo hoped to gain great profits from the official expedi
tions to defray the expenses of the campaigns against the Mongols.
The tribute missions stimulated by the expeditions often, however,
required great expenditures by the Court in return.
was also stimulated.

Private trade

Unintended by the government, migration to

the South Seas was also stimulated to the point that by the six
teenth century the area had become linked genetically to the Chi
nese empire.
J~he tens of thousands of men who accompanied Cheng returned
^th a taste for the foreign which they spread among the CjTjjifise
coistal areas, thereby changing the nature of the Chinese,
to accommodate^a taste for the seagoing life and its pr^its.
From 1405 to 1435 some fifty states came to China to offer tribute.
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and the experiences in China of the hundreds of tribute bearers,
some of exalted rank, sowed the seeds of increased international
trade later.
The Han Race's Basic Position and the Establishment of Agricultural
Policy After the Economic Revival
The life of the peasantry was hard in late Yuan and early Ming.
Much land had been abandoned in the Yellow River valley.

Despite

attempts by the Ming founder to use the army for rural reconstruc
tion, 90^ of the peasants of Kiangsu were hardpressed tenants. The
situation was gradually improved by the detailed land survey ordered
by the founder, the "fish-scale register" and by the "golden regis
ter," so called because of the color of the paper of the copy sent
up to the Census Board, which organized all farmers into groups of
110 households, with ten groups of ten families each led by the
leading ten grain-producing families.

The latter were revised each

decade in accord with the production record of the unit over the
previous ten years.
The land was divided between official and private fields.

The

former included manors for the imperial family, office lands for
the bureaucrats and garrison fields for the army.

The founder

ordered that private fields be divided equitably according to pop
ulation, and that they be taxed equally.

Cooperative fields owned

by the state in each village were to be collectively cultivated.
The founder also ordered extensive use of garrison fields to re
duce the burden of military support on the civilian population.
Eventually, however, these garrison fields tended to be taken over
t

by the elite, throwing on the treasury the burden of supporting
the armies.

Anyone who opened hitherto uncultivated land was

allowed to make it his private property.
The founder sponsored hydraulic works in over A0,000 locations.
Those opening new land were granted draft animals, tools, seed and ‘
capital.

The Ming local granary system represented a reform of

the T'ang-Sung institutions.

The founder ordered Preparation
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Fig. 12

Water-powered mill.

Granaries, managed by local dignitaries, established in all major
towns.

These were similar to the old Ever-Normal granaries.

There

were Righteous granaries.as weil, one for each twenty or thirty
families, headed by local gentlemen, and with the families belong
ing to it giving contributions to it proportioned to their wealth.
There were also cooperative granaries, entireiy under control of
the thirty families constituting the membership of each.

These,

a contemporary argued, were superior to government granaries as
they were more iikely to be efficientiy managed and give loans to

131

those who most needed them because of their superior knowledge of
local conditions.

Rewards, up to official rank, were given to those

who gave generous contributions to the government-sponsored granar
ies.

The laws held officials strictly accountable for operations of

the granaries.

Eventually chou and hsien officia1s were made re

sponsible for the Preparedness granaries rather than local managers.
The manorial economy had developed out of the feudal economy.
It had originated in T'ang, continued in Sung and flourished during
Yuan, using the official fields as manors for the elite.

The Ming

founder originally enfieffed his family with land but eventually
shifted to paying them in rice instead.
ranged from 200 to 50,000 tan.

Such salaries originally

By mid-Ming a part of these salaries

was paid with silver certificate paper money.

But manors for the

highest ranks continued nevertheless to be very extensive.

Official

fields continued to be augmented by lands confiscated from dis
graced officials and from land without heirs.

In early Ming of

ficial fields constituted one-tenth the amount of private land.
Manors continued to develop for three reasons:

imperial

grants to the imperial family and others (in 1601 a proposed AO,000
ch' ing grant to the emperor's three sons would have brought onehalf the land of Honan into such manors), the opening of new land
by manor holders (similar to the T'ang and Sung practice), and the
obtaining of private land by various means (fraudulently getting
title to new land opened by the people, taking advantage of unclear
land titles).
manors.

Buddhist and Muslim temples also received many

Taoist lands were confiscated during a late Ming persecu

tion.
The extent of manorial holdings is not clear, but in the late
fifteenth century in the imperial domain alone, all kinds of manor
ial land totaled around 46,000 ch' ing.

Manors were managed by a

hierarchy of officials either selected from local households or
from among various men without fixed sources of income.

One hsien

in fifteenth-century Anhui had 279 households in manors out of a
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total population of 17>I^5 households.

The holders of these manors

paid no taxes and governed their holdings independently of local
authorities.

Commerce
Though a farmer by origin and hence inclined to favor agricul
ture over commerce, the founder reduced the market tax from 1/10 to
1/30 and even had a reading primer, unfortunately no longer extant,
composed to teach illiterate farmers, craftsmen and merchants how
to read.

He forbade the practice of having officials advance the

money for goods before delivery to the state.

This custom had led

to exploitation of merchants because officials discounted prices.
Prices were to be publicly posted by local officials and weights
and measures were to be periodically checked by them as well.

Of

ficial warehouses were set up just outside the capital, but aside
from the payment of the 1/30 tax, free trade was permitted and
small dealers were exempt from the tax.

Though, as in previous

dynasties since Han, there were such anti-commercial edicts as
sumptuary regulations, in early Ming real repression of commerce
was rarely encountered.
Each of the many crafts had its own district in Nanking.
of the commercial men were not natives of the Nanking area.

Most
When

the capital moved to Peking, southern merchants and goods accom
panied the government in large numbers.
of specialized and periodic markets.

There were large numbers

One great merchant for a time

became the country's richest man through his connection with the
founder.

Another founded a great emporium in Soochow which kept

his family rich for centuries.
Initially, all official trade with Japan had to pass through
Ningpo, Ryukyuan trade through Ch'uanchou and southern seas trade
through Canton.

Pirate raids on the east coast caused the founder

to ban all foreign merchants except Ryukyuan and some South Asian
ones, though these limits were somewhat liberalized during the
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Yung-lo reign.

Tribute missions were limited, for example, the

Ryukyuan to once each two years and the Japanese to once each decade,
with the average for all missions being once each three years.

The

strict rules allowed a measure of private trading by tribute mis
sions, but these rules were often stretched or broken.

The South Asian trade was eventually shifted to Macao when the
Portuguese appeared.

The Portuguese, referred to in the Ming Shih

(Ming History) as the Folangchi (Franks), were permitted their own
city at Macao as a device to wean them away from their earlier freebooting tactics with which the local authorities could not cope.
Sovereign power over Macao was nevertheless retained in Chinese
hands.
Taiwan was not explored in ancient times, but in his voyages
Cheng Ho often visited it and it was first described in a travel
book subsequent to his voyages."
with the aid of several

It was first settled by the Dutch

illicit Chinese merchants.

At the end of

Ming the Dutch were ousted by Cheng Chih-lung and his son, Cheng
Ch'eng-kung.

The Cheng family remained loyal to Ming during the

Manchu invasions and mobilized its 200,000-man army and several
thousand ship fleet.

Though he had only a foothold on the Fukien

coast, Cheng Ch'eng-kung's fleet and his commercial relations with
Japan and Southeast Asia gave him a base which the Manchus could
not break.

Taiwan was to be his main base for the restoration of

the Ming, and in the process he made Taiwan Chinese.
When the Europeans came to the South Seas, Fukien and Canton
merchants were already active there, and if the dynasty had under
stood the methods of imperialism, the Europeans could have been
forestalled.

Tens of thousands of merchants from nearby Fukien

settled in Luzon, but were persecuted by the Spanish conquerors of
the area.

*

Chinese merchants also traded profitably with other

This statement is not quite correct; Taiwan was reached by
an expedition in 230 A.D. See Section VI.
(EHK)

13^

parts of the Philippines, Borneo (which also served as a refuge
for Chinese pirates), and other parts of the Indonesian archipel
ago.

At that time the power of the Chinese people greatly exceeded

that of the Europeans.

That subsequently their power waxed and ours

waned is truly regrettable.
Manufacturing and Mathematicians
The Ming founder had a parsimonious palace building policy so
as to avoid burdening the masses during the early years of the dy
nasty while their loyalty still had to be won.
built extensively in Peking.
on a larger scale.

Yung-lo, however,

The new capital resembled Nanking but

The palace complex on the southeast of the im

perial city had 8,350 rooms.

Extensive building and rebuilding was

also done by later emperors.

Among other notable accomplishments

of Ming building were temples, city walls and imperial tombs.
The Yung-lo reign was the most developed period of Chinese
shipbuilding.

During its first seven years 1,632 seagoing vessels

were ordered built.

These vessels required a high degree of sci

entific and technological knowledge in the places where they were
built:

Fukien, Nanking, Chekiang, Canton, Kiangsi, Soochow, and

Yangchou.

The shipyards were very large.

The Nanking shipyard,

begun by the dynastic founder, was supervised by an official of
the fifth rank, had a complex division of labor and a permanent
staff of around two hundred, augmented by hired workers during
busy times.

Little is recorded of the methods used for fitting out

and supplying these enormous vessels, each holding kSO men, but
they must have been elaborate.
The mid-Ming plague of Japanese pirates was met by the build
ing of a variety of large and small military vessels for coastal
work.

There were large and small tower ships with wooden armor

along their sides; there were patrol vessels and attack vessels
with a variety of shapes, one type of which could use both sails
and oars.
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Fig. 13

Pottery Wheel

day ware was often elaborately painted.
There had been kilns in the Ching-te-chen area since the
Northern and Southern Dynasties and by T'ang its product was fine
enough to be called “false jade ware."

An officially supervised

kiln was established there in Sung-^uring the ching-te year period
(100^-7) and this ultimately led to the name of the place and prod
uct being changed.
most notable kilns.

Even in Sung it was famous as one of the four
Ming porcelain tended to be thinner than that

of earlier periods and colored glazing techniques such as fivecolor glaze and cloisonne were perfected at Ching-te-chen.
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The rise of a craft is not an accident.

The rise of Ming-

Ch'ing porcelain is partly ascribable to objective needs of the en
vironment, partly to the state's leadership as well as to the con
tributions of technical specialists.

Ching-te-chen reached its

peak during the more than twenty years it was led by a man named
T'ang Ying during the Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung eras of the Ching.
T'ang shared the life of the potters and wrote a still
book on the trade.

indispensible

The division of labor was as complex as under

modern scientific management techniques.

Since the late eighteenth

century there has been no further progress in techniques even though
as late as the early republican period there were still over a hun
dred kilns and several tens of thousands of craftsmen in Ching-techen .
Ming produced three notable mathematicians, Wu Ching, Wang
Wen-su and Ch'eng Ta-wei. When a book by the latter appeared in
1592 it was immediately transmitted to Japan where it became the
theoretical basis for Japanese use of the abacus.

The earliest

abacus-like device appeared in Greece around 500 B.C.

But this de

vice received its fullest development in China, while even as late
as the fifteenth century Europe did not make much use of it.

Not

long after the second world war a contest held in Japan for speed
and accuracy between electrical calculators and the abacus was won
by the abacus.

Western mathematics was introduced in late Ming by

several Chinese collaborators of the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci
who translated his works into Chinese.

The Monetary and Postal Systems
The founder established bronze cash as the general-use cur
rency, but the scarcity of copper evoked so much counterfeiting
that in I375 a paper money was issued to circulate in parallel with
bronze cash.

It was issued in six denominations, from one string

(equal to 1000 cash or one ounce of silver) down to 100 cash.
strings were equated with one ounce of gold.

Four

Commercial taxes were

Fig. ]k

Casting bronze coins
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to be paid three parts in cash, seven parts in paper.

Private use

of gold and silver for money was forbidden, but specie could be ex
changed for paper.

Local treasuries were established to exchange

worn notes for new ones.

The exchange rules, however, had to be

loosened before the system would work since worn notes not accept
able for exchange would not be voluntarily circulated by the public.
The founder commuted office-rice to notes at the rate of two
strings 500 cash to one tail of grain. Lower denomination notes
(from 10 to 50 cash) were issued, but overissue depreciated them
relative to higher denomination notes at different rates in various
areas.

Inflation hindered their circulation.

In 139^ all cash was called in to be exchanged for new style
paper notes within a period of half a month.
ing of cash was forbidden.

Circulation or hoard

The prohibition was repeated in 1403 in

more severe terms, forbidding gold and silver to circulate.
increasing quantity depreciated the value of the paper.

But

An ounce

of silver would get eighty strings worth of paper, an ounce of gold
400 strings of paper.
among the people.

Specie and cloth became media of circulation

Further measures proved ineffective.

By U26

paper had depreciated by a factor of twenty in terms of grain com
pared to its value in the early years of the dynasty.
In 1428 printing of the new currency was halted and all
treasury stocks burned.

The next year taxes were increased and

made payable in paper money so as to increase faith in the currency.
The circulation of paper increased somewhat.

In 1448 circulation

of copper cash was again forbidden but relaxed again a decade later.
In 1452 officials in the capital were allowed to exchange their
salary paper for silver at the current rate of 500 strings of paper
for one ounce of silver.

In 1466 their salary rice was discounted

from twenty-five to ten strings of paper for one

of grain.

The

new paper had depreciated to only ten cash for one string; the old
paper to only one or two cash for a string.

Copper and especially

]kO

silver were increasingly used for exchange.

During the next century

even the government steadily went over to collecting its monetary
taxes in silver.
In IA29 commercial taxes were raised by a factor of five on all
business establishments and all means of commercial transport.

In

most places vessels were taxed according to their carrying capacity
rather than on the value of their cargo.

A vessel might be taxed

a hundred times for a total of 100 strings in paper on a given voy
age.

Though the rates were later reduced, the network of tax of

fices was maintained.
The postal system resembled that of the Yuan, with water and
horse stations and express courier posts.

There were also official

hostels in Peking and Nanking for the reception of tribute missions,
the former having a 300-man and the latter a 100-man staff.

Horse

stations were forty or eighty j_i_ apart and each stocked from five
to eighty horses, depending on its importance.

Water stations,

established at important junctions had from five to twenty boats,
each with a crew of ten men.

Transport offices had large and small

carts or freight vessels of varying numbers.
Express stations were placed every ten _H_and staffed with ten
or fifteen soldiers recruited locally.
least 300 J_i_ a day.

A letter was to travel at

Official messages were to be immediately for

warded whether received day or night.
necessary to use the system.

Official credentials were

These credentials could only be is

sued to those carrying official messages, those carrying out
tasks for members of the imperial family, foreign diplomats on
tributary missions, civil and military officials going to take up
their duties at least 1,500 J_i_ away and for transport of sick or
dead officials and their families back to their native place.
The Tax System
The founder initially abolished all Mongol customs and re
stored Chinese ways of doing things.

He tightened administrative
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efficiency and lightened taxes to win back popular confidence in
government.

Various miscellaneous non-agricultural taxes were

abolished and the surtax on the land tax was removed.
resembled the T'ang two-tax system.

The land tax

The founder's aim was to make

payment easier and to make certain that additional illegal taxes
would not be collected by officials.

The Yellow Register of I38I

and Fish Scale Register of I387 provided the basis for the land tax
in Ch'ing as well as Ming times.
After the north had been conquered, merchants were induced to
transport grain for its garrisons by grants of salt certificates.
Government offices on the frontier traded the surplus tea of
Szechwan for barbarian horses.
In later reigns,the people suffered as expenses were increased
to maintain the imperial clan and, in the sixteenth century, to
finance renewed military expenses on the northern frontier and
against south coast pirates.

The Japanese invasion of Korea was an

especially heavy fiscal burden.
scope broadened.

Taxes were Increased and their

Particularly obnoxious methods were used to col

lect the new mine tax which had evoked clandestine mining.

Evaders

of this tax even had their hands chopped off and were thrown into
rivers.
Internally there were new market, crafts, and paper money
taxes.

Externally, though the Ming customs houses were initially

not supposed to tax but merely supervise foreign goods, it became
necessary for foreign merchants to pay over 60% of their goods to
officials to gain permission to land them.
In 1581 the Single Whip land tax system was instituted, con
solidating the head and corvee tax with the land tax.
levied solely according to acreage.

It was

After the land tax, the ex

cise taxes on salt, tea, fish, wine and on various commercial ac
tivities represented the largest source of revenue.
The land was divided into official and private fields, in the
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proportion of one to seven by 1502.

Official land included various

imperial manors, office lands and garrison fields, among others.
Initially the tax on private fields was about 3/5 that on official
fields, except in that part of the lower Yangtze which had the
heaviest taxes since pre-Sung times and was additionally punished
because it was the seat of one of the Ming founder's chief rivals.
The founder's home area was lightly taxed.

Such favoritism is re

grettable.
The Fish Scale Registers recorded the size and productivity of
all fields and were so called because they resembled a picture of
fish scales.

The earlier Yellow Registers had taken household

numbers as their basis.
tered.

All land sales had to be officially regis

This system was rightly believed to be a reliable basis for

honest taxation because "though men move, land remains fixed."

So

long as land was viewed as the "mother" and men as "sons," meaning
taxes were based on land rather than households, abuses could be
checked.

But by the late sixteenth century the Fish Scale Registers

of early Ming had become obsolete.

In 1577, on Chang Chli-cheng's

advice, a resurvey was undertaken.
In early Ming the land tax was collected by the wealthiest
landowners in each neighborhood, each responsible for a ten-family
unit, the chia.

Collection of taxes in advance tended to increase

and thereby raise the actual tax rate.

The Single Whip system, by

consolidating corvee (which the elite had been exempt from) with
the land tax, spread the burden more evenly.

Like the earlier

Sung corvee-avoidance tax it allowed local government to hire
its workers with the proceeds of taxation, which reduced the ser
vice burden on taxpayers.
In early Ming men from sixteen to sixty were subject to corvee.
According to a 1375 edict, every ch' ing of land had to contribute
the labor of one man for thirty days annually at the capital.

A

man could be hired as a substitute, with the landlord paying one
to defray his expenses.

Though the landless were legally not

1^3

subject to this corvee, they were the ones usually hired by land
lords to carry it out.

Using the Yellow Register of households as

its basis, corvee hit each chia once every ten years as it was ro
tated among the ten chia constituting one _l_i_.

There was also a

corvee levied on individuals once every five years, with families
divided into three classes and an extraordinary corvee levied at
irregular intervals.

Attempts to equalize the burden of these labor

taxes were undone by gentry exemptions.
Before completion of the reunification the founder levied a tax
of 1/20 on salt.

Afterward he sold exclusive rights to purvey salt

to merchants who supplied the frontier armies.

Each salt producing

area had to meet a set annual quota to forward to the officials.
Initially 400 chin of salt was exchanged for one tan of grain.
Later paper money was substituted for grain.

In its early years

this arrangement yielded high profits, but by mid-Ming low-priced
smuggled salt undercut sales of the government product.

Various

schemes to increase the tax only led to worse corruption in its
administration.

All salt had to be transported in government ves

sels and be accounted for by official tallies.

Heavy punishments

were decreed for private smugglers and corrupt officials within the
salt administration.

In addition to receiving exclusive marketing

areas for salt, merchants could receive salt in exchange for grain,
horses, paper money, iron or cloth deliveries to various places at
various times depending on the state's needs.

On several occasions

the populace was ordered to buy set amounts of salt and pay for it
with paper money.
In the tea producing districts any merchants buying tea had
to report the amount bought to local authorities and buy a propor
tionate number of tea certificates from them.

In some areas vari

ous other commodities had to be exchanged for tea.

This system

was used successfully throughout the dynasty.
The Ming Hui Tien (Ming Statutes) and the economics section of

thfi Ming $hih record nothing of a wine tax, which at times must
have been subsumed within other commercial taxes.
tion was enforced.

At times prohibi

This was the case in early Ming because of fears

of a grain shortage should liquor grains be planted.

Though this

prohibition was kept up, wine was occasionally taxed directly, but
never became an important segment of the tax system.
In early Ming all goods were taxed at 1/30.
were not taxed.

Goods not marked

There were 382 tax offices distributed through the

country, each with several sub-stations under it.

The lack of a

detailed list of taxable items initially led to burdensome taxation
of anything and everything by these local tax stations until in
1^03 all personal property and ordinary household and agricultural
tools and objects for religious use were declared exempt.

In the

USO's the old system was restored, but detailed lists of taxable
items and their value had to be kept by the authorities.

From the

late sixteenth century on, private tax offices were set up at roads,
bridges, passes, ferries, and other locations, levying a variety
of increasingly burdensome taxes.
Late in the fourteenth century private mining was allowed but
always thereafter under government license only and for payment of
a tax of 2/30.

Tax was levied on silver, iron, copper, mercury,

alum, and other raw materials.

The mines of Chekiang and Fukien

were from the mid-fifteenth century on supplemented by those of
Szechwan and Yunnan.

Silver mines had to pay a set annual amount

in tax regardless of changes in production.

Receipts from this

tax increased by a factor of twenty-three during the Yung-lo period
and by a factor of twenty-seven during the Hsuan-te period, not
because of a correspondingly great increase in production but
rather entirely because of changes in government policy.

In 1596,

because the state needed more revenue, new mines were ordered
opened, especially in Honan, Shantung,

Chekiang,

Shansi, Shensi,

Szechwan, Liaotung, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, Fukien and Yunnan.

The

officials in charge proved villains who confiscated private

1^5

I

Fig., 16

Coal mining using bamboo pipes for
ventilation.

property in the guise of opening these mines.

Posterity recognized

this as one of the reasons for Ming's fall.

Society and People's Livelihood
Sensitive to his humble origins as a monk, the founder feared
and hence persecuted gentry intellectuals, even executing many of
them for writing phrases which might be construed as puns on his
origins as a monk and bandit.
power of the eunuchs rose.

From the mid-fifteenth century the

They became supervisors of the army.
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the markets and of taxation, the unstoppable masters of the central
administration.

Factionalism became chaotic.

The eunuchs were re~

sponsible for the cruel rise in commercial taxation, both licit and
illicit, after 1573-

Great merchants were hounded out of business

and even petty transactions in the villages were taxed.
Though taxes were nominally reduced in 1620 during the brief
reign of Kuang-tsung, under his son capital merchants were ruthlessly exploited and in 1625, after several loyal officials were execu
ted, a market tax of 10^ was imposed at important communications
junctions.

Conditions worsened thereafter, evoking the bandit up

rising of men like Li Tzu-ch'eng and ultimately the Manchu inva
sions.

The last emperor and most of his clan proved selfish to the

end, refusing to contribute their wealth to the defense of the
major cities from the rebels.

The corrupt central bureaucrats were

capable only of buying off the rebels to save their own skins.
It is certain that had there been brave leadership, the crisis
could have been surmounted.

But the last emperor was a cowardly

leader and the moral of people, military and gentry was ruined.

If

the emperor had executed his evil civilian and military officials
and undertaken a fundamental reform, the dynasty's recovery would
have been possible, as this would have restored popular morale.
The system of tax exemptions had reached the point where those
who had the strength to pay taxes and who ought to have paid them
did not and those who ought not to have paid and lacked the strength
to do so had their burden increased.

Contemporaries had warned

that such inequality was more dangerous to the state's tranquility
than Inadequate production.

The great clans had walled themselves

off in isolation from the people.

True leadership would have, by

establishing equality, brought the people back to unity.
The pervasive selfishness of the gentry had led to a fin de
^^ spirit among the people.

The merchants dissipated their

wealth in riotous living, thinking only of the day and not of their
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future fate, prepared to invite the bandits in once they reached the
gates.

If the ruler had been able to make the people his primary

interest, wiping selfishness from his own heart, he could have
brought men's hearts together and warded off the bandits to save the
dynasty.
The exploits of the "rushing bandit" Li Tzu-ch'eng are the
bloodiest in the annals of Chinese history.

Originating in Shensi,

he affected the entire empire for nearly two decades.

Li began as

a postal runner in a part of Shensi suffering from the depredations
of one of chief eunuch Wei Chung-hsien's henchmen and then joined
the ranks of rebellious soldiers who had turned to banditry.
in the Yenan area, he moved to Ninghsia
remarriage to a soldier.

Born

after his widowed mother's

After his stepfather's death he drifted

into a lower-class life of violent crime and thence to banditry.
In I64l Loyang fell to him, but K'aifeng successfully resisted
his siege.
times.

In the course of his career Li besieged K'aifengthree

Though never successful, the last siege was so tight and

evoked such Draconian defensive measures that human flesh was sell
ing for two ounces of silver per chin and barely 20,000 people
remained alive in the city when the siege was lifted.
Having devastated Honan, Li moved into Hupei where his power
waxed and he began to consolidate his power over other roving ban
dits.

He set up his capital in Hsiangyang and began to plan for

the seizure of the north and Peking.

He soon occupied most of

Shensi, with Sian as his new western capital and began to receive
the surrender of Ming generals, even including the former defender
of K'aifeng.
He then sent men across the Yellow River into Shansi and pro
claimed a new dynasty with himself as its head.
totaled 400,000 infantry and 600,000 cavalry.
military power in Shansi he advanced on Peking.

His army now
Having broken Ming
Earlier, cavalry

raids had given him excellent intelligence while simultaneously
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cutting off all sources of information to the Ming Court.
The last Ming emperor committed suicide as Li's forces broke
into the capital.

Li drained the capital of its wealth, renamed all

the bureaucratic institutions and decreed that each five families
be responsible for the maintenance of one of his men.

But the loot

ing and murdering by his men cost Li the loyalty of the people of
the capital, and though Honan and Shantung nominally recognized his
suzerainty. General Wu San-kuei ultimately invited the Manchus to
his aid at Shanhaikuan rather than come over to Li's side.
The Ming-Manchu force defeated Li at the pass and he fled Pe
king, carrying his loot back with him toward Sian.
bandits turned on each other.

In defeat the

The Manchus forced Li from Sian back

to Hsiangyang and then Wu-ch'ang.

Li was finally forced into the

hills with only a remnant of his old force where he was killed
while raiding a village.
Almost as spectacular was the violent career of Li's contempor
ary, the roving bandit Chang Hsien-chung who ravaged Shensi, Honan,
Hupei and Szechwan, for a time in concert with Li Tzu-ch'eng until
jealousy drove them apart.

After feigning return to loyalty to

the dynasty, Chang took the first opportunity to again rebel and
set himself up in Szechwan until repeated defeats forced him to
save himself by joining Li Tzu-ch'eng's now more successful move
ment.

A series of bloody campaigns put Chang in control of Wu-

ch'ang, but fearing Li's jealousy he fled into Hunan, taking Ch'angsha and moving far enough east into Kiangsi to alarm the Kwangtung
border before deciding to pull back into Szechwan to evade his pui—
suers.

With his capital at Ch'eng-tu, he soon reduced virtually

all of Szechwan to submission.
Chang's twin passions were murder and drink.

He regretted

letting a day pass without killing a man, and his policy toward
the gentry in his service in Szechwan was predictable only in its
violence.

After being driven out of Peking Lf Tzu-ch-eng tried
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unsuccessfully to force his way into Szechwan.

By this time Chang's

cruelties had left Szechwan ripe for a comeback by the authorities.
Chang tried to hold on to power by intensifying his terrorism and
changing his own abode every night to avoid assassination.

He fi

nally evacuated Ch'engtu, leaving it in flames and the territory
around it for a thousand J_|_ a desert.

Intending to kill off his own

Szechwanese troops before taking off for Hupei, Chang was instead
betrayed to the Manchus by one of them and killed by the Manchus.
Just before his death Chang ordered his most trusted subordinate to
return his loyalties to the Ming.

At the last even this bestial

bandit uttered this expression of renewed loyalty.
History is the melancholy record of mankind's struggle for ex
istence.

In this struggle, error and obstacles and disasters are

unavoidable.

Much blood and tears must be shed before history's

lessons are learned.

There are many earlier precedents for the de

predations of roving bandits like Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsienchung, going back to the Yellow Turbans.

In spite of earlier suc

cesses, they have all been ultimately destroyed.

Their Taoist

religious basis was not enough to save the Yellow Turbans.

Huang

Ch'ao, Li Tzu-ch'eng and Chang Hsien-chung all relied on terror as
well as the pretense of setting up a new dynasty.
their acts could ultimately save them.

But none of

Indeed, their terror was

what ruined them for, as Mencius said, the world will only be
united by one who does not kill men.
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Section XI
THE AGE OF FERMENTATION: THE CH'ING DYNASTY

Outiine
Lasting from 16AA to 1911, the Manchus' Ch'ing dynasty halted
the progress of the Chinese economy because of the narrow-mindedness
and decadence of the imperial clan and Manchu officialdom.

The

Manchus originated as one of the three main branches of the Jurched
people of Manchuria who had founded the Chin dynasty In the twelfth
century.

The Manchus' branch was settled in the Chien-chou area.

They were united in the late sixteenth century by the chief Nurhachi
who in 1616 proclaimed the Latter Chin Khanate.

Before long, with

his 60,000-man army (organized into eight banners of 7,500 men each)
he defeated the Ming and occupied Liaotung.

Within thirty years,

having changed their dynastic name to Ch'ing in 1640, the Manchus
took advantage of Ming decadence, the rise of internal banditry and
the treason of Ming officers like Wu San-kuei to enter China and
occupy Peking in 16^A.
The period from then until 1911 was one of the greatest import
in world history.

This was the age of popular awakening, of the

scientific and industrial revolutions, of mercantilism's expansion
of world trade, the rise of democratic states, of imperial expan
sion in an age when no nation could remain isolated and advanced
nations came to rule over the economically less developed states.
The entire world's economy was revolutionized by this new era of
capitalism.

The nations transcended the limits of their traditions,

as England did in producing a democratic revolution in I6A9-53,
as France's Louis XIV did in shaking Europe, as Russia did with its
Europeanization after I689, and culminating with the American and
French revolutions in the eighteenth century.

By this time England

had established the base for the industrial revolution, the
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imitation of which was one of the main aims of the Meiji Restoration
of 1868 in Japan.

By the end of the eighteenth century England and

America had established the base for their modernization.

Democracy

and industrialization flourished together.
But what were China's accomplishments during this period?

The

Manchus had still not transcended their barbarous pastoral origins.
Their government's decadence and self-satisfaction led to a policy
of isolation and unwillingness to seek progress.

But from the Opium

War on China could not remain self-sufficient, and the economic
power of Europe and America deeply penetrated China.

At this point

China's economy began to change and gradually enter the road to
modernization.
Factors Moving China's Economy Toward Modernization
In Nurhachi's time the Manchus treated captured Chinese like
slaves and once in power the verbal forms of the master-slave rela
tionship were in large part retained, and real persecution was
practiced through such devices as the literary inquisition.
ments were crueler than those of YUan and Ming times.

Punish

Power was

increasingly centralized, local appointments having to be made by
the central, not regional authorities, and no man could serve in
his home province nor have any relatives serve with him.

Key posts

were reserved for Manchus, showing the essentially colonial nature
of the regime.

Unlike the Mongols, the Manchus made extensive use

of Chinese officials, and thus they were rapidly sinicized but also
became decadent and corrupt, and corruption spread from the top
down to local government.

The corruption of such men as Ho-shen,

who dominated the government for twenty years in the Ch'ien-lung
reign, significantly affected the national economy.
There was an unprecedented growth of tax-free manors, 80% to
90^ of them belonging to the Manchus and largely used to support
the imperial clan, other Manchu clans, and the banner forces and to
establish garrison fields.

Aside from the land confiscated from
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the Ming imperial estates, land was also taken away from ordinary
commoners and removed from the tax rolls.

Nothing was done for the

improvement of this medieval agricultural system at a time when
other nations were progressing into modernity in their agricultures.
An important reason for our lack of economic progress was the
dynasty's intellectual isolationism.

The British East India Company,

founded in 1600, succeeded in entering the China trade by the late
seventeenth century, but by the end of the following century they
were limited to the one port of Canton and obliged to trade solely
through the Co-hong middlemen merchants, largely because of the
dynasty's isolationism.

This isolationism was an obstacle to the

new spirit of free trade and anti-feudal absolutism which dominated
England in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.

Two English diplo

matic missions in 1793 and I8l6 had failed to win either free trade
or equality of status for English.

This failure made inevitable

the Opium War and China's subsequent vulnerability to international
imperialism under the unequal treaties.
Though the Portuguese were the first to bring opium into China,
the British East India Company gained a monopoly over the trade
after I780.

All through the eighteenth century England suffered

from an unfavorable balance of trade with China.

Only a few novel

ties, like clocks for the upper classes, could be sold.

Aside from

such items as silk and tea, large amounts of Chinese cotton were
sold to England especially early in the century, as the English
cotton industry, not yet industrialized, could not compete with
the Chinese product. The resulting deficit was met by exports of
silver to China until the rise of the illicit opium trade put the
deficit on the Chinese side beginning in 1828.
In 1833 the Ch'ing court banned the export of silver.

Its

determination to suppress the opium trade by the sending of Lin
Tse-hsu onspecial assignment to Canton ran up against England's
determination to preserve the trade so as to avoid a return to
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its earlier trade deficit with China, the current surplus also con
tributing to the fiscal health of Britain's Indian colony.

The

British Lord Palmerston also wanted to use the occasion to open
China to trade in general.

The Chinese, not realizing British

strength, were also prepared to risk war.

When the British won the

struggle, China was obliged to accept the Treaty of Nanking.
The opportunities for the West to trade with China thereby pro
vided were the occasion for the first penetration of capitalism into
China and the beginning of the transformation of its economy.

But

the placing by the unequal treaties of the collection of foreign
customs duties into the hands of foreigners contravened the prin
ciples of international equality and free trade.

The 5Z tax on all

goods in foreign trade, regardless of their type, hindered China's
economic development.

English management of the customs service

often reduced or abolished the tax for foreigners but not for our
countrymen.

Foreign goods, unlike domestic products, were exempt

from any further internal taxation.

As further military losses to

the foreigners piled up higher indemnity obligations, the proceeds
of other tax sources such as the salt and 1ikin were diverted to
their payment and placed under control of the already foreigndominated maritime customs.
The use of foreign capital to construct railroads caused no
great harm to China. Though of profit to these foreigners, rail
roads were of still greater profit to China.

Those Westerners who

built railroads for aggressive purposes did not limit their mis
chief to the economic aspects.

After I895, Russia, Germany and

France forced Japan out of her newly won position in Liaotung and
Russia took the initiative by winning a railroad right-of-way
across Manchuria for a shortcut for the Trans-Siberian railroad.
In exchange China's Li Hung-chang won a secret treaty of defense
against Japan.
in Shantung.

In 1897 Germany won railroad and mining concessions
Russia's riposte was to occupy southern Liaotung so

as to build the South Manchuria Railway.

Russia's occupation of
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all Manchuria during the Boxer disturbances evoked the AngloJapanese treaty which made possible the Russo-Japanese war of 1904
and Japan's takeover of southern Manchuria.

The latter in turn,

led ultimately to the eight-year defensive war against Japan after
1937-

The mischievous effects of these events were certainly not

solely connected with their economic aspects.
The most harmful aspect of the foreigners' economic aggression
against China was their snatching of mining rights.

Such attempts

increased after the Boxer disturbances and brought China closer to
colonial status.
After 1895 Japan established textile factories in China, and
America and England, under the most-favored-nation clauses of the
treaties got similar rights.
owned factories in China.

By I9II there were over I60 foreign-

Foreign postal, inland waterway shipping,

and banking establishments grew in strength from the l860's.
China's foreign trade balance tended to grow worse after 1842, but
deficits remained manageable (and balanced by some surpluses) until
after I890.
Sun Yat-sen characterized China's position then as being that
of a "semi-colony" whose situation was worse than that of a full
colony.

Sun estimated that China's losses to all forms of foreign

exploitation amounted to no less than two billion yuan annually.
Though the people were being impoverished and society unsettled,
this economic agression had its good side.

Knowledge was increas

ing, superstitions were being smashed, and the medieval feudal
self-sufficient economy, which could no longer be maintained, was
disintegrated and the millenia-old "changeless" economy and society
were fundamentally revolutionized.

It was an age of economic ren

aissance and fermentation.
Tseng Kuo-fan was among the earliest of the intellectuals to
realize the need for fundamental change after the Opium War, and
from such men came the T'ung-chih Restoration.

Men like Tseng and
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Prince Kung, though without much experience with or knowledge of
the West, understood the practical usefulness of Western science
and technology.

During the T'ung-chih period, Germany and Italy

completed their unification and America resolved its civil war,
adding three more to the great powers of England, Russia and France
who had been aggressing against China.
Of the T'ung-chih era leaders Li Hung-chang had the most posi
tive and progressive attitude toward Western technology, the older
leaders tending to despair that their generation could ever grasp
these things' principles.

In 186A Li wrote Prince Kung to deplore

China's obtuse technological backwardness.

If the Japanese, the

piratical dwarfs of Ming times, could send missions abroad and learn
to build weapons and steamships for themselves, so too could China,
Li argued.

Emphasis had to be placed on getting men who could

build machines and acquiring machines to build machines so that de
pendence on foreigners could be minimized and China could engage
in self-strengthening.
In 1861 foreign warships were purchased and British naval of
ficers were put to work training a new army in Tientsin.

The

T'ung Wen Kuan (School for Translators) was established in Peking
to encourage the new studies.

In I863 Li established a foreign

language school in Shanghai and in I865 Tseng and Li set up the
Chiangnan Arsenal in Shanghai was a translation bureau attached to
it.

Eventually students were sent abroad.

Mining operations were

begun, military and naval academies established, a telegraph line
begun.

Though these men were the pioneers who set the precedent

for all later modernization, they did not succeed in reaching their
goal of self-strengthening.

The buds they produced were plucked

before they could flower and theirs' was only an age of fermenta
tion.
In general, the West sacrificed equality of distribution for
productive efficiency; China sacrificed productive efficiency for
equality of distribution.

Ours was an economic policy of negative
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self-limitation; theirs one of positive progress.

Hence China ulti

mately lost its initial superiority to the Western economies, and
in the age of imperialism suffered the ruin of its villages' handi
crafts and increase in its urban unemployed.
The old remedies unavailing, a new tide of thought ultimately
arose among China's intellectuals.

Tseng Kuo-fan's predecessor as

head of the Hunan Army had despairingly said after seeing his first
steamboat, "This is not something our generation can understand."
But Tseng had enough experience of the foreigners to understand
something of the basis for their superiority.

In his later years

Tseng devoted his energies to having steamship machinery construc
ted and students sent abroad.

Many of the most important men of

the late nineteenth century were either from his original staff or
from among these students.
Tseng had absorbed the characteristic Confucian passion for
economy and simplicity of life and exhibited these virtues in his
personal life.

He also advocated frugality by public authority so

as not to overburden the people.

Of agricultural origins himself

and havmg witnessed the destruction of agriculture during the
Taiping Rebellion, he quite naturally emphasized agriculture over
commerce in his economic thought.

Commerce, he argued, had been

far less adversely affected by the rebellion.

In addition to re

questing tax remission for the lower Yangtze provinces, he used
Chu Hsi's cooperative granary scheme in Hunan, financed by contri
butions from the wealthy and charging 10% for loans of grain to
the poor.

In 1868 he supervised the building of dikes using for

eign machinery.

Use of the 1ikin tax had spread to meet the fiscal

needs of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion.

Tseng advocated its

extension to Shanghai, partly on the grounds that it was a lesser
evil to burden commerce with this unfair tax than to further burden
agriculture.
Having seen the efficacy of foreign arms during the rebellion
and having come to understand China's weak diplomatic position
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through dealing with the foreigners after the rebellion, Tseng took
as his motto “Study the barbarians' techniques so as to control the
barbarians."

Tseng's aim in constructing steamships and cannon was

to simultaneously train Chinese in the techniques of their construe"
tion so as to ultimately not have to depend on the skills of for
eigners.

The students whom Tseng had so long argued ought to be

sent abroad finally left in 1872, a month before he died.
Tseng was a transitional figure, a conservative in his attempt
to preserve the old society, but in his old age a reformer in his
adoption of foreign economic techniques.
Li Hung-chang, Tseng's younger disciple, built on the founda
tion Tseng had established.

In 1873 Li argued that the coming of

the Western imperialists was without precedent in the three thou
sand years of Chinese history, and that it would be possible to
eventually neutralize their power only by mastering their own tech
niques for manufacturing weapons of war.

He soon realized that

weapons manufacture required iron and steel production which in
turn required mining.

Continued penetration by foreign capitalism

evoked new emphasis on light industry and spinning and weaving
factories.

At first officially managed, such industries eventu

ally became merchant-managed government-supervised establishments
with an aura of mercantilism about them.

Up until 1895 most such

innovations came about under Li's inspiration.
During the l870's arsenals and shipyards were set up in Shang
hai and Nanking.

In l880 a north-south telegraph was built and

railroad construction requested.

During the early l890's spinning

and weaving mills were established in Shanghai.
When these proved insufficient to avoid defeat at the hands
of the French and then the Japanese, Li was accused by critics
like Liang Ch'i-ch'ao of shortsightedness, of having concentrated
on acquisition of foreign weapons at the expense of fundamental
reform.

Li acknowledged the limitations of his reforms but
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insisted that military strength had to be the basis for all further
improvements.

His main handicap was to be limited by the institu

tional arrangements of the Ch'ing and the shortage of men with ap
propriate talents.
Chang Chih-tung was politically less powerful than Li but his
equal as an economic builder.

Chang contributed greatly to tra

ditional scholarship's support during his numerous regional tours
of duty as a civil official.

He also encouraged railroad build

ing, mining and silk processing.

His motto was "Chinese learning

for the substance, Western learning for practical use."
could be neglected, but neither should be misused.

Neither

Traditional

studies would cultivate the spirit within and hence preserve China
as China.

Western studies would be used in the material world

but would not interfere with classical studies and hence not in
terfere with the cultivation of the traditional virtues.

The

principles of the sages, the lessons of history on how to control
disorder, were all still valid.

Western improvements would merely

supplement the deficiencies of Chinese practice.
By admitting some Western ideas as legitimate Chang went a
step beyond Tseng and Li, though from our perspective he still
seems a conservative.

In 1901, in the aftermath of the Eight-

Power Intervention, Chang made several recommendations:

(l) The

sending of large numbers of men abroad to study the sources of the
foreigners' strength.

(2) Wholehearted changeover to foreign

models of military organization and equipment.

(3) New policies

to encourage agriculture (the basis of the economy) through new
techniques and tax forgiveness for opening new land.

(A) New

policies to encourage industry through patent rights, tax abate
ment, and the establishment of modern commercial and criminal law
codes to provide a climate of security within which Chinese capi
talists could develop.
would result.

The creation of large-scale corporations

The lower costs of production would yield within a

decade lower prices competitive with those of the foreigners.
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(5) Use of the silver yuan to limit exchange abuses by officials and
facilitate the flow of money in commercial life.

(6) Establishment

of a stamp tax to be placed on the great majority of foreign goods
not yet taxed.

(7) The establishment of a modern postal system with

its local offices under chou and hsien management.
translation of foreign books.

(8) Intensified

Unfortunately, the Dowager Empress

remained a conservative at heart, and none of Chang's proposals was
adopted during the next five years, except his proposal for greater
study abroad to substitute for the defunct examination system.
Kuo Sung~l?ao, the dynasty's first ambassador abroad, was even
tually Impeached by conservatives for his reports from London call
ing for reform along Western lines.

He pointed out that most of

the new devices which ensured Western superiority hardly dated back
to the early years of the century, especially the railroad and
telegraph which were most important for the state's security.

Kuo

realized that military affairs ran a distant second to economic
factors in making the West wealthy and powerful, and hence he rec
ommended that, like Japan, China should have its overseas students
emphasize the learning of economic techniques.

But this was an

idea for which the men of Li Hung-chang's generation were not yet
ready.
Another diplomat, Hslieh Fu-ch'eng, argued that China's tra
ditional favoring of the scholar over the inventor and industrial
ist would have to be reversed and specialization be encouraged.
He warned that unless the productivity of Chinese labor was in
creased by industrialization, China's large labor force would not
be able to match the low prices of foreign goods, even within
China.

Railroads had to be built for internal security and to

encourage trade by Chinese entrepreneurs who should be further
aided by tax holidays of three years for new enterprises.
Ma Chien-chung was another diplomat protege of Li Hung-chang.
He argued that the path to wealth and power lay through a mercantilistic policy of having exports exceed imports, exports to be
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encouraged by loans funnelled through a Ministry of Commerce from
foreign sources to Chinese enterprises.

He also advocated use of

foreign capital for railroad building but paid less attention than
Hsueh to the problem of avoiding consequent foreign control.

Like

the Western mercantilists he wanted to encourage mining of gold and
silver and urged Li Hung-chang to preserve the mineral resources of
the far north from Russian takeover.

Ma called for the complete

abolition of the 1ikin as an unfair burden on Chinese but not for
eigners' commerce, but this tax was not to be abolished until 1931.
The reform faction led by K'ang Yu-wei rose briefly to power
in 1898 in the wake of the failure of the self-strengthening move
ment to stop imperialist encroachments, but it only remained in
power for a hundred days before it was overthrown and six of its
members were martyred by the court reactionaries.

Though K'ang

lived on until 1927 he was henceforth without infl uence.
The society K'ang envisioned in his book Ta T'unq Shu (The
Great Harmony) was a hybrid between Confucian notions and various
Western ideas, adding up to a species of anarcho-communism.

Under

the Great Harmony there would be no states, no class or racial
divisions, no war or poverty.

His economic principle was the elim

ination of private property and establishment of public production.
All agricultural land would be owned publicly, and public authori
ties at the national, regional and local levels would decide what
was to be grown and by what means to meet actual needs.

Private

property would also be forbidden in industry and communications.
Using industrial methods under these conditions of absolute
equality, a day's labor might be completed in three or four hours
or less and the balance of a day devoted to leisure and study.
Private commerce would be replaced by a Ministry of Commerce which,
on the basis of its knowledge of local population sizes and varying
needs, would assure equitable distribution through its regional and
local branches.

There would be no bad goods or cheating merchants,

merely transportation men, clerks and accountants.
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In practice, K'ang had more modest goals:

to establish the

administrative basis for capitalism while preserving the Confucian
moral values in politics.

In his Ten-thousand-Word Memorial to the

Kuang-hsu emperor, he called for a large number of reforms:

issu

ance of paper money backed by gold and silver in the public treasury,
building of railroads financed by public subscriptions to avoid
foreign control, allowing the people to build modern machinery rather
than attempting to keep monopoly control in government hands, en
couragement of mining engineering and establishment of a 5^ flat
rate tax on production, the minting of silver coins and ultimately
gold ones so as to eliminate foreign coinage from the domestic mar
ket, and establishment of a government run postal system in con
junction with the railroad network.
To nourish the people K'ang urged the establishment under gov
ernment supervision of agricultural societies to diffuse the knowl
edge to be obtained from foreign agricultural treatises, the estab
lishment of a network of workmen's academies to diffuse new tech
niques among the population, establishment of commercial institutes,
followed by lowering of export taxes to encourage commercial growth,
and encouragement of migration to the northwest and Manchuria to
relieve poverty.

Such migrants would receive special training.

It was essentially a democratic capitalism that K'ang called
for in his immediate reform proposals.

But unlike England and

France, who had to go through long and bloody revolutionary ex
periences before establishing their capitalist systems, K'ang
proposed to merely take advantage of foreign threats and the good
will of an emperor to impose such changes on a still feudalistlcaristocratic court.

Hence his failure.

In its aftermath, K'ang

remained loyal to the dynasty in the manner of a true Confucian,
losing thereby the allegiance of those Chinese abroad who were
turning to revolution, but without himself ever regaining his po
sition within the dynasty.
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T'an Seu-t'ungand Liang Ch' i-ch'ao were K'ang's chief disciples.
T'an, though a brilliant thinker, wrote little on economics.
During his fourteen-year exile in Japan after I898 Liang broke
with K'ang to become a republican.

Unsuccessful in politics after

the revolution, Liang turned to teaching and writing in his last
years.

But his scholarship too was limited by his presentist as

sumptions.

He was, however, very influential among late Ch'ing

and early republican young intellectuals.
He believed in the creation of a "new people" through education
as being more fundamental than political reform.

He argued that

China's poverty was not due to lack of land or labor but their un
profitable application to production of goods which did not them
selves produce additional goods.

This unprofitable notion was

based on the concept in the Ta Hsueh (Great Learning) that producers
must be many and consumers few.

Traditional Chinese industry could

not compete with that of the West after the industrial revolution,
was decaying inexorably, and yet its replacement by modern industry
was not evident.
cient capital.

China lacked both advanced technology and suffi
Hence Chinese commerce could only be a subsidiary

of foreign commerce.
In agriculture, Liang noted Chinese special crops like tea and
sugar could no longer compete with equivalent foreign products,
and ordinary crops were barely sufficient for domestic consumption
even in good years.

In bad years and because of tax increases

farmers were steadily driven off the land, leading to a repeating
cycle of poverty causing disorder causing still more poverty.
Liang advocated the application of the principles of sixteenthcentury European mercantilism to contemporary China, arguing that
any resulting diminution of economic freedom would be more than
compensated by increased national wealth.

In fiscal policy he

advocated strict control of expenditures to meet only genuine needs
through a carefully prepared budget, a state monopoly on salt
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sales, encouragement of a modern native banking system and going on
a gold exchange standard as the closest China could approach a full
gold standard.
Though no reactionary (he introduced St. Simon's ideas into
China), Liang was often inconsistent, praising Kuan Tze and Wang
An-shih but denigrating Sun Yat-sen for partisan reasons.

A self-

confessed dilletante, his contributions to economic thought were
not great.

/

Yen Fu did not participate in the I898 Reform.

He had received

a modern education in China and then in England, serving as a tea
cher upon his return.

Though he was among those calling for

fundamental domestic reform after I895 (he argued that 70^ of the
reason for China's defeat was domestic), he did not win favor and
remained restricted to a life of wide-ranging scholarship.
It was as a translator of Western works that he helped lay the
base for China's renewal.

He especially emphasized the works of

the English political and economic philosophers, like Mill, Spencer,
Adam Smith, and T. H. Huxley who had laid the basis for modern
Western capitalism and democracy.

He was a proponent of the evolu

tionism of Darwin, Huxley and Spencer and its application to both
individuals and societies.

China would grow competitive with the

Western powers not by simply imitating their innovations but by
instituting economic and political democracy which would enable
the Chinese as individuals to become competitive with Westerners.
He opposed mercantilism and favored Adam Smith's laissez-faire,
though he also approved of state monopolies over the postal service
and telegraph and state pioneering in new industries which could
not yield immediate profit.

Population growth could bring disaster

unless production grew proportionately.

Though two or three dec

ades of sustained effort would be sufficient to retrieve China's
position. Yen feared (and his fears proved justified) that such
efforts would evoke hostile countermeasures by the imperial powers.

In youth and middle age Yen believed firmly in fundamental re
form, but in his later years, seeing the destruction of the first
world war, his faith in modernization was shaken, and he reempha
sized the value of China's traditional Confucian thought.
By the last years of the Ch'ing, reformers had gone beyond
their earlier limited concern with armaments and steamships as the
requisites for modernization and much work was done in railroad
building, mining and manufacturing.

Sheng Hsiian-huai may be taken

as representative of the official managers of such enterprises and
Chang Chien of the mercantile-managed enterprises.
Sheng was originally merely a minor official.

He rose in

status and wealth as a bureaucratic manager of modern enterprises
like the telegraph, railroads and mines under the sponsorship of
Li Hung-chang and Chang Chih-tung.

His scheme for a great national

railroad system was aborted by the revolution.

He advocated aboli

tion of the 1ikin tax, raising of the tariff to 10%, establishment
of a modern banking system, creation of a silver coinage and a
unified money system with mints in Canton, Hupei, Tientsin and
Shanghai to produce a range of coins which would become the sole
medium for payment of all forms of taxation.
He did not want the modern banking network to be officially
managed lest abuses arise.
lic spirited merchants.

It should be owned and managed by pub

It should be allowed to issue paper notes

and, if successful, would ultimately make possible the establish
ment of a central state bank.

He initially argued that a special

corporation ought to be set up to build railroads, dominated by
private Chinese capital and management, but with some government
and foreign capital as well.
mind.

By 1911, however, he changed his

Because of corruption which had appeared in privately man

aged railroads, he advocated national ownership of the main trunk
routes, limiting merchant-gentry ownership to local lines.

Sheng

remained adamant against local opposition to his plan to national
ize the trunk routes, and this led to the riots in Szechwan which
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provided the opportunity for the Wuhan uprising to take place and
the consequent overthrow of the dynasty.
Chang Chien was an early exception to the general opinion among
the gentry that modern industry ought to be an official responsi
bility.

Rather, he argued, achievement of high office ought to come

sfter a man had achieved success in business.

Giving up prospects

for an official career, he returned to his native Nant'ung region
in the southeast to pioneer a modern cloth industry and eventually
set up a network of additional businesses and social services, like
primary and vocational schools, with his profits.
He also advocated governmental reform, including establishment
of a convertible hard currency, establishing a network of provin
cial banks as the tax reception agencies, rationalization of the
tax system, establishment of vocational schools and colleges, and
encouragement of local corporations for mining and local railroad
1ines.
Agriculture, in Chang's view, remained the foundation for man
ufacture and hence trade and military power.

In addition to tax

holidays for newly cultivated land, agricultural corporations
should be encouraged as the modern way to mobilize capital for
technological improvements.

Unlike traditional advocates of the

primacy of agriculture, Chang held that commerce, particularly
cloth and iron manufacture, must be the instrument for improving
agriculture.

When in charge of agriculture and commerce In 1913>

he made this a formal policy.
Chang opposed socialism, arguing that wealth and poverty were
ultimately the consequence of differences in Intelligence and
energy among different people and that China's traditions of social
harmony could allow it to avoid the class jealousies that had
plagued Western countries without resort to socialism.
All of the above men could only propose partial remedies.
remained for Sun Yat-sen to offer the fundamental revolutionary

It
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resolution of China's dilemma by recognizing that the very existence
of the Ch'ing dynasty was an obstacle to true reform.
Mr. Sun's education was entirely modern.

He was entirely free

from the inhibitions of a traditional education.
convinced revolutionary.

He was also a

He even viewed his training as a physician

as a means to modernity rather than an end in itself.

In 1894 he

wrote a letter to Li Hung-chang calling for large-scale imitation
of the West as the only true path to national resurgence.

Educa

tion, Sun wrote, must be along Western and practical lines, par
ticularly for officials.

The state must actively encourage mechan

ization of agriculture and the opening of new land so that
population would not outstrip production.

Unprofitable activities

based on superstition must be replaced by use of ever better devel
oped technology based on the replacement of animal energy by steam
and electricity.

All internal tariffs must be abolished and only

a tariff on imports retained so as to encourage the growth of the
economy.

Only a rail network would be capable of fully opening

the interior to modernization.
This first stage of Sun's development of his economic thought
emphasized production rather than distribution, but it already
established the economic realm as more primary than the political
or military, something Li Hung-chang could not conceive.
Sun's ideas on the people's livelihood first began to crys
tal ize during his travels in Europe from I896 to I898.

He noted

that even though the West had solved the problem of production, it
had not solved the social question of distribution.

If China

could solve that question, it could modernize without running the
ultimate risk of revolution which now faced the West.
The goal of people's livelihood was to assure equal distribu
tion of society's wealth, and most such wealth was in land.

The

land's value was increased by the labor put into it, but the land
lord reaped an unearned increment from this increased value which

17^

ought to revert to the public.

Though China's landlords were large'

ly small-scale, early action was necessary to head off big land
lordism.

The ideal behind equalization was the same as that of the

ancient well-field system, but the practice had to be different.
Formerly men had been scarce and land plentiful whereas now the
reverse was the case.

Equalization could be achieved by taxation

or by the state buying excess land from private landowners thereby
limiting but not destroying the right of private ownership of land.
The recent land-to-the-ti1ler program of land reform on Taiwan ful
fills Dr. Sun's goals.

It is fundamentally different from the

Communist "land reform" which makes the state the single great
landlord of the country.
As Sun originally envisioned it, the present land value would
remain the property of its owners, but the boundless increase in
land value after the revolution would be taken over by the state,
to be used for needed increases in social services.

Right after

the revolution the price of the land would be determined and there
after its tax or purchase price would be proportioned to increases
in its price so as to nationalize its monopoly rent.
would set their own price for their land.

Landowners

Should they undervalue

it, what they save in taxes they will more than lose when the
government buys them out at the low price they have themselves set.
Conversely, if they overprice their land, they will pay an ex
cessive amount of taxes.
administration easy.

The principle here is simple and its

Hence the age-old problem of eliminating

corruption in the collection of taxes is in principle solved by
this reform.

By levying only a single tax on the value of land,

the non-usage of land would be discouraged as even unused land
would be taxed.

Moreover, the efficient use of labor and capital

would be encouraged because improvements on the land would not be
taxed.
The application of this single tax in Canton city alone. Sun
argued, would provide government with enormous revenues to
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encourage electrification and roadbuilding without further burdening
the people.

Rural land bought by the state could be equitably re

distributed among cultivators.

It would be easier, Sun reasoned,

to institute this reform before modernization had driven up the
price of land all over China to the degree that Shanghai land prices
had risen during the preceding forty years.

If this great increase

in monopoly rent was reserved for public use, the growth of great
capitalists and resulting social inequality, like that of Europe,
could be avoided.

If not checked, the landowner usurps the profit

justly belonging to capital and the wages due labor.
Sun was advocating a land-to-the-ti1ler reform as early as
1907, a decade before the Russian revolution.

guished

Even then he distin

between improvements on the land, which should be private

ly owned, and the natural land itself the value of which should be
publicly held.
Sun realized how short China was of capital for building rail
roads and canals, opening mines and financing machine industries
and hence, though he understood the danger of creating invidious
class distinctions, he was willing to see private Chinese and
foreign capital engaged in such enterprises.

By I919 Sun had

worked out what amounted to an economic plan for China (before the
USSR had adopted this method) which envisioned the state undertak
ing those enterprises which individual capitalists were unable to
take on.
Sun denied that class conflict was the source of social pro
gress, and though he believed that the struggle for existence was
the cause of progress, he denied Marx's principle of materialism.
Social progress could only take place when the majority gained
profit.

Nor did Sun accept the Marxian theory of surplus value.

A factory owner need not reduce his workers' wages to gain a profit.
The history of the preceding seventy years had demonstrated Marx's
inaccuracy as a prophet.
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Land Distribution and Agricultural Credit Policies
The Manchus behaved like their Chin dynasty ancestors and the
Mongols with regard to the land.

They usurped land, particularly

the imperial and official manors of Ming, for distribution among the
imperial clan and the eight banners.

The Ming manorial system was

already extensive enough to have displaced many peasants.

The large

number of unproductive and often non~office holding bannermen ex~
acerbated the situation.

The provincial horse stations of the

local banner garrisons also took much land from cultivation.

An

attempt in 1725 to set up a Mencian well-field system for landless
bannermen failed within a decade largely because of the bannermen's
tendency to sell the land to outsiders.

Each manor had an heredi

tary head whose main duty was to forward the rents from the excess
of which he supported himself.
Imperial manors originated from voluntary cession of private
lands as well as from confiscated Ming imperial manors.
banner lands were concentrated in Chihli.

The Manchu

The lands of the Mongol

and Chinese banners were spread among the other outlying provinces.
One class of manors in Chihli and Manchuria served to nurture the
official troops of the eight banners.

The eight banner manors were

not supposed to be alienable, but in 1853 this rule was abrogated
as too difficult to enforce.
The garrison-fields institution went back to the first century
B.C. when it was used in Kansu to ward off the Hsiungnu.

It con

tinued to be used for a variety of purposes through Ming, but under
Ch'ing its functions had been largely taken over by the banner
system; by the eighteenth century it was abolished in all but name
and formally abolished in I898.
Official fields awarded to worthy families, like the descend
ants of Mencius and Confucius, and to support poor scholars were
tax exempt.

Monastic and temple lands had been largely confiscated

by the state in late Ming,

During Ch'ing they never recovered to
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the size of the T'ang churchly estates.
By the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign Manchu and Chinese offi
cials had become corrupt.

The population had increased to three

hundred million and a shortage of uncultivated land had appeared.
Rebellions were caused by both political and economic hardship from
as early as the 1770's.

The Taiping Rebellion of the l850's was

the culmination of this trend.

Most of Hung Hsiu-ch' uan's followers,

including his chief lieutenants, were impoverished farmers, unem
ployed artisans, petty merchants and dissatisfied intellectuals.
According to the Taiping rules all land was the possession of
the Heavenly Father and Heavenly Elder Brothers and was bestowed
equally on all by the Heavenly Emperor.

According to the Taiping

regulations of 1853> land was classified in nine grades and was to
be distributed in proportion to the size of families, men and women
being counted equally.
Taiping state.

All surplus product was to revert to the

No goods were to be held as private property.

An

equitable conscription system and a network of churches and local
treasuries were established.
illegal.

Footbinding and slavery were made

All these reforms were in accord with peasant demands.

But after taking Nanking Hung abandoned these utopian goals to
establish a traditional dynastic structure which soon degenerated
into bloody factionalism and ultimately led the peasant masses to
abandon the movement.
To stabilize the chaos into which the countryside had fallen
since late Ming, the early Ch'ing rulers reinstituted the pao-chia
system and attempted to regularize certificates of landownership,
especially for those who opened up new land.

Attempts were made

to discourage slaughter of draft animals and acquisition of land
by officials.

Loans of draft animals and tools were also made.

Pioneers of remote territories were given housing and travel sub
sidies.

As a consequence, 1.8 million mou of new land was opened

annually from 1662 to 1766.
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Ever-normal relief granaries were established.

Rich men were

rewarded for contributing to local cooperative relief granaries,
but a tendency to retain reserves of 70^ kept the granaries from
selling enough grain to reduce prices sufficiently during times of
high prices.

In 1723 new rules attempted to remedy this defect.

By the l850's rebellions had depleted grain reserves and after
1870 grain imports were necessary to supplement domestic production,

ending China's self-sufficiency in food.
After the Taiping Rebellion rural pawnshops which made short
term loans increased in importance.

Some attempts were made re

gionally to limit their interest rates, but the government had
traditionally been connected with their profitability through taxes
on their business.

In the last years of Ch'ing there was an abor

tive attempt to set up modern rural credit banks, but only one
branch was actually established.

Though ostensibly based on French

and Japanese models, the new bank actually more closely resembled
the traditional pawnshops in its use of pledges and was so viewed
by the peasantry.

Commerce
Before the Manchu conquest four customs stations had been
established by them on the border with Ming.

As money was plenti

ful and goods dear, trade was also encouraged with Korea.

During

the first generations after the conquest attempts were made to
limit corruption in the collection of commercial taxes through
published regulations.

But even in its years of prosperity the

Ch'ing gave formal precedence to agriculture, the fundamental
activity.
The development of Ch'ing internal commerce may be divided
into three phases:

the first, when commerce was nurtured under

the K'ang-hsi emperor; the second, when commerce was flourishing,
with prosperity, steady prices and many rich merchants under the
Ch'ien-lung emperor; the third, when commerce was decaying, with
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internal rebellions and foreign competition under the Chia-ch'ing
and Tao-kuang emperors.
In addition to the capital there were four great commercial
centers:

Chuhsienchen near K’aifeng in Honan, the crossroads for

waterborn traffic from the south; Ching-te-chen in Kiangsi, the
center of production for porcelain which had a national market;
Hankow in Hupei, the center for the Yangtze valley's trade; Foshanchen in Kwangtung near Canton on the Pearl River, the gate to
South Asia.

Hangchow and Soochow served the flourishing trade of

the lower Yangtze.

The various provincial capitals were also cen

ters of provincial commerce.

The richest merchants were the Shansi

bankers and Yangchou salt merchants.
The English, who had been trading with several coastal cities
since the late seventeenth century and were gradually restricted
during the eighteenth century to Canton, late in the Ch'ien-lung
era sent a mission to the capital to unsuccessfully request wider
trade opportunities and the opening of diplomatic relations.

The

Russians, who had unsuccessfully been seeking trade relations since
Ming times, ultimately achieved the first Sino-foreign treaty late
in the seventeenth century and improved terms of trade in a new
treaty in the eighteenth century.
The Cohong system was established late in the K'ang-hsi era.
Its thirteen Cantonese merchant members' monopoly over foreign
trade was later given official recognition, thereby limiting for
eign trade to Canton.

Its members determined prices, collected

taxes and a 3^ commission on the trade.

The hong merchants

rented thirteen buildings, called factories in English, for the
foreign merchants to reside in on the riverbank in the southwest
ern suburbs of Canton.
thirty-one were English.

Of the fifty-six firms resident in them,
Foreign warships, women and firearms

were banned from the settlement and even the merchants could only
remain there during the trading season.
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The customs office, called Hoppo by the foreigners after the
Hu Pu or Board of Census under which it was placed, was supposed to
collect a 16^ import and kZ export tariff in addition to charging
for various services like translators.

But the Cohong nominally

collected 30^, and total exactions were often many times the offi
cial rate.
Imports largely consisted of opium, cotton cloth, ivory and
woolens; exports of silk, tea, brocades and granulated sugar.

Tea

was the most important export, but as a consequence of Chi'ienlung's banning of private exports, exports tended to decline in
quantity toward the level of imports which came to be dominated by
opium.

The English had replaced the Portuguese as the chief sup--

pliers of opium which had been formally contraband since the Yungcheng era and which was again banned early in the nineteenth cen
tury.

During the eighteenth century the English had come to domin

ate the Canton trade, but later the other European states and
America again began to enter the market.

The attempt to really ban

opium in the l830's led to war with England, the opening of five
ports to foreign trade, and the opening of an era of unrestricted
foreign trade.
Treaties with America, France and then several other states
followed the treaty with England in 1842.

A new wave of treaties

opening more ports followed the renewed conflict with England and
France of the late l850's.

Tariffs were limited and diplomatic

representation in Peking granted, with each nation gaining all the
privileges given to any other.

Influence over Vietnam was lost by

war to France, and over Burma to England.

More territory and

privileges were lost in war to Japan in 1895.

Still more privi

leges had to be granted after the Boxer Rebellion and the Allied
occupation of Peking.
opium trade by 1917.

Only in 1911 did England agree to end the
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Modern Enterprises
China's traditional manufacture was organized on either a
family or guild base.

Even large-scale enterprises like iron

smelting or salt making were essentially families writ large.

Only

natural sources of energy like wind or water power were used and
were linked to direction by men doing physical work.

This differs

profoundly from modern industry with its use of steam and electri
cal power directed by men's intelligence rather than their brawn.
China's development of modern enterprises may be divided into
two periods: the beginning stage up to 1895 and the flourishing
stage after the Sino-Japanese War.

Before I895 the capitalist

countries concentrated on commercial penetration of China, and
within China attention was largely paid to steps to overcome mili
tary weakness.

After 1895 the capitalist countries had reached

the stage of imperialism and were ready to export capital rather
than just goods.

Hence they now took over spheres of influence and

invested in railroads, mines, factories and banks.

The merchants

and officials of China now realized that concentration on military
modernization had not prevented defeat by Japan, and they undertook
modern enterprises to match the efforts of their foreign competitors
within China.
-The Ch'ing authorities, defeated by the foreigners twice be
tween 1839 and i860 and having required the aid of foreign weapons
to put down the Taiping Rebellion, concluded that military modern
ization had to be carried out.

Hence a number of arsenals and

shipyards were built with the aid of foreign advisers between 1862
and 1881, the first being set up by Li Hung-chang in Shanghai in
1862.

Soon realizing that arsenals and shipyards required auxili

ary supporting enterprises, the first modern mine, the K'aip'ing
Corporation was established in I878.
company appeared in 18?2.

The first Chinese steamship

The telegraph began in Tientsin in I878

and the railroad in I88I, as did the telephone under English aus
pices in Shanghai.

The early enterprises were all closely linked
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to military needs, were entirely officially managed, and gave little
emphasis to domesticating among Chinese the techniques involved.
It was only after successive defeats at the hands of the French,
Japanese and then the Allied force occupying Peking that the inade
quacy of this approach was finally appreciated.

From 1882 to 1894

the officia 1-dominated enterprises began to be supplemented by
merchant-managed officia1-supervised enterprises, and the modern
production of commercial

(as opposed to military) products may be

said to have begun with these firms.

Foreign goods had already be

gun to adversely affect Chinese handicrafts, and it was proposed to
keep profits from such goods from flowing out of China by beginning
their production domestically.

Cotton goods were especially empha

sized, but mining and iron smelting were also encouraged.

As of

ficial supervision inevitably proved inadequate, foreign engineers
were usually called in, but they tended to neglect training of Chi
nese and usually served as an entering wedge for domination by
foreign capital.

In 1893 electric power generation began in Shang

hai under foreign auspices.
After China's defeats in 1895 end I9OO foreign capital took
advantage of the spheres of influence their countries had won to
separately and jointly make extensive investments, even to exploit
ing China's cheap labor and raw materials in the interior to pro
duce goods for sale in the cities on the coast.

Though these

enterprises inhibited native Chinese competition, they also taught
native capitalists and laborers techniques hitherto not understood,
and large-scale cloth, tobacco, glass, iron and publishing entei—
prises aiso began to be established by Chinese capitalists for the
first time.

Railroads began to expand, and the earliest Chinese

modern bank, under joint officia1-merchant control, was founded
in 1897.

In 1896 a Ch inese-managed postal service was begun.

The government began to reorganize itself to accommodate
modern industry, establishing a Ministry of Commerce in 1903 snd
beginning work on a modern commercial law code.

In the aftermath
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of the Boxer defeat, military vengeance was out of the question and
the indemnities had so weakened the government fiscally that it had
no choice but to collaborate with the merchants in a variety of
ways, including the establishment of several vocational schools.
Lower class opposition to the foreigners had been defeated with
the Boxer movement.

The upper classes now took over this opposition,

though they exercised it through peaceful economic competition, in
particular through beginning to invest in local rail lines to limit
the degree of control by foreign capital.

Chinese investment in

modern cotton mills and in silk and wool production also increased.
Investments In Yangtze steamships, cement works and ironworks ap
peared.

In 1907 the Ching-te-chen porcelain works came under

private control.

Several state banks were established and the rail

network largely completed.

Foreign, particularly Japanese, invest

ments continued to expand.
The Fishing Trade
Fishing originated in prehistoric times in conjunction with
hunting.

From Neolithic times on it was gradually subordinated to

agriculture and again became a large scale activity only in the
Ch'ing dynasty.
Shang.

Fishing is mentioned as a subordinate activity in

Emperor Shun is said to have engaged in it.

The Chou Li

gives the title of an official in charge of its supervision.

Ssu-

ma Ch'ien describes fishing and salt making as being the original
main activities in Shantung which Kuan Chung used as the basis for
Ch'i's enrichment.

Fishing was important in all the eastern and

riverine states of late antiquity.
ponds was carried out.
ing.

Commercial fish farming in

Fish could be preserved by boning and dry

By Ch'in times fish oil was used for lamps.
Thereafter fishing was thoroughly subordinated to agriculture.

Most fishermen were poor inhabitants of coastal areas, and govern
ment took little notice of them compared to salt manufacturers.
In Ming times, given the threat of Japanese pirates, attempts were
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made to organize fishermen into groups of eight to ten boats which
would cooperate in fishing and occasionally be used for grain
transport, by analogy with the pao-chia system used on land.
Ch'ing saw the beginning of the modern fishing industry.

The

The many

new activities occurring on the coast stimulated the government to
extend the organization of fishermen begun by Ming.
It was only at the end of the nineteenth century that earlier
orders to establish provincial fishing administrations began to be
carried out even fitfully.

It was early in this century before
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the first modern fishing companies were established as joint stateprivate concerns by several regional governments.

This was a pro

gressive step in the process of assuring the people's livelihood.

Communications
A communications revolution is the most efficacious weapon for
transforming a nation's economy.

Modern communications make pos

sible the full unification of a nation's economy.

During Ch'ing

the traditional land communications instruments, horse and
wagon, which had their greatest development in the postal system,
were revolutionized by the railroad.

The first Chinese railroad

was set up Just outside Peking over a one l_i_ track by an Englishman
in 1866, but it was soon torn up because of popular fears.

In I876

another Englishman set up a 1.3 mile line between Wusung and Shang
hai, but it was bought up and torn down by the government the next
year.

A horse-drawn line was assented to in I88O, the first rail

line built by Chinese.

It was motorized in 1882 by an English

engineer.
Popular and Court opposition to railroads overwhelmed the mi
nority who understood their value for both defense and commerce
until the defeat by France in I885 increased the latter's number
and influence.

In I889 Chang Chih-tung called for construction of

a line from Peking to Hankow.

Such a route, he argued, would be

secure from border dangers and would pass through several prov
inces, enhancing their economies.

It would be the most effective

route for hurrying soldiers to deal with any internal rebellions
and as an alternate to easterly water routes for supplying the
capital.

Finally, it could be built in several relatively inex

pensive stages.
With the Court's assent, China's railroad era at last began
when construction began on the 1,213 kilometer long Peking-Hankow
line in the late l890‘s.

It was completed some seven years later.

A Peking-Fengt'ien line had been completed earlier.

A line south
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from Tientsin under Anglo-German control was not completed before
the fall of the dynasty, but another line from Peking to Changchiak'ou was finished using only Chinese capital and completely designed
by Chinese engineers.

Lines from Nanking to Shanghai (entirely

under foreign control), Shanghai to Hangchow, a narrow gauge line
from Shihchiachuang to T'aiylian, a line from K’aifeng to Loyang,
and several lines in Manchuria and in the southeast were completed.
In Taiwan, a line from Taipei to Tainan was not completed until
after the Japanese takeover, though most of the work was done eai
lier under Chinese auspices.

In all, fourteen lines were completed

under official auspices before the fall of the dynasty.
private lines were in various stages of completion.

Four

In addition,

the Japanese built the South Manchurian, the Russians the Chinese
Eastern, the Germans a Shantung line, and the French a YunnanVietnam line.
The two-thousand-year dominance of sail, the Chinese state's
control over shipping and the domination of Chinese shipping by
Chinese were all ended by the coming of the foreigners' steamships.
Steamships first appeared on the China coast in the mid-l830's and
on the rivers in the late l850's.

By the l860's steamships were

appearing regularly on the coast and along the Yangtze and English
and American steamship companies had been formed in China.

The

3,000 traditional sailing vessels on the Yangtze were reduced to
AOO by the late l860's because of this foreign modern competition.
In 1862 several Chinese merchants bought four steamships to
use as grain transports, and in I868 Kiangsu officials built
steamships for the same purpose.
ful.

Both attempts were unsuccess

In 1872 Li Hung-chang won approval for China's first offi

cial shipping line along the coast, and in 1873 a Yangtze line was
established.

The same year the official shipping line was re

organized under merchant management.

In I885 Sheng Hsuan-huai

reorganized the line again as a joint state-private enterprise
which it remained until into the republican era.

There were also
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a number of other local joint state-private shipping lines.
Though the pioneering foreign shipping lines were overwhelmed
by their Chinese competition, several new foreign lines were estab
lished linking China to the outside world but with extensive routes
within China as well.

Most were English and Japanese.

There were

also American, German, French and Italian lines.
Steamships were being built in China by the l860's.

During

the first decade of this century the Kiangnan shipyard built nearly
150 warships and merchantmen.

Though not as large as the one at

Kiangnan, the Foochow and Taku shipyards were of considerable size.
These three facilities, built by Tseng Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang
and Li Hung-chang respectively, were constructed only with great
difficulty against many handicaps, but they served as the founda~
tion of the modern Chinese shipbuilding industry.
In 1878 the first modern post offices in the capital , Tientsin,
Yent'ai, Niuchuang and Shanghai were established under the direc
tion of an Englishman.

At the turn of the century the system was

extended down to the provincial and hsien level, and by the end of
the dynasty an extensive local network had been established through
agreements reached with several foreign post offices.

The foreign

post offices earlier set up within China did not, however, cease
operations.

After the Boxer Rebellion the Japanese started their

own postal system which soon had over I60 offices.

The French,

Germans and Russians each had fourteen offices, the English eleven,
and the Americans only one.
/

The Chinese electrical business started in 1879 when Li Hungchang had a Dane install a telegraph line between Tientsin and
Taku.

Within a few years it was extended down to Shanghai and

made a Joint state-private enterprise.

By the end of the dynasty

a nationwide network of over 6OO stations linked by over 120,000
J_i_ of line had been established.
along the coast and to Japan.

Undersea cables were also run

By I9O5 wireless telegraph stations
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were being established as well.
The first telephones were installed in Shanghai in l88l by the
English.

The first Ch'ing government-run telephones, in Tientsin,

were destroyed by the Boxers.

Upon Sheng Hsuan-huai's advice tele

phone service was placed under the telegraph administration.
1907 the network reached from the capital

By

to Canton, and the Shang

hai system had been bought out. That year both telephone and tele
graph were placed under the newly established Postal Ministry.
Most of the telephone companies were under provincial management,
but several, notably in Foochow, Wuch'ang and Hankow, were private
ly managed.
Coinage and Monetary Institutions
Nurhachi issued his first coinage in I6I6.
tablished immediately after the conquest.

Two mints were es

The earliest post-1644

coins were blank on the reverse, but to discourage forgery the
custom was soon established of having a Manchu language inscription
on the reverse.

The location of the provincial mint issuing the

coin was also inscribed.

In 1646 all Ming coins were called in for

reminting, but in I685 their use was again permitted.

During the

Shun-chih reign the weight of the coins was intermittently in
creased from 1.0 to 1.25 ch'ien and provincial mints closed to
discourage forgers.

During the K'ang-hsi reign provincial mints

were intermittently closed to reduce the quantity of money in cir
culation so as to preserve its value.

Several regional mints were

permitted during the Yung-cheng reign, but the weight of the coin
was reduced to 1.2 ch' ien to discourage melting down.
Monetary discipline began to slip during the first part of
the nineteenth century, and during the Hslen-feng reign a series
of large denomination coins was ordered issued to meet the high
military expenses of the time.

But objections that such coins had

never succeeded because they encouraged forgery led to modification
of the order and only 100- and 50-cash coins were issued. Attempts
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to circulate iron coins were still less successful because of their
inconvenient weight.

During the rest of the century there were in

termittent attempts to circulate heavier coins, on one occasion
using imported copper.

Near the end of the dynasty minting of

coins with holes was discontinued, and for the first time holeless
coins were circulated.
The Taiping Rebellion halted provincial coinage, and stoppage
of copper imports drove up the value of existing coins and decreased
the effective money supply, causing monetary disorder.

Near the

end of the century bronze dollar (yUan) coins were issued in the
south to meet the money shortage, and they soon had national circu
lation.

These coins' greater initial value than the silver dollar

stimulated their overproduction in the provinces and their conse
quent depreciation in value.
Small denomination silver coins were minted regionally during
the late nineteenth century, but the central authorities never suc
ceeded in carrying out plans to do so themselves.

As other nations

went on to the gold standard their silver coins tended to drift
into China where their varying values caused confusion.

Provincial

mints began coining silver dollars in response, and the central
authorities eventually consolidated these operations into several
regional mints.
As silver was the standard of value in commercial exchanges,
blocks of the metal had traditionally circulated as money.

But

lack of standardization of the weights and degree of fineness of
the blocks was further confused during Ch'ing by the increasing
circulation of foreign silver coins.

During the first half of the

nineteenth century the government licensed private silversmiths so
as to achieve a measure of standardization of blocks of silver.
Paper money was used in early and late Ch'ing.

From K'ang-hsi

to Chia-ch'ing silver and copper coinage predominated.
Ming paper notes had decreased in circulation.

In late

There was a paper
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issue during the Shun-chih reign, but the bad precedents of the
Sung, Yuan and Ming caused its halt within two decades.

Paper

notes based on silver and copper were again issued during the Hsienfeng reign, and their number gradually increased thereafter.
were also private and foreign notes in circulation.

There

By the end of

the dynasty the notes of the new state-established banks circulated
in confused competition with those of local authorities.
During the late eighteenth century certain Shansi dyestuff
merchants began to branch out into the business of discounting
notes for other merchants and by mid-nineteenth century a number of
merchants in other trades were doing the same thing.
three major groups, each with many branches.

There were

Because of the diffi

culty of transporting specie, merchants preferred to make payments
to each other with notes issued or backed by these houses.

By the

1870's they were also handling the transmission of tax revenues for

the government.

They did much business with very limited capital

ization and made large profits through turning over other people's
money.

Their organization was quite simple as they depended on

their customers' trust for their business.

They were partnerships

or single proprietorships with unlimited liability.
mality of structure was characteristically Oriental.

Their infor
Though they

survived the loss of their government business to the new state
banks after 1900, most were wiped out by the I9II revolution which
made it difficult to call in their loans to meet the claims of
their depositors.
Several money-changing houses in the Yangtze valley were able
to compete successfully with the Shansi note houses by making
profits from differences in exchange rates.

The money changers of

Shanghai dated back to the eighteenth century but grew in number
and size after the mid-nineteenth century to 105 houses.
ic of 1882 ruined half of these.

The pan

Some of them could pay high in

terest to depositors because highly profitable short-term loans
were made to opium traders, but ruinous competition among those
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engaged in this practice led to their collapse and affected those
not engaged in it as well.

Collapse of a foreign-promoted rubber

speculative fever in 1909 ruined many more money changers.
From the l850's on a number of foreign banks opened in Shang
hai.

Chinese resentment at discrimination against them by these

foreign banks led by I896 to the establishment of the first Chi
nese-owned modern bank.

From then until the end of the dynasty

seventeen more modern banks were established, and in I906 the first
state bank was set up and soon evolved into China's official central
bank.
The Taxation System
To win popular acquiescence taxes were lightened after 1641+.
All surtaxes on land were abolished.

Henceforth tax rates were

ordered to be revised every decade by the central government and
the tax schedules published, with copies at the local level for
public inspection and comment.

After several partial tax remis

sions, the K'ang-hsi emperor froze the size of the tax census reg
isters.

The registers were kept at that level for the remainder

of the dynasty.

The Yung-cheng emperor combined the head and land

taxes to simplify administration.

There were several tax remissions

during the Ch'ien-lung era because of government revenue surpluses.
the government's fiscal situation was completely reversed by
the foreign exactions and domestic rebellions of the nineteenth
century.

Inhibited by the earlier, self-imposed limits on the tax

system, informal exactions, including those on merchants, had to
be resorted to.

Such exactions on the rich salt and foreign trade

merchants had been used in the Ch'ien-lung era.

More profitable

was the selling of gentry status and ultimately official office
not only to rich merchants but to the gentry as well.

The defeat

of the Taiping Rebellion required letting the provinces exact a
variety of local taxes.

Hence by the end of the dynasty there was

no longer a unified national tax system.

Beginning as
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"contributions*' these new levies became indistinguishable from taxes.
They removed in fact the prohibition on increasing land taxes.
These land tax increases went to local authorities, salt and excise
increases to the central authority.
In anticipation of the end of revenues from opium imports in
1907 preparations were made for a modern commercial

tax code, but

one was not put into effect before the end of the dynasty.

The new

military and educational responsibilities placed on the provinces
after I895 caused still greater multiplication of taxes and greater
divergency among provinces.

Nationally, the maritime customs and

salt taxes had to be dedicated to paying off foreign loans and in
demnities, and attempts to replace this lost revenue with miscel
laneous new taxes were generally unsuccessful.

The land tax re

mained most central, followed by the maritime customs, 1ikin, salt
and ordinary excise taxes.
Private land included alienated banner fields and land held by
minority peoples as well as ordinary privately held fields.
ficial fields paid rent rather than tax.

Of

There were also imperial,

imperial clan, banner, and garrison fields in the north and north
west.

There were schedules of punishment for officials who il

legally acquired land.

Tax holidays for newly opened land were

available so long as it was registered, but the rich and powerful
could easily corrupt local officials so as to keep land permanently
off the tax rolls.
In early Ch'ing the size of the mou was redefined, but the new
definition was only applied to newly opened land.
sure varied chaotically from region to region.

Hence the mea

The land registers

remained essentially those of the Ming all through the Ch'ing.
Local fears and inertia and the expense of a complete resurvey
caused this.
was possible.

Hence except in name no equity in assessing taxes
A variety of systems of billing landowners was used

at different times and under different circumstances.

Abuses,

such as collecting taxes in advance and excess collection, were
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nevertheless numerous.

The two annual collection periods were at

different times in different regions.
The land tax subsumed five categories within it.

The most im

portant ones were a combined land and head tax levied in kind and
cash at a ratio of eight to two but collected in different amounts
in various provinces, and a grain transport tax levied in kind in
proportion to a province's distance from the capital and sent to
either the capital or T'ungchou to supply banner garrisons or off/i c i a 1 s.
In the l880's Liu Ming-ch'uan succeeded in compiling a land
survey of Taiwan despite the armed opposition of some of the major
landowners whom the reform was designed to force to pay a higher
proportion of the land tax than they had done hitherto.

So com

plete a resurvey had not been carried out anywhere else during
Ch'ing, and Liu only succeeded in Taiwan by personally supervising
the entire operation with the aid of a few reliable assistants
and, on one occasion, by fighting a pitched battle with his oppon
ents.

Nevertheless the reform made possible the completion of the

Taipei-Keelung railroad and the opening of steamship routes to
Hong Kong and Shanghai which, in turn, permitted the blossoming of
Taiwan's economy.
Males from sixteen to sixty years of age, graded by wealth
into three categories (with considerable provincial variations)
owed a labor service tax commuted into money.

The head tax was

included in the land tax and was fixed at the census level of the
early eighteenth century.

This led the government to lose interest

in keeping accurate census records.

The pao-chia system, which

gave some population information, was mainly designed for taxation
and internal security purposes.

Though local governments were

supposed to hire labor service men, in early Ch'ing a limited
number of men could be levied for militia duty.

In the early

nineteenth century such men were allowed to avoid taxfes on thirty
mou of land, and hence this cannot be considered a true corvee.
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There was also a variety of locally levied corvees from which city
residents and gentry were exempt and which could be commuted, giving
local officials and clerks many opportunities for corrupt practices.
Though the early Ch'ing

salt laws

resembled those of the late

Ming, trouble was postponed until the Yung-cheng reign by keeping
the tax rate low.

Rates were still kept low during the Ch'ien-lung

reign, but the salt merchants were not well controlled and their ex
ploitation of the people continued to grow worse through the end of
the dynasty.
Some salt was entirely handled by officials, some partly or
wholly by licensed merchants who often used their influence to pass
their positions on hereditarily.

From mid-Ch'ing on such merchants

tended to have a free hand in disposing of their salt and to have
all the tax associated with it pass through their hands.

For thir

teen years after 1792 free sale of salt by unlicensed merchants in
some areas was permitted.

The normal salt tax was divided into

several components, assessed at different rates in different areas.
In addition salt was subject to the 1ikin which averaged more than
twice the normal tax rate and made salt prohibitively expensive in
areas far removed from production centers.

There was an elaborate

hierarchy within the Salt Administration to oversee the trade.
Ordinary excise taxes of early Ch'ing resembled those of the
Ming.

From the Ch'ien-lung era on they steadily rose and were

levied on goods traveling by sea as well as by land.

After 18A2

these taxes were labeled "ordinary" or "old" taxes to distinguish
them from the new maritime customs in the treaty ports.

After

1901 those collected within 50 J_i_ of a port were placed under the
maritime customs administration.

The ordinary excises were col

lected by appropriate officials from the circuit (tao) level on
down.

They were levied by category of goods at a nominal rate of

5^, though in practice the rate varied widely by locality.

This

variation gave the foreigners an excuse to gain exemption for
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themselves until a uniform national rate was published, something
the dynasty never succeeded in doing.

Exemptions were also per

mitted for goods needed in disaster areas and for some small scale
shipments.
The 1ikin was first applied in 1853 in Yangchou to goods in
transit along the Grand Canal at the rate of fifty cash per shih
of grain.

It was soon widely applied by the regional authorities

fighting the Taiping rebels at a rate of 1^.

Few merchants were

affected, and it was understood to be only a temporary war tax.
But after the war the tax was extended to more goods, and the rate
increased to as much as 5Z-

Local control led to extensive corrup

tion, and the nature of the tax greatly hindered the development
of internal commerce, leading to repeated calls for its abolition.
In addition to fifteen categories of goods, 1 ikin was also assessed
on seven more products, notably salt, tea and wine.
The early Ch'ing prohibition against foreign trade (to defend

' against Cheng Ch'eng-kung and other pirates) was lifted in 1685,
and four ports were opened of which Canton became the most impor
tant.

Its trade was supervised by a special imperial supervisor

limited to a one-year term so as to discourage corruption.

For

eigners were restricted to Canton and were annoyed by the extra
ordinary exactions which were also exacted against Chinese merchants
at the other ports.
New maritime customs houses were established in the treaty
ports after 18A2.

The tariffs were collected by each nation's

consular officials, and while this ended the old abuses, the ten
dency of each consul to favor his own nation's merchants led to an
agreement in I85I for the Ch'ing government to again administer
the customs.

Renewed abuses led to the establishment in I85A of

an Anglo-French-Amerlcan directorate to administer the collections.
Between 1862 and 1907 forty-eight customs stations were established,
both on the coast and in the interior.
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By treaty the rate on imports was limited to

but the ex

emption of many goods and the tendency of prices expressed in silver
to drop reduced the effective average rate to k%.

The rate was in

creased to 5% and the number of exemptions reduced when the customs
revenue was dedicated to payment of the Boxer indemnity.

The regu

lations of 1902 exempted grain, precious*meta1s and specie currency,
printed matter, goods for the use of the Ch'ing and foreign govern
ments, travelers' personal goods and other minor goods.
only opium and saltpeter were contraband.

Before I858

Thereafter the ban on

opium was lifted, a ban on salt imports imposed, and certain mili
tary goods imports permitted.
The rate on exports was also 5^.

Specie and corns, printed

and educational materials, and some other goods were exempt from
duty.

The export of weapons, medicine, salt, copper, iron, food

(except for vegetable oils) was banned.
The Treaty of Peking with Russia in i860 allowed tax-free
trade at three places.

Later treaties gave Russia still more duty

free or reduced-duty privileges.

A treaty with Japan in 1905 gsve

the same advantages to Sino-Korean trade as had been earlier
granted to Russia.

A treaty in I866 reduced tariffs for France,

and a similar deal was made for the Burmese-Yunnan trade in a
treaty with England in 189^.
Goods in internal commerce often paid in ordinary excises and
likin a tax several times greater than their price.

The treaty

with England in I858 provided that English goods, after paying the
maritime customs, pay only an additional tax of 2.5^ in lieu of
these exactions.

This advantage, provided only to foreign goods,

placed severe handicaps on the development of native Chinese com
merce and was the greatest reason for its inability to develop.
The duty placed on opium by an agreement in I887 became the largest
single revenue producer for the maritime customs, an indication
of the extent of the harm done by the English to our people.

Mar

itime customs revenue tripled in the last quarter of the nineteenth
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century and the first decade of this century, but with foreign goods
penetrating every corner of our country, how could it not be impoverished?
The Late Ch'ing Destitution of the People's Livelihood and the
Explosion of the National Revolution
Ch'ing began to decay from the middle of the Ch'ien-lung reign.
The quality of the emperors had begun to decline as early as the
K'ang-hsi reign.

The Manchu officials' avariciousness, always

present, grew beyond bounds during the Ch'ien-lung era, as evidenced
by the twenty-year career of Ho-shen whose private fortune was said
to equal ten years of ordinary tax receipts.

Local officials took

their cue from their leaders and the quality of the Chinese offi
cials also steadily deteriorated.

In 1800 Hung Liang-chi wrote

that the level of honesty and morale among officials had deterior
ated noticeably during the previous several, decades and that clerks
had become more numerous and avaricious, unchecked by equally
avaricious officials.
The great increase in population had caused a turn for the worse
in economic conditions.

The population had exceeded 300,000,000

by the latter part of the Ch'ien-lung era.

Hung Liang-chi feared

that population was greatly outstripping the land supply and that
the situation was exacerbated by the maldistribution of land.
Prices, he claimed, had already increased significantly because of
the pressure of increased demand on fixed supply.
A series of popular rebellions from the late eighteenth cen
tury on had been ostensibly responses to official persecution, and
the Manchus had not been able to put down the strongest of them
without the aid of the local militia.
After China's first defeat at the hands of the foreigners in
the Opium War, further defeats followed one after the other during
the rest of the nineteenth century.

198

There had been only indirect contact between Occident and
Orient before Ming-Ch'ing times.

Chinese silk making techniques

had been transmitted to Byzantium in the sixth century A.D.

The

technique for making paper, though transmitted to Central Asia by
the eighth century, did not reach Europe until the twelfth century.
The magnetic compass reached Europe in 1302, some two centuries
after its use for navigation was first recorded in China.

Gunpowder

was in use in China by the time of the Sung-Chin war in the 1120's
but first appeared in Europe in 135^*

Block printing began in mid-

T'ang, movable-type printing during Northern Sung, but in Europe
not until 1438.

Hence it can be seen that China was not inferior

to but rather a stimulus to the West.

It is only in the last cen

tury or two that the West has jumped ahead in commerce and science
and, not realizing that we too have our learning, has treated us
like Africa's savages.
By the time of the Opium War, the drain of silver had driven
up the price of an ounce of silver to 1,600 cash.
both trade and tax collection.
still larger silver drains.

This disturbed

The loss of the Opium War caused

Yet the T'ung-chih Restoration, co

inciding as it did with the American Civil War, the start of the
French Third Republic and Japan's Meiji Restoration, had a chance
to make a true renovation of Chinese life, but this was spoiled by
the obduracy of the Manchus, particularly the Dowager Express.

Her

and a minority of courtiers' ignorant behavior during the Boxer
uprising is further evidence of this.

Though the Ch'ing authori

ties seemed to learn their lesson from the Boxer debacle, the
reforms they backed were only superficial.

Chang Chih-tung con

cluded in the end that no fundamental change would be made.
The upheavals of the last half of the nineteenth century
produced Mr. Sun Yat-sen, a great popular savior.

He was born in

1866 in Kwangtung province to a family which had fought for the
Ming in the seventeenth century.

It had vowed never to serve as

officials under the Manchus and hence had devoted itself to farming

ever since. From childhood Sun had heard stories of the Taiping
rebellion, whose leader was a Cantonese, and deeply admired the man
and the movement.

Because of the depth of foreign influence in

Canton, Sun was able to learn English from a missionary at an early
age.

He was, therefore, suited by background and training to lead

a revolution against the Manchus and, in the interests of the peas
ant majority, to use Western as well as Chinese ideas.
Sun's determination to overthrow the Manchus was fixed in 1885
in the aftermath of the loss of the war with France which in his
view had demonstrated the regime's inability to either prepare for
war or exploit the limited tactical success it had won in Vietnam.
The inability of Li Hung-chang to accept Sun's advice in 189^ con
firmed him in his view that a revolution against the Manchus was
the only course which would save China.

His organization of the

Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Society) followed hard on the humili
ating defeat by Japan.

During the following decade and a half he

extended his activities to overseas Chinese, traveled abroad and
tried to unify all the indigenous anti-Ch'ing organizations within
China under a common leadership.
The Hsing Chung Hui's successor organization, the T'ung Meng
Hui (Association of the Joint Oath), was particularly successful
among Chinese students overseas, especially in Japan.

It was

notable for the oath its members swore in writing not to abandon
the goal of creating a new China nor to leave the organization un
til that goal was achieved.

Membership was open to all classes,

and its officers were democratically elected.
Its constitution called for establishment of a republic after
the overthrow of the Manchu government.

Social and economic in

stitutions were to be changed so that any increase in land values
consequent upon republican reforms would revert to the nation.
Ownership of land would thereby be equalized.

In other words, the

San Min Chu I (Three Principles of the People) were already em
bodied in the constitution of the T'ung Meng Hui.

These
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principles were to be achieved in three stages:

the stage of mili~

tary government, which would defeat the Manchus and foreign im~
perialists, and within three years set up local administrations
to begin removing such abuses as opium smoking and foot binding; a
six-year transitional stage during which representative government
would be set up locally; and a final stage of full constitutional
government.
The Three Principles were publicized in the T'ung Meng Hui's
Min Pao (People's Journal), published in Tokyo from 1907 to 1910.
The Three Principles, the journal argued, explained Europe's rise
to dominance, but though China had to adopt the first two, it was
by tradition closer than Europe to being able to resolve the prob
lems of People's Livelihood.
By winning over members of the new army in Nanking and Wu
ch'ang. Sun and his associates were undermining the heart of the
Manchus' power. While Sun was organizing support in America, his
followers unsuccessfully attempted a revolution in Canton in
April of 1910.

The martyrs of this revolt nevertheless already

demonstrated the Nationalist movement's later ability to bind to
gether men from all classes and occupations.

The Canton rising

also helped inspire the successful revolution the following year
which was able to take advantage of the disturbances associated
with the government's railroad nationalization proposals.
Within three days after October 10, I9II, the revolutionaries
were able to win the garrison of Wuch'ang to their side and take
over the area, and the whole nation rapidly responded.

Within a

month Shanghai and Nanking were won over and with them the whole
of the south.

Sun Yat-sen was in Denver, Colorado at the time of

the Wuch'ang uprising.

He quickly returned to China by way of

Europe and arrived in Shanghai in December.

At the beginning of

1912 he was installed as provisional president of the new republic.

Though not all battles were over, he immediately set to work on
such reforms as the abolition of opium use and footbinding and the
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unification of the fiscal administration, thereby setting the standard for the new order.
of China

Hence we call him the Father of our Republic
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Appendix A
Precis of Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past.
Stanford University Press, 1973-

Stanford:

Part I
THE FORMATION OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST ENDURING STATE

Empires and Their Size
Empires tend to expand until their technological superiority
and politico-military efficiency are balanced off by the burdens of
«

increased size (delayed and more costly communications, a more com
plex, costly and harsher bureaucracy).
more and more various resources.

Size, however, also yields

In China these factors tending to

limit size and cause fragmentation were not strong enough to create
permanent disunity.

The evolving tradition of unity and relative

isolation from competing high civilizations in turn strengthened
geographical and cultural unity.

Geographical unity was also ulti

mately encouraged by a revolution in transport and communications
(Ch. 10).
Among the consequences of unity were manorial ism without feud
alism, cities larger than Europe's but without Europe's autonomy,
and absence of the cultural diversity which results from dividing
a civilization into a competing system of states.
The Early Chinese Empire
Prior to Eastern Chou, the Yellow River valley was divided
into local principalities.
and burn.
'

Its agriculture was dominantly slash

Lords' estates were worked by slaves-serfs; the rest of

the land by peasant collectivities.
in Lu in 59^ B.C.

The first land tax is recorded

The appearance during Eastern Chou of fallowing,

manures, and iron tools lessened the number of workers per mou and
encouraged the dissolution of peasant collectivities.

Land became
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private property and serfs became free peasants.

This happened more

quickly and thoroughly in Ch'in.
The first empire's rotational conscription of peasants for mili
tary service and the related tax collection system were imperiled by
the growth of huge estates owned by officials and merchants and
worked by tenants or slaves.

Hence Han Wu-ti attempted to reduce

the aristocracy's size, tax trade and capital, confiscate estates
(making the state the biggest landowner) and establish state monopo
lies in salt, iron, and wine.

The tradition was begun of executing

the politically suspect and selecting bureaucrats from the lower
classes.

Though he realized it ran counter to the goals of his

domestic policy, Wu-ti moved against the Hsiungnu.

Public lands may

have been allocated to cultivators in lifetime tenure.

They were

also used to reward officials, leading to the creation of new latifundia.
During Eastern Han, slaves, about 1^ to 10^ of the population,
were likely too expensive to use as agricultural labor, but were at
times used in manufacturing.

Eastern Han was too indebted to estate

owners to prevent them from quasi-enserfing most of the formerly
free peasantry, as happened to colon! on contemporary Roman estates.
The government's weakness and the collapse of conscription (ca. A6
A.D.) forced local self-sufficiency.

Walled defenses around the

camps of great estates spread for the first time from the frontiers
to the interior.

Barbarians were invited inside the frontiers, as

in Rome.
The Crisis of the Third Century A.D.
China's division into three kingdoms paralleled the division
of the Roman empire into three parts.
greatest innovator.

Ts'ao Ts'ao was the era's

His state colonies provided the government's

fiscal base; his hereditary military households made up the core of
the army.

The state colonies were a public version of the mag

nates' private estates.

The stratification of society induced by the
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military households' ubiquity resembled late third-century Rome's
creation of a caste society.
These innovations soon decayed.

State colonists evaded their

obligations by entering trade or by not registering.

Chin assimi

lated colony land into its state land and allocated it to cultiva
tors.

But this did not work well either, as the elite preferred to

usurp land for livestock and pasturage which were still economically
competitive with cereal agriculture in northeast China and were more
prestigious.
China's situation was parallel to that of fifth-century Byzan
tium.

There were many more big estates in the Western Roman empire,

which collapsed, than in the Eastern Roman empire, which did not.
As in Rome, in early fourth-century China barbarians were becoming
increasingly sinicized and hence still more dangerous.

$ino-Barbarian Synthesis in North China
The armed camps in the interior of north China, though novel,
still reflected the characteristically Chinese idea of a "properly
ordered society."

Ideally a camp's leader was a superior man whose

deputies were senior local leaders supported by their own communi
ties.

This hierarchy was to be cemented by moral unity and legit

imated by equity in resource allocation.
The Hsienpi and allied Hsiungnu victors in the fourth-century
intramural barbarian conflicts initially tried to keep themselves
as a separate military elite, living off the production of Chinese
cities and farms.

But they were steadily urbanized and drawn into

large-scale farming and manufacture, often for the market, and
melded with the richer Chinese families.

The provinces were domin

ated by local magnates who also were often hereditary local offi
cials.
Attempts to control these landowners led by the late fifthcentury to the Equitable Fields system, an attempt to limit large

.4
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holdings to service tenure.

Local loyalties were to be fragmented

by basing registration on deliberately artificial units.

For the

upper elite this was usually just a "paper revolution," but in
itially the state was merely attempting to establish the principle
of central control over land.

Middle landowners could evade limits

by gaining additional allotments for their slaves.
By mid-sixth century, sinicization permitted the moving of the
capital from the grazing-arable frontier south to Loyang.

The use

of professional tribal warriors was replaced by a local militia sys
tem (similar to the Roman temones and capitula) which for the first
time for the Toba Hsienpi combined farming and fighting.

By 58I

this system provided a force big and wel1-supported enough to re
unify the empire.

Sui Wen-ti, though deeply sinicized, was "not

ethnically or spiritually fully Chinese."

The Middle Empire
Sul's soldier-peasant militia resembled that of the Byzantine
Heradian dynasty.

The Yangtze became the empire's granary, playing

the role of Egypt in the Roman-Byzantine empire.
was China's Mediterranean.

The Grand Canal

Eventually the canal system rendered

obsolete the militia's self-supply system.

Sul's and T'ang's mili

tia were commoners registered in the Equitable Fields system.

As

in Byzantium, the health of the militia depended on the functioning
of its Equitable Fields base.

Both T'ang and Byzantium made in

creasing use of body armor (T'ang as a defense against the powerful
crossbow) and of elaborate drill maneuvers.

Hence it was necessary

to replace dependence on barbarians and mercenaries with the use of
a tough, professional militia.

/

Serious attempts to keep big estates from subverting the
Equitable Fields system were made by limiting the size of office
lands estates.

But lack of land made it hard for the state to

distribute even the legal quotas.

Attempts to move local officials

every three years (before they could develop local vested interests)
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kept them so insecure that they retained incentive to corruptly
usurp land.

Equitable Fields never worked in rice growing areas,

hence migration south increased.

Slaves, though still important in

agriculture, were not allotted land during T'ang.

They lacked sur

names, could not marry free people, and there were lesser penalties
for murdering them.
T'ang's eighth-century collapse was partly caused by reaching a
point of diminishing returns in military campaigns beyond the em
pire's bloated frontiers.

By the late seventh century these exten

sive campaigns had already disrupted militia schedules.

Development

of the canal system removed justification for a dispersed, selfsupplying militia.

Overissue of nominal honors (hitherto reserved

for the militia) debased the militia's social status.

After 67^

the militiamen lost tax-exempt status and hence membership became
less attractive to the elite.

Even before the An Lu-shan rebellion,

rotating militia units had been replaced by frontier armies under
permanent leaders.

After 755 the loss of central control led to the

breakdown of the Equitable Fields in a way parallel to the rise of
European seigneuria1ization.
Manorial ism Without Feudalism
The Sung reunification was accompanied by an economictechnological revolution which cheapened the military and adminis
trative costs of unity and so integrated society that fragmentation
thereafter was rendered much less likely.

Only then did China's

evolution diverge from that of Europe.
China got manorial ism but without a feudal political-military
superstructure.

By the tenth century much of the peasantry had been

enserfed on large private manors.

That there was a distinction

between serfs and free peasants is illustrated by a questionnaire
circulated in ll80 by Chu Hsi, which has separate categories for
tenant-serfs and "families cultivating land belonging to others."
Admittedly few other contemporary documents make the distinction
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this clearly, but attempts (such as that by Tan Kyoji) to define
free tenants as serfs not fully provided for by their masters cannot
get around Chu's clear distinction between serfs and tenants.
Tenant-serfs are tenants bound to the soil.
records only in the tenth century.

They appear in the

Several decrees in Sung and Yuan

times attempted to mitigate bondage to the soil, but likely had
little impact.

Probably serfdom tended to grow harsher with time,

with serfs bonded to masters, not the land.

In parts of west China

the state even helped enforce such bondage by ordering the repatria
tion of fugitive tenant-serfs if they had been enticed away by other
lords and their original masters were not cruel.
Tenant serfdom likely originated in several ways:
Europe, by the partial liberation of slaves.

(l) As in

This would account for

the greater harshness of Sung than T'ang manorial ism.

(2) Poor free

peasants might be enserfed when they sold their land.

(3) Coercion

or inducement of free peasants into quasi-serfdom by offering them
attractive terms.

There was also a limited flow of peasants from

serfdom to freedom through manumission.
There was much regional variation in the percentage of the popu
lation in serfdom.

Chetung, for example, had greater social equality

because of its relatively infertile land.

Serfs were usually not

enrolled on population registers, and many of those registered (in
some areas 70^) rented some land.

But though it is not possible to

estimate its role exactly, "the manor was the dominant institution
in most of the Chinese countryside."

This is Indirectly confirmed

by the eleventh-century decision to entrust local government to
units of from five to 250 households, led by the wealthiest members
of each unit.

This system was based on a rural hierarchy and only

collapsed in the seventeenth century when manorial ism also collapsed.
Some manors were scattered; others were compact.

Most fre

quently both forms were combined: a compact demesne worked as a unit
under a manager was associated with allotments run separately by
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rent- and service-paying tenants.

Demesne workers were even regu

lated by water clocks set up in the fields.

Most irrigation projects

were administered by manors individually or in combinations.

Each

tenant-serf family was normally an independent economic unit which
might even trade in the market.
There were many differences from medieval European manorial ism.
China had many free peasants, there was free sale of land, manorial
justice was not legally recognized, and landowners were not members
of a special military class.

But the Chinese system could have con

verged with Europe's if (as Li Kou actually proposed in 1052), land
lords had been allowed to establish private armies and were given
official rank for successfully routing local bandits.

Even so,

manorial ism may have siphoned off enough wealth from the state to
account for Sung's "incapacity to survive unconquered."

Iron, Gunpowder and the Mongols
The Sung economic revolution permitted it to establish the
greatest army the world had yet seen.

By 1160 government arsenals

were turning out 3>24 million weapons per year.

Northern Sung had

300.000 soldiers in and near the capital, a like number on the Liao

frontier and 450,000 on the Hsi Hsia frontier.
ruined by even one such army.

Han would have been

Though it could afford such an army.

Sung was nevertheless conquered piecemeal, mainly because its high
technology was diffused across the frontiers to its enemies.
Sung was possibly using coke (coal was definitely used as fuel
to heat the blast furnaces) to produce at least 40,000 and likely
125.000 tons of iron per year.
Liao and then Chin.

This iron technology diffused to

The combination of abundant iron with barbar

ian cavalry was too much for Sung.
its cavalry.

Liao did not total ly armor all

Chin used armored halberd-carrying horsemen as shields

for its bowmen.

The Chinese were chronically short of horses.

The Chin conquest deprived Sung of its best iron and coal re
sources.

Worse, Chin let iron flow freely to the Mongols.

The
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Mongols used a variant on Chin's cavalry technique: their front cavairy shield was divided into sections through which archers could
They also used improved stone throwers and evolved Sung fire-

move.

lances into true guns.
The Supremacy of Logistics Under the Ming
Ming faced no serious external threats.

Even the fifteenth-

century Oirats wanted only trade and/or ransom of needed goods.

By

the sixteenth century, the "Japanese pirates" were mostly Chinese
traders made outlaws by Ming's own regulations.
Ming and Ch'ing absorbed a relatively small proportion of
China's GNP for administration and defense, likely only 15^ to 20^
which shows that the Sung jump in economic productivity had proved
irreversible.

Costs were further reduced by the civil service ex

aminations, which enticed the elite to pay for its own preparation.
The Sung-Yuan military innovations were also maintained, but
Ming made no fundamental military breakthroughs.
cannon was hindered by metallurgical limits.

Development of the

A more fundamental

cause of this stagnation was the lack of sustained competition with
equals such as faced Europe and the daimyo of sixteenth-century
Japan.

Ming could successfully meet its limited barbarian competi

tors with superior logistics mobilizing the resources of a vast
empire.
The Ming founder could not afford to keep up the army (twice
the size of Northern Sung's) which had conquered his empire, but
feared the consequences of its demobilization.

Hence he established

the military as an hereditary caste settled in colonies composed of
full-time soldiers and soldier-farmers who supported the former
with one-half of their grain output.
civilian tax burden.

This system lightened the

There was a tendency to increase the propor

tion of soldier-farmers to soldiers and to supplement their support
with grain transported to the colonies by merchants in exchange for

salt certificates.

The merchants in turn tended to settle their own

tenants on the frontiers, as the grain they produced was cheaper
than grain transported from the interior.

But after 1^92 all grain

brought to the frontier was paid for with silver, and merchant fields
disappeared.
The military colonies decayed during the fifteenth century.
They tended to attract Mongol raids, received less state support,
and incurred greater burdens.

Officers tended to turn colonies into

their private manors, and the state acquiesced in this to assure ad
equate grain.

The fifteenth century also witnessed a partial, al

beit in part inadvertent, pull-back from the frontier which proved
irreversible.

Thereafter reliance was placed on the rebuilt Great

Wall which was now higher, had more towers, and was supported by
cannon, with camps built right into its structure.

The wall formed

a double line in northern Shansi.
By the early fifteenth century the establishment of military
colonies in Liaotung allowed closure of the sea supply route to the
north, though it was briefly revived in the 1590's to meet Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea.

The new Grand Canal had four times the

capacity of the sea route and permitted the supplying of Peking, the
new capital.

It also represented a technological breakthrough,

with an elaborate system of locks using water from the Wen and Ssu
rivers.

The canal was thirteen Chinese feet deep and thirty-two

feet wide.

After 1500 canal traffic declined, mainly because the

hereditary soldier labor force absconded.

This was probably a con

sequence of the decay of serfdom.
But Ming was not destroyed because of decay.

It was merely an

accident that ruined it a century and a half after internal decay
began.

The coincidence of the rise of the Manchus, internal re

bellions and epidemics caused a decline of military manpower.

The

Manchus, by themselves no match for China, carried out their con
quest by using Ming generals.

Their infantry was vulnerable to

firearms, hence the ability of the Three Feudatories to nearly
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reverse the conquest in 1673 to I683.
The Manchus deemphasized firearms within their own armies after
the conquest.

Muskets could still not match the crossbow.

They

also feared dispersal of firearms among the civilian population and
tried to ban their use until the mid-eighteenth century when bandits
began using them and ordinary civilians would have been defenseless
without them.

The Manchus accepted defeat in the Opium War because

China, like Russia in the Crimean War, though too big to be con
quered, feared the strain of continued war.

In particular, the

Grand Canal was vulnerable.

Part II
THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMIC REVOLUTION
The Revolution in Farming
Between the eighth and twelfth centuries agriculture was revolu
tionized.

In the north better milling techniques led to wider use

of wheat instead of millet.

The most significant improvements were

in the south's paddy-rice agriculture.

The dam, sluice gate, noria

and treadle watei pump led to manorial dominance, as only manors
tended to have the resources to exploit these innovations.

(Simil

arly, the European manor of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was
best able to exploit the ax, better plows and horse harness.)

Po

litical unity eased the spread of these new techniques as did
printing of illustrated agricultural treatises such as the works of
Lou Shou and Ch'en Fu and the Yuan figure Wang Chen.
The growing market for grain stimulated consolidation of the
manorial system, just as the early nineteenth-century growth of
international grain markets intensified Russian serfdom.

There is

some evidence of serfs paying money rents, though payment of a fixed
quantity of grain was more usual.
directly tied to the market.

Some tenants, therefore, were
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On the land there was now better plowing and more manuring.

A

plow capable of turning over the sod had been developed in the north
by the third century and was adapted for use in the wet fields of
the south by the ninth century.

A variety of new seeds, including

quick-ripening types, had appeared.

Seeds and cultivation tech

niques were finely adjusted to differing soils.

Increased possibili

ties of marketing had stimulated crop specialization.

Dovetailing

of crops and double-cropping wiped out seasonal unemployment in many
areas.

Only the use of wind power in farming was to antedate this

medieval economic revolution.
Though

thirteenth-century China had the world's most sophisti

cated agriculture, there was still much disparity among regions.
That Northern Sung's population of over 100,000,000 could grow to
about 160,000,000 to 250,000,000 by I58O was the result of a more
general use of Sung techniques.

The Revolution in Water Transport
During T'ang there were still difficulties in building allweather roads, but by Sung times stone and brick were used to sur
face not just intracity but intercity roads.

The government post

took eight to fourteen days to traverse the route from Ch'angan to
Canton in T'ang and Sung times.

Hence by mid-T'ang the statesman

Liu Yen could receive information quickly enough to adjust central
government policies to the shifting local prices of commodities.
The reports sent regularly from the capital by agents of late T'ang
regional commandants evolved by Sung to the official gazette, "the
world's first national newspaper."
The volume of shipping was "impressive."

The 2,000 river ves

sels built in mid-eighth century by the Salt and Iron Commission
had alone a carrying capacity equal to one-third that of the mid
eighteenth century British trading fleet.

By Sung, junks were

being built with iron nails, were waterproofed with t'ung oil, were
fitted with watertight bulkheads, and carried sea anchors, axial
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rudders, sea floor sampling scoops, depth lines, compasses and rock
ets for defense.

After 1000 A.D. even foreign merchants preferred

to travel in Chinese ships.
An estimate in 148? that inland water transport was 30^ to k0%
cheaper than land transport, and that sea transport was 70% to 80^
cheaper than land transport probably holds for Sung times as well.
But losses at sea were high, especially for smaller ships, and the
northern seas were not reliably mastered until the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
The double canal lock was invented in the eleventh century.
Its use at the juncture of the Grand Canal and Yangtze at Chenchou
saved 500 workers and 1,250,000 cash annually over the amount needed
earlier to drag ships over ramps and permitted the use of ships of
three times the carrying capacity as before.
Though shipping was largely a family enterprise, partnerships
were also common.

These were usually dissolved after each voyage,

but some were more permanent.

Some fleets were as large as eighty

ships and were run by delegated managers.

The Southern Sung policy

of requisitioning ships for the navy induced combinations of up to
sixty merchants to build ships in collective ownership, half the
ships going to the government.

Brokerage was the most efficient

way to assure steady cargos for ships without engines (and hence on
loose schedules).

By Yuan there existed standard threeway contracts

linking hirers, brokers and shipmasters.

The Revolution in Money and Credit
Ch'in and Han used copper money widely, but it tended to dis
appear during the age of disunion, except during periods of politi
cal stability.

By the early sixth century use of cash was sporadic

and confined largely to big cities even in the stabler south.

By

Sui times the economy was likely no more monetized than during Han.
The money shortage persisted into T'ang.

Though at the peak
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of production 300,000 strings were minted annually in the early
eighth century, the amount was reduced to 100,000 strings by 83^.
Copper was in short supply.

Because minting and transport cost

twice the face value of coins, provincial mints were established, but
these permitted lack of uniformity and debasement and hence problems
in paying taxes in cash, which in turn required payment in other cornmod ities.
By the eleventh century the volume of money was much greater
and its use reached down into villages even for very modest trans
actions which had been carried out via barter during T'ang.

Sung

coins were used as far away as Southeast Asia and Japan.
Why this monetary revolution?

In part it was because "Inter

national trade" among the Chinese states during the Ten Kingdom era
disciplined their coinage policies.

For example, when Min began to

use lead coins, its trading partners had to follow suit to avoid
loss of their copper for inferior Min lead.

The copper shortage led

to a grim search for new ores, the banning of copper utensils or
decrees lowering their prices to keep people from melting coins to
manufacture them.

Even free coinage was tried, though this was

ruined by debasement.
The use of iron, lead and even pottery coins to substitute for
copper during the tenth century was really the beginnings of a
primitive fiduciary currency:

"Paper" money made of other materials.

Bills for the transfer of cash were known by T'ang times: food
tickets issued to the militia, the eighth-century government-issued
"flying cash" (based on the flow north of tax money and the flow
south of money into the tea trade), deposit shops honoring deposi
tors' checks for a fee, and the issue of promissory notes by gold
and silversmith shops (which was very close to true money).
Sung initially acquiesced in Szechwan's use of iron currency
and drained copper from the province.

In 979 copper was permitted

to return, but a subsequent fiat giving iron parity with copper
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led to the latter's disappearance which opened the way for sixteen
officially recognized merchant houses to issue paper promissory
notes.

By 1072 abuses led to government takeover.

The state's

notes were issued against public money deposits, had three-year ex
piration dates (because the paper would wear out within that period),
and were fully convertible, except for a discount at issue.

Expira

tion dates were soon eliminated, and a cash reserve was set up as
backing, but the notes were not yet inconvertible.
By mid-eleventh century the state succumbed to temptations to
overissue paper to pay for the wars with Hsi Hsia.

A note of 1000

cash face value was worth only 9^0 to 960 cash by the 1070's.
Chin notes almost completely displaced cash.
sued five- and two-cash notes.
reserve.

Under

The Mongols even is

They used silver and gold as their

By mid-thirteenth century removal of reserves to the Yuan

capital from the provinces and overissue led to inflation, the cure
for which was correctly diagnosed by one minister as being cuts in
government spending.
During Southern Sung and in the contemporary north private paper
was also very important as currency.

There were commodity bills for

tea, flour, bamboo and wine; wooden chits issued by tea houses and
brothels, and the tax-free ordination licenses of monks.

Credit

was built into the production process; for example, in the twelfth
century capitalists in the hemp cloth industry would advance loans
to spinners in the countryside by way of brokers and collect their
cloth later in the year.
The Revolution in Market Structure and Urbanization
In Han times, by requiring that some taxes be paid in specified
commodities, the government drew even many isolated communities into
the market, but nevertheless only the upper classes were signifi
cantly affected by commerce.

This narrowness of the commercial

sector rendered it easy for government to control and even cruelly
exploit merchants.
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This pattern continued on through the T'ang.

But by late T'ang

the limitations placed on official markets had stimulated the ap
pearance of local unofficial markets which became numerous enough to
oblige a slackening of official controls on the old markets.

In

turn, the new linkages of the rural economy to the market via trade
in necessities was exploited and regulated by the state through the
creation of an internal customs network.
The peasantry was becoming a "class of adaptable, rational,
profit-oriented, petty entrepreneurs" engaged in commercial timber
ing, oil pressing, sugar growing and processing, fish farming in
ponds, etc.

Such specialization often required the importation of

food into non-food specializing rural regions.
markets fed into three main regional markets:

A network of local
K'aifeng serving

north China; the Lake T'ai cities serving south China; the Ch'engtu
plain cities serving Szechwan.
Commercialization, though incomplete (vide the quasi-serf 1ike
status of much of the managerial class), could also be strikingly
sophisticated.

There were various business associations.

Business

functions (trade, warehousing, brokerage) became highly specialized.
The wealthy tended to disperse their capital among specialized
agents within this structure rather than concentrate it under their
direct control.

Yet there were some large individual operations,

like that of the Southern Sung ironmonger Wang K'o whose establish
ment of several thousand workers was comparable to the eighteenth
century Urals iron works.
By the twelfth century there were enough large cities for crowd
diseases to become important.

About

to 7-5% of the population

(ca. 6,000,000 people) were in cities over 100,000.
least 10^ of the population was urbanized.

In all, at

But because of the

power of the imperial state these cities never developed the inde
pendence of their later European counterparts.
Hence, unlike Europe, the manor and the urban market were kept
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from conflict.

Indeed the market's existence rendered the manor more

attractive for its potential productivity.
The period from 1300 to I9OO saw the end of the earlier trend
toward the growth of great cities.

By I900 a smaller proportion of

the population lived in the largest cities, but there were many more
small and medium-sized towns than earlier, thereby lessening the gap
between town and country.

Though one may explain urbanization as

being caused by technological improvements in agricultural and nonagricultural segments of the economy, it is equally plausible to
reverse the causation, and credit the appearance of large urban
markets for stimulating agricultural growth.

The Revolution in Science and Technology
The invention of printing and wide dissemination of books (to a
significant degree under state auspices) "made medieval China the
most numerate as well as the most literate nation in the world."
In medicine, by the thirteenth century there was a conscious
search for novelty.

Old remedies were systematically questioned

and often rejected for new ones.

The state certified doctors by

examinations and devoted much attention to matters of public health,
like drainage systems in cities and quarantine rules during epidem
ics.

Local "officials often tried hard to raise the level of medi

cal practice" by distributing medical texts.

"Medicine was one

field of science at least in medieval China where a gentleman might
without fear of social stigma aspire to be an expert."

Even tooth

paste and the toothbrush were in use.
In the thirteenth century Ma Chih-chi gave the first descrip
tion of eruptive typhus.

Influenza was first described during the

Sung, as was schistosomiasis, a disease caused by parasites which
enter through the skin while working in irrigated rice fields.

The

spread of irrigated rice agriculture, accompanied by increased use
of human manures, may have increased the risk of this disease which
by the twentieth century affected 10% of the population south of
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the Yangtze.

This may explain the "declining economic vigour of

South China in later traditional times."

The first Sung dissection

was performed in 1045, and in 1113 an illustrated anatomy text was
published whose drawings were tr.;nsmitted to the West by the Persian
Rashid al-Din al-Hamdani.
eleventh century.

Mercury poisoning was recognized by the

Malaria was linked to the influence of swamps.

Some believed that infection was the cause of disease, hence the
quarantine of Hangchow during the 1181 and 1187 epidemics.
believed that prior body weakness was the cause.

Others

Previous medical

theory was systematized, revised and linked to many more specific
drugs and diseases than before.
Unlike the West during the seventeenth-century scientific revo
lution in physics, however, the Chinese failed to resolve the in
ternal inconsistencies in these theories, perhaps because medicine
is much more complex than planetary motions.

Though it seemed a

more practical science, the Chinese were unlucky to have picked on
medicine for such extensive work.
Mathematics in north China, under barbarian as well as Chinese
rule, was linked to Taoist numerical mysticism.

Li Yeh, who was a

scholar in Shansi after the Mongol conquest, used location in an
array (matrix) to indicate powers of an unknown.
ics was more practical.
structing calendars.

Southern mathemat

Indeterminate analysis was used for con

A late thirteenth-century introduction to

mathematics drew many of its examples from contemporary city life.
By Ming times nobody understood the advanced positional algebra
of Chin and early Yuan, perhaps because of the intervening disrup
tion of north China.

In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japan

this early work showed its potential fruitfulness with Seki Kowa's
invention of determinants and Ajime Chokuyen's development of cal
culus, though the former used a written notation perhaps learned
from the West.
In Sung astronomy much larger instruments yielded greater ac
curacy, and a clockwork mechanism was invented.

In metallurgy coal
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and perhaps coke were used in blast furnace technology.

In military

technology gunpowder was developed into a true explosive, flame
throwers and poison gas were developed, and the Mongols used previous
Chinese work and Chinese technologists to produce a true cannon.

In

textiles, a machine described in a 1313 work automatically spun silk
and later hemp into thread.

It is very like an eighteenth-century

European machine described in Diderot's Encyclopedia.

Further prog

ress in textile machinery after Yuan was not blocked by inadequate
science but by a "weakening of those economic and intellectual forces
which make for invention and innovation."

Part I I I
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The Turning Point in the Fourteenth Century
For still "largely inexplicable" reasons the medieval economic
revolution ended with a sharp economic decline between 1300 and
1500 after which only a slow recovery occurred.

From the mid

fourteenth century on the economy's dynamism disappeared.

Why?

In

part because the expanding frontier began to "fill up," in part be
cause reduced overseas trade cut off supplies of foreign silver and
reduced foreign contact encouraged society to become "inward look
ing," in part because philosophers turned from the investigation of
nature to introspection and intuition.
In 1290 the proportion of the population in the north reached
its nadir, about 3% to 10^ of the total.
of northerners began to increase.

Thereafter the proportion

This was a long-term trend, not

just a response to the Mongol conquest.

The south had begun to

fill up, its old frontiers becoming densely enough settled to send
out migrants themselves.

By the eighteenth century there was no

longer any place promising for migrants to move to, except for Man-s1
churia which remained closed until i860.
Up until this point was reached, migration ta new regions
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would increase productivity in both the old and new regions, even
without technological advances, as the new regions would relieve
population pressure on the old settled ones and further stimulate
the latter via trade.

After 1300 increased production only kept

pace with population growth.
vance.

There was no real technological ad

Even the novel crops from the New World occupied only about

JX of the total acreage.

Soy cake was one of the few new types of

ferti1izer.
Why was there no boom in production of the new fiber cotton big
enough to break out of these limits?

Feasibility of machine spin

ning had already been demonstrated for hemp.

A cotton-based indus

trial revolution did not occur because the "relative glut of raw
cotton . . . did not last long and could not, under the economic
circumstances of late traditional China, be re-created."
By the sixteenth century cotton was in short supply in the
lower Yangtze and by early Ch'ing the region had to import most of
its supply from north China.

After 1700, when cotton manufacture

began in the north, the south had to turn to Manchuria and before
the end of the century to India.

There was no way to raise the al

ready high domestic productivity in cotton agriculture.

Hence

China had no opportunity equivalent to Britain's access to New World
cotton which permitted a tripling of production between 17^1 and
1775.

There were too many Chinese, and China's commercial network

was too good to permit any local anomaly to develop into an indus
trial revolution in cotton.

Industrialization of cotton manufacture

would have had to draw its supplies at the expense of handicraft
cotton production, and this would have yielded no net increase in
production.
The closure of foreign contacts overtly harmed Fukien and re
moved its former intellectual stimuli.

The works of Ptolemy and

Euclid were known in Peking by the late thirteenth century and had
been translated by early Ming but had "no lasting impact."
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Imports were first taxed in the mid-eighth century.

The Court

asserted priority of access to imports, but others could deal with
foreign traders.

In 979 Sung established a state monopoly over some

imports but soon allowed officiaily licensed private trade in these
goods.

On balance, however, both Northern and Southern Sung encour

aged foreign trade.

The Mongols banned foreign trade totally by

1309 but allowed a limited reopening in 131^-

The Ming founder set

up a purely tributary trade but tried to ban overseas travel by Chi
nese.

By the mid-fifteenth century even coastal shipping was banned.

Within a century growth of illegal trade forced relaxation of the
ban, but in the mid-seventeenth century it was reimposed and the
Manchus initially continued the ban so as to isolate Coxinga (Cheng
Ch'eng-kung) on Taiwan.

The ban was again relaxed by the early

eighteenth century and then gradually restored until by 1757 only
Canton was open to foreign trade through the officially licensed
Cohong monopoly.
Extension of the Grand Canal to Peking by 1A15 removed Ming's
incentive to maintain its navy and its seaborne trade, especially in
the flimsy (because cheap) and hence dangerous government vessels.
The ban was maintained thereafter because the government feared de
velopment of independent centers of power.
economically disastrous.

But this policy was

The shortage of good money it engendered

contributed to the post-fourteenth century recession.

Earlier, the

Mongols' "reckless issue" of inconvertible paper currency had
drained silver into West Asia, further contributing to the early
Ming liquidity crisis.

Hence, without foreign trade, Ming had to

stick with an inconvertible paper currency which must have greatly
alienated the people.

The situation was mitigated by the silver

brought from Japan and South Asia by the semilegal and illegal
foreign trade of early Ming and by New World silver in the sixteenth
century.
But too much of southeast China's energy was wasted in dodging
the authorities.

Only the local gentry had sufficient power to
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defy the ban, and they connived in smuggling so thoroughly that they
developed a vested interest in keeping the ban formally in effect.
In 15^7 to 15^9 the Chekiang governor Chu Huan was impeached for
successfully enforcing the ban.

There followed a great increase in

"piracy," apparently attempts by small and middle merchants to break
loose from the big (nerchants and gentry.
in 1567.

The ban was finally lifted

The very size of the empire made the ban possible in the

first place.

States the size of those of Ten Kingdoms times could

not have afforded such isolation.
The fourteenth century was also a divide in philosophy.

Sung

Neo-Confucianism asserted the world's reality against the Buddhist
claim that it was an illusion. Hence it was good to study Nature.
But then how to explain evil? If human nature and JJ. ^^3 ) were
good, then some portion of ch'i ( ^ ) had to be bad or at least
"unclear."

This, however, drove j_i_ out of Nature and rendered phil

osophy vulnerable to Wang Yang-ming's intuitionism which made "Na
ture ... a derivative of man's consciousness."

Hence, by the seven

teenth century even practical scientists thought of knowledge "as
an ordered progression from the empirical/analytical study of phe
nomena to an intuitive grasp of the working of Mind or Spirit as the
ultimate reality."
The seventeenth-century scientist Fang l-chih looked down on
Western thought for never reaching this ultimate reality, and hence
he did not take seriously its empirical/analytical side.

Fang

merged the mind of the individual and the mental aspect of the uni
verse.

This merger, he argued, made it possible to finally reach

ultimate reality after the study of particular phenomena had en
lightened the individual's mind.

But such an assumption had the

disastrous effect of enabling Chinese science to always be able to
explain any puzzle by shortcircuiting the progression up to ultimate
reality.

Fang himself, however, was cautious about how much of the

universal mind an individual's mind could link up with.
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The Disappearance of Serfdom
Manorial ism and serfdom were still dominant during Ming and
early Ch'ing but with declining vigor.
eighteenth century.

They disappeared during the

The manor lord was replaced by the landlord and

pawnbroker; status relationships were replaced by financial rela
tionships; the gentry ran rural projects as professional managers
and not as interested landowners.
During early Ming very large manors were given to the new no
bility, and it proved impossible to take these back.

Manors also

increased through exercise of private force and by voluntary commen
dation (t'ou-hsien) to escape taxes.

The extent of serfdom

cannot be measured; tenants were sometimes treated like serfs.

Only

the official classes could legally hold serfs, hence others would
hide their holdings.
There is evidence that by mid-Ming the manor lord was no longer
obliged to aid his tenant-serfs in time of disaster.
them mere tenants?
legal.

Does this make

Without a written bond, serf status was not

In the sixteenth century the master-serf relationship seems

to have become more precarious, needing kindness by the master for
it to be kept up.

As local networks of markets grew more dense

during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tenants and serfs
tended to meet in them and forge a common class interest.

Hence

the seventeenth century peasant rebellions much more overtly aimed
at "overthrowing the existing status order" than did those of the
mid-fifteenth century and in fact really helped do so.

In part

this was because they coincided with the uprisings of roving ban
dits in the northwest (though men like Litzu-ch'eng were not inter
ested in a status revolution) which ultimately destroyed Ming.
The Manchus considered serfkeeping as socially dangerous be
cause it encouraged murder of serfowners.
selling of tenants along with the land.

In 1681 they banned
Land in any event was now

less profitable than trade, pawnbroking and urban real estate.

By

the eighteenth century, land accounts for only 2% to 20^ of those
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great fortunes for which detailed breakdowns are available.

By that

time in many areas, such as Kiangsu, tenants habitually resisted pay
ing rent.

Pawnbroking was easier and more profitable.

With land less attractive, the Chinese bent toward equal inheri
tance asserted itself and manors were gradually fragmented.

Land-

owners were increasingly drawn into the more numerous and attractive
towns, weakening their control over sefs, especially as they tended
to use local government officers at the lowest level to collect their
rents.

As in Tokugawa Japan,' free tenants proved to be more effi

cient than serfs in irrigated rice agriculture, though there is no
actual evidence of landowners freeing serfs for this reason.

The

south Chinese pattern was to separate rights to the subsoil from
rights to the surface, and hence for long-term tenancy to become de
facto permanent tenure.

By the early twentieth century one-third to

two-fifths of the lower Yangtze and four-fifths of the land in north
China was farmed by tenants holding their land in permanent tenure.
The end of manorial ism contributed to a population explosion.
In 1580 there were about 200,000,000 Chinese and in I85O about
Al0,000,000.

This in turn contributed to increased social and geo

graphical mobility and to the movement of rural power to institu
tions or the rich in towns and cities.

Serf females were often

kept unmarried, as those who reared girls had to pay their lords
for the privilege.

Hence the end of serfdom increased the supply of

females who had children.

Though monasteries remained dispropor

tionately wealthy, the number of monks leveled off before the end
of the fifteenth century.
By the 1930's, according to Communist documents, it could take
only three years to achieve landlord or rich peasant status.
"Everywhere there was a constant competition, without benefit to
society as a whole, in which the fortunes of individual peasant
families continually rose and fell," producing a society "both
egalitarian and riven with mutual jealousies."

Even landless

managers of clan, temple and association land could become wealthy.

226

Until the mid-seventeenth century, landowners were still re
sponsible for local public works.

But their disappearance from the

countryside led to takeover of these tasks by local clerks and vil
lage officers, and later, in the eighteenth century, by local gentry.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the Ming local
administrative apparatus began to be dismantled piecemeal, region by
region.

Labor service supervisors and mutual-responsibi1ity tax

collectors disappeared.
men avoided service jobs.

Clerks became so corrupt that local rich
Since the early sixteenth century, service

Jobs had often been performed by men from the poorer classes who
could not stand up to the clerks but who had to be used because few
er rich rural landlords were available.
The gentry were not drafted to be local managers.
trates had to consult with and defer to them.

Hence magis

The gentry worked

through lower-level professionals, as on the Rural Compact Boards,
who were usually lower class and lived off squeeze.

Gentry did not

hold gentry status because they owned land, though such status
might be reflected in land ownership.

In order of ascending impor

tance, local power resided in trade, finance, education and institu
tional position.
Rural Markets and Rural Industries
Around the seventeenth century, market towns, especially in
economically advanced areas, began to multiply faster than the popu
lation increased.

Judging from Shanghai county, this seems to

correlate with the rise in interregional trade guilds in the county
seats.
Large scale putting-out (as in the Sung hemp industry) disap
peared by late Ming, apparently because the market mechanism was
now so elaborate as to make it unnecessary, even for cotton manu
facture.

Though without capital, a peasant had daily access to a

market to buy raw materials and sell his or her finished product.
(The argument for the absence of putting-out is, it must be
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conceded, ex silentio.)

The first evidence for putting-out in cotton

comes from the late nineteenth century.
The cotton industry was based on subsidiary, seasonal labor, an
"enormous reserve of unused productive capacity."

Merchants operat

ing through the market had "no direct involvement" in the production
process.

A rise in demand simply temporarily mobilized this unused

potential, permitting no reward for technological innovators.
slumps, peasants could spend more time farming.

In

Hence there were no

penalties to drive the inefficient permanently out of the business.
Four groups interacted in this mix of "organizational fragmentation
and structural rigidity": cotton cloth merchants, contractors, arti
sans and perhaps landlords of the places where the work was done.
Cotton's institutional arrangements appear to be typical of
Chinese industry in general.

Merchants were rarely involved in fi

nancing production except in some very competitive markets or in
fields where raw materials were very expensive.

The raw material

for silk was expensive and the looms for weaving it could be very
elaborate, needing two or three men to operate.

Hence when demand

grew during the eighteenth century, twenty-loom shops became un
competitive and putting-out evolved, financed by "account houses"
which were isolated from producers by two or three levels of inter
mediaries.
Though in general production increased, the separation of pro
duction from commerce indicates that China was not evolving toward
an industrial revolution.
truant i tat i ve Growth, Qualitative Standstill
Some Ming-Ch'ing industries operated on a massive scale: the
porcelain works of Ching-te-chen and the ironworks on the HupeiShensi-Szechwan border which used charcoal rather than coke, trans
ported ore and wood over long distances and employed thousands of
workers.

Then why was there no industrial revolution?

The devel

opment of the cotton, iron and silk industries shows there was no
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shortage of capital or restrictions on markets to account for the
"drying up of mechanical invention."
Was industrialization aborted by political hazards and govern
ment rapacity, causing the middle class to hide its capital by en
tering the gentry?
the merchants.

The government did occasionally "hunt and fish"

Yet officials often were involved in commercial

life, at least indirectly through agents, and this led to a "symbi
osis between bureaucrats and businessmen."

By the nineteenth century

guilds were taking on governmental roles, particularly during the
Taiping crisis, as did the Ten Guilds of Hungchiang in western Hunan,
almost all of whose leading members also held official rank.

Such

men represented an urban elite based on commerce and government more
than on landholding and were not members of "a disadvantaged caste.
The Ch'ing government abandoned Ming's forced inconvertible
paper currency.
copper.

It opened new copper mines and imported Japanese

Paper money did reappear as demand for money increased, but

it was the entirely private "cash bills" of money shops.

The only

drawback to the late imperial monetary system was its excessive mul
tiplicity of forms which required an "army of assayers and ex
changers," but this was preferable to a liquidity shortage.
Were enterprises too small-cale and shortlived?

No.

Though

commercial law was mainly a matter of privately enforced custom
within guilds and trust among non-friends was rare, up to a point
contracts could be enforced in courts of law, and kinship ties and
partnerships could support very large enterprises.

Much use was

made of networks of branch offices, as by the Shansi banks, which
allowed large fortunes to be put to work quite flexibly.

There are

records of businesses lasting for centuries, as did a 240-year old
Suchou drygoods store.
None of the conventional explanations of Europe's industrial
revolution are controverted in China, but an industrial revolution
nevertheless failed to occur, even though the Ming and Ch'ing
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economies still showed resourcefulness.

New World crops were adopted

the simpler Western contraptions (guns, clocks, telescopes, micro
scopes) were imitated; zinc-smelting, multicolor printing, and sail
ing in northern waters were perfected.

The use of damp cellars for

spinning cotton in the dry north was discovered.
factured nationwide.

Cotton was manu

Welldigging spread into the north.

The gybing

sail windpump, the bulletproof vest and soybean cake fertilizer were
invented.

Entrepreneurship and new institutions (money shops, re

mittance banks, denser market networks) were all present.
But it is also necessary to consider the availability of re
sources, capital and labor.

Many resources were drying up: wood,

fuel (especially on the coast where weed and reed fields had been
converted into paddy), fiber (though cotton gave more fiber per acre
than hemp, good cotton land was also good food-growing land), good
farmland and metals.
exacerbated shortages.

Population growth and technological standstill
Even simple wooden machines became too

costly for many peasants.

The Yuan government had to donate wood to

peasants so they might construct water pumps.

The high cost of

metal may have prevented the wide use of the Western cylinder and
piston pump later on.

Roads, though good, were often designed only

for pedestrians and wheelbarrows because fodder land was so scarce
that men were cheaper to use for transport than animals.
Waterways were so much cheaper than land routes that areas
without waterway potential remained underdeveloped.

Even eighteenth-

century British-sty1e land transport improvements would not have
made land transport competitive enough with water transport to make
the improvements worthwhile.

Backward landlocked areas remained

backward for this reason and also because areas with water trans
port attracted developmental interest away from them.
Because of the high degree of sophistication in water trans
port only marginal improvements were possible.

No big advance via

simple improvements, like the American Erie Canal of 1825, was
possible because such technology had long since been in use.

Only
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a "large jump forward" into steam power could have made any signifi
cant difference.
A similar "technological discontinuity" would have been needed
in agriculture.

Higher yields would only have been possible by in

dustrial-age techniques like chemical fertilizers and pesticides and
machinery.

Even additional traditional inputs

were often not

available.

In the 1930‘s Hopei and Shantung agriculture would have

done better with more animal manure, but manure was in short supply
because grazing land was scarce, and grazing land was scarce because
a dense population needed more crop land.
Demographic pressure also brought increasingly poor land into
use, reducing the proportion of the total in paddy.

Hence figures

showing static overall productivity may mask much higher productivi
ty on the best land.

According to Dwight Perkins' figures, agri

cultural productivity rose from 140 to 22A catties per mou from 1368
to 1600.

By the 1770‘s it dropped to 200 c.p.m. and then rose again

to 2k0 c.p.m. in mid-nineteenth century.

The initial rise most

likely represents mainly recovery from the Mongol devastation.

From

1600 to 1850 there was not much of a rise unless Perkins underesti

mated the amount of land in use in I6OO, which would lower produc
tivity for that date.

This is possible because much arable land was

concealed from the government during late Ming.
Yet yields in the 1920's were well above Europe's just before
the industrial revolution; France got 9>5 bushels per acre of wheat
around I8OO, but in the 1920's China got lA.

Hence the Communist

attempt during 1956 to 1959 to increase output by applying more
traditional technology and labor increased neither yield per acre
nor per worker.

By mid-eighteenth century Chinese writers like

Hung Liang-chi

recognized that a point of diminishing returns had

been reached.

J. L. Buck has shown that in this century yields per

acre are constant for all farm sizes, but yields per worker are
higher on larger farms with fewer workers.
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Why did the population keep growing?

The population peaked in

the twelfth century, fell until the fourteenth century, rose again
until the late sixteenth century, dropped until I65O and has appar
ently been rising since.

From the twelfth to the nineteenth century

the population increased threefold to around 400,000,000.

Disease

was the biggest check; there were epidemics in the periods from 1586
to 1589 and from 1639 to 1644 and which led to a 35^ to 40% popula
tion decline between 1585 and 1645.
around I8OO.

This eased land pressure until

Cultivated land doubled in quantity from I6OO to I85O,

but its average quality fell.

There were no big epidemics from 1644

to 1756 which allowed population to increase.

Cholera epidemics

began around 1820 to 1822, just when population pressure on the land
again became critical.
Manchuria's population doubled from 1905 to 1940.

From 1919 to

1932 its land in use more than doubled and its cereal output in

creased three and a half fold.

This was done by traditional tech

niques, except for the institutional novelty of the large land
development company.

Because initially Manchuria was well short of

a point of diminishing returns in its agriculture, it could provide
a base for industrialization under the Japanese in the 1930's.
The rest of China was "almost incapable of change through in
ternally generated forces."

For China to have tripled its cotton

consumption as England did from 1741 into the 1770's, would have
been beyond the entire planet's resources.

The modern West's role

in China has been to "ease and then break" this "high-level equi
librium trap," at first through the treaty ports, especially Shang
hai, and then by percolating new techniques into the interior.

The

new methods "made possible new combinations of traditional elements.
Steamships on the major river and coastal routes stimulated busi^
ness for junks on subsidiary routes.

The telegraph allowed tradi

tional banks to form themselves into more efficient networks.

Im

ported cotton yarn was used in a new Fukien handweaving industry.
Foreigners bought Hunan and Szechwan t'ung oil.
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Cone 1 us ion
Compared to China, early modern Europe enjoyed what Alexander
Gerschenkron has called the "advantages of backwardness."
have been too mature to progress rapidly.

China may

Late imperial China's

complex hierarchy of urban centers may not have been a prelude to
modernization but an alternative thereto.

The disproportionate de

velopment of the fewer Sung cities might have been better suited to
encourage modernization, as was the case for the similarly dispro
portionate position of early modern London and Paris in the economies
of England and France.
Original contributions, in a Western language
knowledge may be claimed for these topics:

at least,to our

(a) the origins of the

Equitable Fields; (b) the origins of Chinese paper money; (c) the
role of the late Ming epidemics; (d) the structure of the late tra
ditional cotton industry; (e) the argument that serfdom and serf
like tenancy from Sung to early Ch'ing were not minor and that their
disappearance led to the evolution of a new type of rural society;
(f) the thesis that between 800 and 1300 something akin to an econ
omic revolution took place, after which growth slowed relative to
China's earlier pace and that of contemporary Europe.
Chinese technological creativity has deep roots and its re
awakening may astonish us.

But industry must advance fast enough

to let agriculture break out of its trap, and to do this industry
must enter foreign trade.

It can do so effectively, but if it does,

it will disrupt the regime's control over thought and information.
We cannot tell if this will be "potentially lethal or merely
troublesome."
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Appendix B

k

Translation in Precis of Fu Chu-fu (
.) and Li Chingneng ( ^
), Chungkuo fengchien shehui nei tzupenchuyi
yinsu ti me'ngya
A^
£
(The Sprouts of Capitalistic TactoVs Wifnin China's r€
■euda1
Society). Shanghai: Jenmin ch'upanshe, 1956WHAT ARE THE SPROUTS OF CAPITALISM?
Though it had its idiosyncracies, China's society went through
all the stages prescribed by objective historical law.

As Chairman

Mao has pointed out, even without foreign intrusions after the mid
nineteenth century, the sprouts of capitalism already existing with
in China's feudal society would have slowly developed into full
capitalism.

Already present within Chinese society were money,

production and consumption capital, capitalists and their agents,
and proletarians.

Commercial capital was already serving as the

leading edge of capitalism.

At first capitalist relations were mere

ly localized, with labor subordinated only in form, not actuality,
to capital.

It is from such sprouts as these, as Engels points out,

that capitalism eventually burgeons to become the central and unify
ing factor in the economy.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S MERCANTILE ECONOMY
DURING T'ANG AND SUNG
As Marx tells us, the mercantile stage is the necessary precon
dition for capitalism.
as well as trade.

The mercantile economy involves production

Trade was already somewhat developed by Warring

States-Ch'in times, and there were large-scale accumulations of com
mercial capital.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien wrote that by Han "for a poor man

to seek riches, agriculture is not as good as artisanship, and
artisanship is not as good as trade" (Shih Chi, 129).

Though for

eign trade, by land and by sea, was highly developed, it was largely
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in luxury goods and isolated from the rest of the economy.

Commerce

depended on guile and was subject to the whims of the state.

It was

without roots and not only unable to serve as the base for capitalism, but was also a hindrance to society.
T'ang represented the peak of China's feudal economy.

Though

the feudal natural economy was still the most important sector, the
mercantile sector, began to make great strides forward.

By the mid

eighth century T'ang's internal economy had in many respects tran
scended its earlier forms.

Markets were fixed and urbanized.

Articles of everyday use now entered the market.
ized and were grouped in markets by specialty.

Merchants special
Craftsmen also

traded in their own products, at least locally.

Middlemen with con

siderable capital as well as money changers became numerous.

Bills

of exchange came into use.

There were also rural markets operating

down to the village level.

The monetary system was shifting from a

bronze-cloth basis to specie, particularly silver.

Improvements in

commercial and transportation techniques were mutually stimulative.
Foreign trade grew, particularly the land trade with the nearby
states of Central Asia.

Occasionally this trade drained so many

goods from China that the state had to suspend it.
number of private fortunes were created.

A significant

T'ang's sea trade provided

the base for still more extensive development later on.
the most important people in this trade.

Arabs were

Maritime excise taxes be

came a significant source of government revenues.
Tea, which had become ubiquitous in its use by mid-T'ang, was
a notable agricultural specialty.

The "flying cash" paper notes

were mostly used by the far-ranging tea merchants.

Tea also now

began to be exchanged for horses at the frontier markets.

One T'ang

source lists fifteen districts specializing in tea production. Most
he actual cultivators were hired laborers.

J

They worked by the

feds in large tea gardens owned by the rich, usually of the ofal class. We do not know whether most of these laborers were
. 1 The skilled workers engaged in drying and processing the tea
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leaves were recruited from a wide area, and they were often paid in
tea which they then sold after dispersing from the gardens.

Their

status still had a feudal aura about it.
Tea seems to have been the only product significantly commer
cialized.

Officially controlled artisans for the palace and army

were still in the central position in the labor force.

This practice

went back to Chou times and had spread with the evolution of the
economy.

Production materials for these official artisans came from

taxes in kind.

Artisans served prescribed periods of apprenticeship

with close supervision either directly or indirectly by the state.
State interference in the salt and iron industries after mid
eighth century greatly restricted the private sector in these trades.
This was because some of the state monopolies in these trades did
not produce for the market and kept many of their techniques secret.
Even in those activities like the salt trade, which produced for the
market, the state's aims were primarily profit for itself and the
subordination of commerce to agriculture.

But because the scale of

operations was so great, there was advance in the division of labor
and increasing sophistication of techniques.

Nor did state produc

tion prevent a significant increase in the size of the private sec
tor.

Rural and urban commercial production were already separately

organized.
In manufacture there was specialization by craft and region.
In textiles, silk, hemp and wool were distinct trades.

The scale of

manufacture was, however, comparable in smallness to that of the
producers' guilds of medieval Europe, i.e., it was still pre
capitalist in form.

Little is known about the forms of management

and status of labor of the large-scale private firms.
As would be expected in a period when feudalism was at its
peak, the several forms of labor service tax constituted the most
important forms of labor in the T'ang state industries, though at
times hired labor was used to supplement it.

Free labor existed,
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as is shown by the numerous names used for various kinds of hired
laborers.

Laborers were hired by the day, month, or by piece rate.

Some artisans owned their own tools.
themselves for hire.

Some traveled about offering

Some had their own fixed places of business.

But, as Marx and Engels say was the case in medieval Europe, free
labor was scattered and without power or cohesion, merely an aid to
a feudal order in which a natural economy was still central and the
state was still emphasizing agriculture.
Hence one may not yet speak of the sprouting of the factors of
capitalism.

Present, however, was the foundation for economic devel

opment in the period from Sung to Ch'ing.
Late T'ang and Five Dynasties was a period of feudal chaos and
warfare.

Economic decay was not halted until the early Sung reuni

fication and consequent pacification of village life provided a
breathing space for society.

Thereafter growth was renewed and the

mercantile economy took a step forward.
Sung commerce was much greater in scale than T'ang's.

The

T'ang urban markets operated only during daylight hours and were
closely supervised by the state.

Locations of the markets and the

type and quality of the goods sold were all specified.
such restrictions were gone.

By Sung

Free markets operated day and night.

There were also temple markets.

Southern Sung went even further..

There were big urban markets thronged with both local and traveling
merchants.

Local trade, especially Southern Sung's, was also much

more developed than during T'ang.

Many rural markets which had been

formally organized as garrison centers (chen sh i h

"jP ) during

Northern Sung, became significantly large urban centers, often county
seats, by Southern Sung.

These were also the loci for considerable

accumulations of monetary capital.
Though the forms of state regulation of foreign trade still re
sembled those of T'ang, the scale of the trade was much greater,
reaching its peak during Southern Sung.

Even by Northern Sung there
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were many more tax offices and sub-offices than during T'ang.

Canton

was still the biggest port, but by late Northern Sung and early
Southern Sung Ch'Uanchou was beginning to become the new center, ul
timately because of its nearness to Hangchow, the Southern Sung
capital.

It attracted

merchants from more than fifty countries

dealing in several hundred kinds of goods.

Because imports exceeded

exports, there was a monetary drain and a serious internal monetary
crisis.

Nevertheless a flourishing foreign trade continued through

late Yuan.

But because it was still controlled by feudal lords and

rich merchants, this trade was not able to displace from centrality
the feudal natural economy, and capital accumulation and the devel
opment of internal commerce was still hindered.
Tea was still the chief commercialized agricultural product,
but the scale of the trade greatly exceeded that of T'ang.

The

state took over marketing and even had its own tea plantations and
processing plants, some using water power.

Labor was still either

conscripted or recruited and hence was still basically feudal.
There were many more varieties of tea than during T'ang, requiring
specialized processing techniques.

Tea was no longer a subsidiary

agricultural product but the center of mass-use specialized industry.
Sugar became an important commercial item during Sung.

Though

still a part of agriculture, it was also becoming an article of in
terregional trade.

Its processing required specialized tools and

shops of twenty and more workers, with some division of labor. There
were other specialized trades during Sung but, unlike sugar and tea,
they all produced for local markets only.
Sung handicraft industries were much advanced over T'ang's.
Though we do not know the nature of labor relationships, there was
division of labor.

The scale of operations of both private and

public mining and smelting was much greater in Sung than in T'ang.
By Northern Sung coal was used in smelting iron.
as many as 500 or 600 workers.

Some smelters had

One public mint employed 300 day

laborers and could turn out 10,000 strings of cash daily, 270,000

I
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strings in a nine-month period.
feudal in its management.

Of course this mint was completely

Private mints also flourished and there

was no way to stop them.

Private manufacture of bronze implements

also flourished.
Silk weaving was carried out on a big scale.

State enterprises

were feudal in organization and larger than private ones.
division of labor.

Both used

Printing was a new industry during Sung.

Aside

from the National Academy in the capital, there were printing centers
in Chekiang, Szechwan and Fukien.

In addition to books, printing

was used to produce paper money and commodity bills.

Not only did

the new technique promote a higher level of culture, it also encour
aged the division of labor.
Porcelain manufacture also became a large-scale industry during
Sung.

There were both state and private kilns.

port trade in porcelain.

There was a big ex

So large-scale an industry must have re

quired division of labor, but little evidence of this survives.
Shipbuilding was also more developed than in earlier times.
State and private shipyards built large, complex vessels, using
special skills and mechanical aids to supplement human muscle power.
Though there was an extensive internal and external waterborn com
merce, shipbuilding techniques were linked to military use and never
strongly affected society at large.
All of the above are merely samples of the proliferation of
commercially produced goods during Sung and illustrate the possi
bility that existed for production capitalism by factory owners.
State manufacture was still extremely important and still used con
scripted craftsmen.

Farmers and official slaves were still impor

tant sources of labor.

But hired labor was more generally in use

than in T'ang, particularly when official labor was insufficient
or during emergencies.

Conscripted labor was in decline because of

the inconvenience of bringing conscripts from a distance and dis
turbing their businesses.

Many would abscond.

Hence conscripted
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labor was inefficient and costly to maintain.

It was better to col

lect a labor service tax and use it to hire men.
An-shih proposed in his Service Avoidance Tax.

This is what Wang
There are many refer

ences to private hired labor, buL most such laborers were not engaged
in production and the methods of organizing hired laborers were
tainted with feudalism.
Especially by Southern Sung, the mercantile economy was much
more developed than during T'ang.

Though still limited to urban

areas and not affecting the bulk of the rural natural economy, it
was nevertheless now large-scale.

It involved not just accumulations

of monetary capital but a diversified commercial output which pro
duced the sprouts of capitalism and served as the historical precon
dition for capitalism's development.
with systematic division of labor.

There were already factories
Of course many factories were

state-owned and hence completely feudal in nature, but quite a few
were private and these produced a variety of commercial goods.
Hired laborers were becoming ever more numerous.
say that by Southern Sung in the Soochow-Hangchow

It is possible to
region there were

sprouts of capitalism in the cloth trade, though we still lack suf
ficiently detailed materials to describe it adequately.

Neverthe

less the base was present for Ming-Ch'ing developments.

THE SPROUTS OF THE FACTORS OF CHINESE CAPITALISM
DURING THE MING-CH'ING TRANSITION
Yuan represented a period of pause, with different sectors of
the economy unequally affected.

The policies of the early Ming

centralized feudalism encouraged revival of commerce to a level
above that of Southern Sung.

The period from early Ming to mid-

Ch'ing was the high point of feudal society's economic development,
the period when sprouts of capitalism clearly appeared.
The lower Yangtze silk cloth trade was first to revive and show
sprouts of capitalism.

Even during Yuan much wage labor was being

used in factories owned by the rich.

Laborers worked long hours
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and were much weakened thereby.
get better wages.

They were mobile and shifted jobs to

This shows that labor was commercialized, being

bought and sold freely.

By mid-Ming this phenomenon spread more wide

ly down to the smaller commercial towns of the lower Yangtze and
their surrounding agricultural areas.

Small family weaving enter

prises would frequently bring their products into the commercial
towns to sell to traveling merchants.

Some of these weavers prosper

ed, expanded production and hired laborers, thus becoming capitalists
in their own right.

Commercial capital entered the production proc

ess by making contracts in advance to buy small operators' output.
These sprouts developed further by late Ming as many officials,
landowners and rich merchants began to invest in the trade.

In ad

dition many unsuccessful weavers were losing their production capital
and were being forced to become wage laborers.

In 1601

in Soochow

there was an uprising of such laborers.
Cotton, which had come up from Lingnan during Yuan, became wide
spread during Ming.
being paid in cotton.

By early Ming part of the land tax in kind was
Cotton manufacture provided another task for

cottage industry and advanced the mercantile economy.
cotton had become the most common clothing fiber.
ed in the Sungchiang area, including Shanghai.

By mid-Ming

The trade center

By mid-nineteenth

century about 1Q% of the rural population of this region was in
volved in the cotton trade.

By the eighteenth century 20^ to 30^ of

the land in Chihli was devoted to cotton culture.

By Yuan times

there was already elaborate equipment for processing cotton, includ
ing a two-man cotton gin.
prove.

During Ming techniques continued to im

There were spinning machines run by foot treadles and capable

of spinning three or four threads simultaneously.
In Ming-Ch'ing Sungchiang commercial capital was entering cot
ton cloth production and gradually transforming itself into produc
tion capital.

Sungchiang was also a cotton merchandizing center.

The contract purchase system allowed rich merchants to dominate the

241

local markets and oblige the actual producers to make what the mer
chants wanted.

A putting-out system also evolved in the cotton trade,

with cloth being contracted out by a main house to various specialists
for different stages of its processing.

Finished cloth was also con

tracted out to family workshops, which often possessed their own tools,
to be sewn into stockings.
Mining and smelting also progressed.

From early Ming a special

tax of one-fifteenth was paid on such products.

The amounts paid

over the course of years show the great size and growth of this in
dustry.

The late Ming technological encyclopedia T'ien-kung k'ai-wu‘s

narrative indicates that iron smelters were of considerable size.
Growth continued into Ch'ing.

A Ch'ing era blast furnace in Kuangtung

had 300 families living nearby and employed over 200 men to service
the furnace.

There were many large iron complexes in this area,

each using detailed division of labor and large-scale blast furnaces
working around the clock.

Kuangtung iron and its products were ex

ported as far as Hunan and the lower Yangtze.

A similar scale and

complexity of operations was achieved in other handicraft industries
such as porcelain, salt, sugar, wine, paper and shipbuilding.
These sprouts of capitalism were also reflected in other sec
tors of the economy.

Conscription of labor in state enterprises

gradually disappeared.

In early Ming there were still over 230,000

hired state craftsmen.

By mid-Ming many were defaulting on their

quota of labor and were being allowed to pay a tax in lieu of such
labor.

By late Ming such default continued and because the continu

ing expansion of the commercial sector rendered conscripted labor's
productivity ever less than that of hired labor, the dynasty went
fully over to the use of a labor exemption tax and then increased
its rate, using the proceeds to hire labor.
The spread of commercialization increased the avariciousness
of the ruling strata.
Ming times.

A monetary economy was fully dominant by

Taxes and rents were collected and computed in money,

not kind, after mid-Ming.

Peasants now had to sell their crops in
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the market to get cash to pay their taxes.

They also began to buy

necessities in the market as well, thereby beginning the destruction
of the natural economy and creating regional specialization.

The

raising of silkworms and mulberry trees was one notable specialty,
particularly in Chekiang and Szechwan.

Most of the profits from such

specialties went into the hands of rich landlords.
Tea held a special place in China's agricultural economy.

Its

production increased at an unprecedented rate during Ming-Ch'ing,
During Ming it was an important source of state revenues.

The gov

ernment set up many offices to manage its production and distribu
tion.

Under state auspices production increased greatly and spread

to new regions.

Much tea was exported to the northwest in exchange

for horses, and from the seventeenth century until the l880's in
creasing amounts were sold to Europe and America.
Sugar production also increased in amount and variety.

By

Ch'ing, Canton was its center, with as much land devoted to it as to
grain in some areas.
with the cloth trade.

Dyeing and dyestuff production increased along
Indigo was the most common dyestuff, its cul

ture spreading from Fukien all through the empire.
vegetable oils also spread.

Production of

Tobacco appeared in late Ming, coming

from Luzon to Fukien and then becoming much more diffused as the
habit of smoking took root during early Ch'ing.

A variety of fruits

were also increasingly grown for the market.
After mid-Ming hired agricultural labor in commercialized areas
became comparatively common and relations between landlords and
peasants changed.

By late Ming many peasants were forced by feudal

exploitation and usurious exploitation by commercial capital to go
out and sell their labor, either by the year or month, in order to
live.

Many worked in commercial agriculture.

Such laborers were

related to landowners by a cash nexus, as is shown by the increas
ingly numerous complaints about their productivity made by land
owners.
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Though such evidence indicates that commercialization of life
was somewhat developed in comparatively advanced areas, this only
represented the beginnings of the transformation of a predominantly
feudal natural economy.

Small-scale farming and artisanship were

still the dominant forms of economic organization.

Nevertheless the

scale and complexity of urbanization were much greater than before
Ming.

There were many smaller cities apart from the capitals, with

rich inhabitants possessing capital on a capitalistic scale.

Mer

chants were dealing in materials of production, both manufactured and
agricultural, not just finished goods.

This was a fundamental dis

tinction from the commerce of previous eras.
Money was becoming increasingly indispensible, especially for
the elites.

By mid-Ming there were seventeen and more families with

capital of from 500,000 to 1,000,000 cash.

Many of the rich invest

ed in the commercial sector and by their oppression of small crafts
men and farmers further concentrated wealth.
commercial cities developed.
well as political centers.

Several dozen large

Peking and Nanking were economic as
Other cities were regional economic

centers specializing in various products like silk, cotton, and
porcelain.
CONCLUSION
From the above we may conclude the following:

(l) Though T'ang

was the height of feudal development, it also saw the establishment
of commerce and commercial production to a sufficient degree to
serve as the base for later sprouts of capitalism.

(2) Sung's (es

pecially Southern Sung's) commercial economy was more developed
than T'ang's.

Commerce was already yielding rather large-scale ac

cumulations of monetary capital.

There were large manufacturing

enterprises, with division of labor and with hired labor becoming
daily more evident.

These all reflect the steady proliferation of

petty commercial producers.

Perhaps in a few areas (Soochow-

Hangchow) in Southern Sung, the sprouts of capitalism had already

Vo
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appeared.

(3) During Ming-Ch'ing, the feudal natural economy still

held the dominant place in Chinese society, but the commercial econ
omy had risen to a high level from the T'ang-Sung base.
In the Soochow-Hangchow silk trade, Sungchiang's cotton looms,
and in the metals, porcelain, papermaking and shipbuilding handi
crafts trades in various areas, the elements of capitalism had al
ready sprouted and developed.

In these trades, on one hand petty

commercial producers differentiated Into capitalist enterprise owners
and hired laborers and, on the other hand, merchants managed produc
tion directly via delegated commercial capital.
This high level of commercial development and the sprouts of
capitalism in some handicrafts were also reflected in other aspects
of China's social economy, most importantly in official manufactur
ing's substitution of the hired labor for the conscripted labor sys
tem, the development of cottage manufacture in agriculture and the
gradual increase in hired labor, commercial capital's rapid increase
and participation in commercial production, the concentration of
monetary wealth in a few men's hands, and the appearance of important
economically specialized regions.

All these are related to the

sprouts of capitalism in important industries.
But we must forcefully point out that the development of China's
feudal social economy was extremely uneven; the sprouts of capitalism
appeared in only a few regions and industries where the commercial
economy was highly developed.

For the most part villages were still

in the grip of a feudal natural economy.

Though China's feudal sys

tem had begun to loosen in late Ming, the economic links between
small-scale agriculture and handicrafts were still extremely close,
and these became a serious obstacle to the general spread of the
commercial economy.
Aside from this, the rulers of China's feudal monopoly system
were still quite strong.
and develop.

Official industries continued to exist

Various sorts of taxes and feudal management and
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oppression were all at that time serious obstacles on the road to
development of privately managed industries.

All of these are the

basic reasons for the failure of capitalism to develop and for primi
tive capital accumulation to be delayed in its appearance.

During

Ming-Ch'ing, though sprouts of capitalism developed within Chinese
feudal society, the historical basis for development to a capitalist
society was not prepared.

Hence by mid-nineteenth century the whole

of the feudal system of production had not yet been destroyed.
Of course this does not mean that China's feudal society was
incapable of developing into a capitalist society.
Chinese capitalism were slowly progressing.

The sprouts of

If there had been no

capitalist intrusion from abroad, China too would certainly have
been able to slowly develop from a feudal to a capitalist society.
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DYNASTIC TABLE
(Keyed to Chou Chin-sheng's periodization of Chinese economic history)
PERIODS AND DYNASTIES
I.

DATES

The Mythical Period
1.

The Yellow Emperor (Huang Ti
) trad. 2697~2596 B.C.
[Traditionally viewed as the ancestor
of the Chinese race. Traditions vary
as to his predecessors, but most in
clude thf "culture hero" rulers Fuhsi4;^ ^
2852-2738) and
Shen-nung
^ (trad. 2737“2696)
among them.]

2.
3.

[Four mythical rulers]
Yao ^

trad. 2597-2357 B.C.

4.

Shun

trad. 2255-2206 B.C.

5.

YU
Hsia Dynasty ^

trad. 2205-2198 B.C.

6.

trad. 2356-2256 B.C.

trad. 2197-1766 B.C.

[Said to have been founded by
Yu's son.]
11.

The Founding Period
1.

trad. 1766-1122 B.C.
(perhaps actually
only c. 1500-c.1100)

Shang-Yin

trad. 1766-1400

Shang
Yin
2.
III.

V.

trad. 1400-1122
trad. 1121-770

Western Chou

The Age of Metamorphosis
1.

IV.

[Name changed when
capital moved]

770-249

Eastern Chou
Spring and Autumn (Ch'un-ch* iu)^
Warring States (Chan-kuo)

770-403
403-220

The Flourishing Epoch
1.

Ch'in

2.

Western (or Former) Han

3.

Hsin (Wang Mang)

(or

)-;^

)

221-205
205 B.C.-8 A.D.

9-24 A.D.

The Age of Troubles
1.

Eastern (or Latter) Han

(or

)^^

25-220
25-220

DYNASTIC TABLE

(cont'd)

The Age of Troubles (cont'd)
2.

Three Kingdoms
Shu (Han)
Wei
Wu
^

220-265
220-265
220-265
222-280

f' )

Chin ^
__
Western Chin^p
Eastern Chin^^

[in South China]

265-^30
265-316
317-^20

Southern and Northern (Wnasties
(Nan Pei Ch'ao\^,) J.L
)
Southern Dynasties:
Liu-Sun^
Ch' i
^
Liang ^
Ch'en
Northern Dynasties:
The Sixteen Kingdoms
(Shih-1 iu kuo
Northern Wei Jk
Western Wei
Eastern Wei
^
Northern Ch'i
Northern Chou

420-478
479-501
502-556
557-588

304-439
386-534
535-557
534-550
550-577
557-581

The Age of Reestablishment
1.
2.

3.

Su i
T' ang
)
(Wu Ta i
Dyn
a. Fivee dynasties
[in North China]
Later Liang
^
[Turkic]
Later T'ang
Later Chin (Tsin)
[Turkic]
Later Han
: J|
[Turkic]
Later Chou
^
b. Ten Kingdoms ^Shih kuo -f'
) [in
various places in South China, except
for Northern Han.]
Wu ^
[capital at.Yang-chou]
Southern T'ang
[capital at
Nanking]
^
^
— ^.......... ,
[middle Yangtze]
Ch'u
[in H^nan]
Former Shu j^i i/Q
in Szechwan]
Later Shu ,
[in
^
. n Szechwan]
S:
Wu-Yueh ^
[capital at Hangchow]

581/9-618
618-906. ■
907-960
907-922
923-935
936-946
947-950
951-959

902-937
937-975
907-963
927-951
907-925

934-965
907-978
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DYNASTIC TABLE (cont'd)
VI.

The Age of Reestablishment (cont'd)
[capita], at Foochow]
Southern Han vf)
[capital at Canton]
Northern Han
y 'f:, [in Northern Shansi]

VII.

The Age of Renewal
1.

Sung

960-1279

Northern Sung Jb
Southern Sung
VIII.

3.
4.

Yuan

[Mongol]

^

916-1125
1126-1211
1115-1234
1234/79-1368

Ming

ij/j

1368-1644

The Age of Fermentation
I.

XI.

Liao
[Khitan]
Western Liao (Qara Khi ta i)
Chin ^
[Jurched]

The Age of Renewal
1 .

X.

960-1126
1127-1279

The Age of Destitution [overlaps Age of Renewa1]
[Tangut]
1 . Western Hsia \iyj ^
1038-1227
2.

IX.

909-944
907-971
951-979

Ch'ing

[Manchu]

The Republic (Minkuo

1644-1911
)

1912-
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WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
Chinese weights and measures have varied, often over considerable
ranges, at different times during the past three millenia. Even in
relatively recent times there has been wide variation among differ
ent regions during the same period. The metric and English equiva
lents given here are for recent times only, and are intended only to
make rough comparisons possible. They must NOT be used as the basis
for quantitative calculations, even for recent times. For purposes
of calculation consult a good history of Chinese weights and measures
and make whatever allowances seem prudent for regional and local
variations.
1.

Li near Measures
Metric equivalent

Chinese unit
fen '4
10 fen = 1 ts'un J
10 ts'un = 1 ch'ih X.
10 ch' i h = 1 chang Ji,

3.3 mni.
3.3 cm.

33
cm.
3.3 m.

10 1 i = 1 fen /)
10 fen = 1 mu
100 mu = 1 ch ‘ i ng

0.33 miles

Metric equivalent

English equivalent

6.1 sq. m.
.6lA4 are
6.144 ares
6.14 hectares

,

7.34 sq. yd.
74.43 sq. yd.

.1647 acre
16.47 acres

Cubic Measures

Chinese unit

Metric equivalent

sheng
10 sheng = 1 tou ^
10 tou = 1 tan (or shih)>^
[not to be confused with
the homophonous unit of
weight. Cf. below]
A.

in.
ft.
ft.
ft.

Areal Measures

Chinese unit
li M

3.

0.131
0.109
1.094
10.94

0.5 km.

150 chang = I 1i
2.

English equivalent

1 1iter
10 1iters
100 liters

English equivalent
.908 quart

1.14

pecks

2.85 bushels

Weight Measures

English equiva1ent
Metric equivalent
Chinese unit
1iang"tael"*
1.1 oz.
31.25 g.
16 1 iang = 1 chin /f
1.102 lb.
.5 kg.
"catty"*
50 kg.
110.23 lb.
100 chin = 1 tan
or
"picul"*
*Commonly used "pidgin English" terms during the nineteenth century

GLOSSARY-INDEX
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Africa, 127
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Agriculture: invention of, 22; ancient, 2(>-n, 39-^1, 203;
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Ch'engtu
, 54, 87, 148, 149, 217
Chi dan
, 38

Ch
Ch
Ch
Ch

ancient state of
dynasty (Northern)
dynasty (Southern)
an (Khitan) ^

wiling dynasty^

T&
^

35-37,
hz, 1»6, 183
69
67-68
17, 85, 91, 112, 120. Cf. also

Chia (ten-family unit)
, \kl, 1^*3
Ch ia-ch ' ing (Ch ' ing emperor) %■
135, 179
Chia Hsien 'p
,100
Chia Lu
ll^* ,,
Chia Ssu-tao’^
, 98
Chia yij ch' i (fa Ue jade ware) 'iH. X
135
fchiang Kai-shek
-ft ^ , 15, 17-18
Chiangnan Arsenal, 162
Chiaochou ^ ‘I I f
81
lOlt
Chiao-tzu
Chienchou/i' )■)■] , 157
Chienk'ang^_
67, 71. Cf. also Nanking
Ch' ien-1 ung (C
ing emperor) ^
, 136, 158, 177, 178,
*9’’ '97
"Ch‘ ien shen lun“ ("Paean to the God of Money") M'
. 67
Ch'ien-t'ang
,89
Chihli, Gulf of, 55
Chihl i ^ ^
,58, 176
Chihnan ch'e (south-pointing carriage)
100
Chin, ancient state of
, 45
^
Chin (dynasty)-,^ , 5I , 66-67
Chin (dynasty)
, 16, 19, 109, HO, 111, 112, 117-118, 157,
209, 216
Chin niu tao (Golden Ox Road)
^
, 44
Chin Shih (Chin History)
,111
Ch'in, ancient state of^
, 37, 40, 43
Ch'in Chiu-shao ^ yo-55
, 100
Ch'in (dynasty) A , 16, 18, 47-49, 214, 233
Ch'in, First EmpeTor of, Cf. Ch'in Shih-huang
Ch'in Lun ^
,65
Ch'in Shih-huang (First Emperor of Ch'in)
43
China's Pestiny. Cf. Chungkuo chihmingyun
Chinese Eastern Railway 'f
^
, I86
"Chinese learning for the substance. Western learning for
practical use;'
j/ft
, 165
Ching-te-chen -f
135-136, 179, 227
Chingis Khan >5V ^
, HI, 112, 118, 121
Ching t'ien (well-field 'system) if 1-9 , I5, 18, 26-27, 31,
39, 50, 70, 174, 176
'
Ch'ing (dynasty)/.^
, I5, 16, 17, 19“20, 114, 121, 157-201,
221, 222
^
Ch'ing miao fa (green shoots policy)
92, 93-94,
98, 99
n ^ ^
Ch'ing t'an (Pure Talk)
, 66
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Chou, Duke of
, 29, 30, 60
Chou (dynasty) /|j , 15, I6^^ 18, 25~^6
Chou dynasty (Eastern)
, 33-46
Chou dynasty (Western)
/•()
, 16, 25-32
Chou Li (Rites of Chou) }i]
, 27, 32, 44, 183
Chu Hsii“|
^ , 9S-99, 163, 207
96-97
uii u, aiiv,iciiL 3 ua LC ui
, m2, 45
Chuang Tzu ^
, 35
Ch'uang tsei' ("rushing band] t") lf^"j
, l47
Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring-Autumn Era) ^ ^ ^ , 16, 18, 39-40, 45-46
Chungkuo chihmingyun (China's Destiny) ^
,
Chung-shu-men-hsia (Secretariat)
~f
, *93
Chuan (contr i but ions), 191
Ch■uanchou^ ^/| , 81, 103, 120, 128, 132-133, 237

tnun Ki \n 'ji'Q ^
, lui
ChUn shu fa (equal tax 1 aw) it)
. 92, 93
Chun t' ien (equal fields system)
> *8, 69-7I, 74, 76, 86,
205-207, 232
Chuntzu (gentleman) 3^-^ , 14
Cities. Cf. individual city names. Urban life
Clocks, 83, 219
Cloth, 19, 28, 4l, 82, 83, 103. Cf. also Textiles, Cotton,
Silk, Hemp
Coal, 19, 145, 209, 220, 237
Co-hong
, 159, 179-180, 222
Coinage. Cf. Money, specie
Columbus, Christopher, 127
Commerce: ancient, 18-20, 22, 29-30, 42-45, 216-218; Han, 52-55,
58; Age of Disunion, 65, 67, 68-69, 71; Sui-T'ang, 80-82, 222,
234; Sung, 98, 102-103, 222, 236-239; Yuan, 113-114, 119-120;
Liao, 115; Ming, 127-129, 132-134, 221-223, 234-243; Ch'ing,
159-161, 178-180, 182-183, 195-197, 221, 226-227
Commercial law, 8O-8I, I65, 182, 228
Compass, 15, 19, 100, I98, 214
Confucianism, 26, 113, 122. Cf. also Neo-Confucianism
Confucius. Cf. K'ung Tzu
Contract purchase. Cf. Pao mai
Contributions. Cf. Chuan
Convenient exchange. Cf. Pien huan
Cooperative granaries. Cf. She ts'ang
Cooperative societies. Cf. Ho hui
Copper, 42, 90. Cf. also Bronze
Corporations, business, I65, I8I. Cf. also Business, organization
of
Corruption, official, 58-59, 126, I58, 197, 223, 228

Corvee. Cf. Li yi
Cotton, 19, 83-84,
159, I80, 221, 226-227, 231, 2k0-2k\
Cowrie shelIs, 29
Credit, 40, 44, 50-51, 78, 93, 94, 98
129-131, 163, 176-178
Customs taxes, traditional, 102, 120, 141, 160, 194-197
da Gama, Vasco, 127
Darwin, Charles, I70
Destitution, period of, 16, 111-123
Double-tax method. Cf. Liang shui fa
Dowager Empress (of Ch'iTli') , I66, I98
Draft animals, 49, 58, 64, 70
Dutch on Taiwan, I33
Earthquakes, detection of, 51
Economic cycles, 38
^^220-22/^227-23?"^'

theories of, 13-14,

Egypt, 206
Elvin, Mark, 8, 9, 10, 11, 203-232
Empires, size of, 203
England, 157-160, I6I, 168, I79, I80, I96, 213, 221, 231
Equal Fields system. Cf. Chlin t'ien
Equal-fields tax reform. Cf. Fangt'ien chlin shui fa
Equal tax law (of Wang An-shih). Cf. Chlin shu fa
Eunuchs, 55, 63, 125, 145-146
------------------Europe, 120, 207, 217, 230
Ever Normal Granaries. Cf. Ch'anq p'ing ts'anq
Examination system, 92, 210
---------Excise taxes, 61, 71, 8l, I08, l4l, 143, 144, 194-195.
Cf. also Kuan shih chih shui
ft,
'M.
.35-37
HEiiTf ines) 15 'If
, 32
False jadeware. Cf. Chia yii ch'i
Famine, 28, 59, 64
Fang La ;5 /M
.110
Fangt'ien chun shui fa (Equa 1-fields tax reform):^
92, 94, 97, 105-106
Farmers, primary position of, 14-15. Cf. also Peasantry.
Agriculture
’
Fei ch'ien (flying money)
, 84-85, 215, 234
Fengt'ien
, \8S
Fermentation, period of, 16, 19-20, 157-201
Feudalism, I5, 18, 25~27; decline and remnants of, 38-39;
77, 131; Marxist use of term, 234, 244-245
Feudalism, nominal. Cf. Su feng
Field tax. Cf. T'ien fu
Fines. Cf. Fak'o
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Fiscal policy, 90,
Cf. also Taxation
Fish-scale register, Cf. YLi 1 in ts 'e
Fishing, I83-I85
Five Dynasties. Cf. Wu Tai
Five elements. Cf. Wu hsing
Flourishing, period of^ 16, I8, 47-62
Flying money. Cf. Fei ch'ien
Folangchi (Franks, Portuguese)
, 133
Foshanchen 4^ J-^ jiA ,179
Foochow shipyard end arsenal, I87
Forgery, 104, 105
Founding period, 16, 18, 25-33
France, 94, 157, 160, 168, 180^ I85, 196, 199
Fu ch' iang (wealth and power) ''i
, 35
Fu Chu-fu i| lAA
, 9, 233-245
Fukien
, 55, 85, 87, 89, 101, 104, 133, 134,
144, 221, 231, 238
Garrison fields system. Cf. T'un t'ien
Gentleman. Cf. Chuntzu
Germany, I60, 162
Gerschenkron, Alexander, 232
Gold, 42, 43, 48, 103, 104, 138, 168
Golden Ox Road. Cf. Chin niu tao
Golden register. Cf. Huang ts'e
Government organization, 109, 158, 226
Government-run trade, 36, 38, 51-52, 53, 152. Cf. also Commerce,
Monopolies, state
Grand Canal, 19, 79, 81, 89, 195, 206, 211-212, 214, 222
Grapes, 54
Great Wall, 211
Greece, 136
Green shoots policy. Cf. Ch‘ing miao fa
Guests. Cf. K'o
Guest households. Cf. K'o hu
Guilds. Cf. Hang
Guild exemption tax. Cf. Mien hang ch'ien
Gunpowder, 15, I9, 100, 115, 198, 220
Han Ch'i
, 92, 93
Han (dynasty) 7;^ , 16, 18, 47-62, 203-204, 214, 216, 233-234
Han Fei
#
, 37
Hankow
v3 , 179, I85
Hang (street, commercial district, guild)
, 83, 93
Hangchou
/•){ , 79, 87, 89, 101, 103, 179, 186, 237
Hanoi
, 55
Head tax. Cf. Ting fu
Hemp, 28, 70, 226
High-level equilibrium trap, 231, 232
Hofei 4^ >]6,42
Ho hu i (cooperative societies) ^3 ^
, 78
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Honan
)fj , 25, 30, 87, 101
1^^, 147, 148, 179
Hopei
, 25, 101 , 111
Hoppo. Cf, Hu pu
Ho-shen ^v7 />te
, 158, 197
"Horner's Method," 100
Horse-breeding system. Cf, Pao ma fa
Horses, 123, l4l, I85, 242
Hotels, i*5, 86
Household tax.
. Hu shui, Jenk'ou shui
Hsia (dynasty) tS
, 16, 22, 29
Hsiangyang"^
„
.
147, 148
mfad^e
Hsiaojen (mearl rellow) -J-^ 14
Hsien (prefecture, d i str i ct)
48
Hsien-feng (Ch'ing emperor) /
188
Hsienpi ^f<0 , 57, 65, 69, 205:^206
Hsin-an Association
^
, 78
Hsin (dynasty)
, 60
Hsing Chung Hui (Revive China Socie
JIM f <
, 199
HsiungnulivJ
, ]6, 48-49, 52, 53,
-58,
60,'i369,
57176, 204, 205
Hsu Hsing (Hsu Tzu)'SJ
^
), 34, 37
Hsuan-te (Ming emperor) 'i,'
128, 144
HsLian-tsung (T'an^ emj3eror)
. 86
Hsueh Fu-cji'eng 0
, 166 ■rHsun Tzu
^
3$, 37
Hu Han-min
,27
Hunan
, 148, 163
Hupei
87, 147, 148, 149, 171, 179
Hu Shih
,27
Hu pu (Census Board, "Hoppo")
, 129, 180
-Hu shui (household tax) 7^
, 66-67, 71,*
74, 122, 141
Huai River
, 63, 64, 87, 111, 114
, 87, 89, 149^,
Huang Ch'ao ^
Huang chi (yellow registers) 'S
, 67
Huang chin (Yellow Turbans)^ >p
63, 149
Huang Ho (Yel low River), 14, >8, 25, 28, 55, 63, 81
89,
114, 147
’
111
Huang ts 'e (golden registers) -(f jjij129, 141, 142, 143
, 56
Hu i (Han emperor)^,
, 128
Hu i (M i ng emperor)'"
Hui-tzu
_______
'05
Hung Hsiu^-ch'uan
^ ^ ,177
Hung Liang-chi -ic % --ir
. iq? ?qn
Huochien (rocket)
J , loo, 214
Huxley, T. H. , 170
Hydraulics, I5, 18, 27, 28, 40, 50, 51, 64, 95, 114, 129, 212

,

Ibn Battuta, 1I5, 120
Imperial system, 15, 16
Imperialism, Western, 157-161, I8I-I83
India, 19, 54, 55, 65, 82
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Industrial Revolution:
initiative of West in, 15, 19"20, 157, 166;
failure to occur in traditional China of, 122, 169, 227^232;
beginnings in China, 162-175, 181-183
Iron and iron smelting, 18, 28-29, 35“36, ^41 , 42, 51, 52, 56, 61,

104, 117, 164, 209, 217, 227, 241
Irrigation. Cf. Hydraulics
Isolation of China, 14
Italy, 162
Ivory, 80, 103
Jade, 29, 43
Japan, 54, 55-56, 58, 65, 67, 80, 82, 103, 111, 115, 132, 133,
134, 136, 141, 158, 160-161, 162, 180, 183, 196, 198, 215, 225
Jenk'ou shui (capitation tax)
, 56
Ju kiln
‘f. ,101^
Juchen (Jurched)
, 17, 111, 1.17, 120, 157* Cf., also Chin
dynasty
Jurched. Cf. Juchen
K'aifeng
, 81, 85, 89, 95, 101-102, 125, 147, 179, 217
K'aip'ing (Corporation))^]
> 1®'
K'ai-yuan Jera) f/j j(j
, 86
Kansu
^
, 102, 176 ^ ^
178, 188, 191, 197
K'ang-hsi (ChJJng emperor)
K'ang Yu-wei
, 167“169
Kao-tsu (Han emperor) ^
, 56, 51
Khitan. Cf. Ch'itan
Kiangnan arsenal and shipyard, 162, 164, I87
Kiangsi>X\^ , 134, 144, 148, 179
Kiangsu^X^i
> 1^9
Ko k i 1 n .3 "
, 1 01
K'o (gueS^ts) ', 77
^
K'o hu (guest households)
f' , 96-97
Korea, 19, 54, 55-56 , 58, 79, 80, 85, 90, 103, 111, H4, 115,
141, 178, 196, 211 ^ ^
Kuan (official) kilns'{5
, lOJ^ ^ ~ ^
Kuan shih chih shui (market tax)
^
, 31"32, 46, 56-57,
61, 68, 81, 103, 106, 132, l,40,‘^'i4i; 144, 146, 178, 192
Kuan t'ien (official fields)
, 105, 117, II8, 126, 129, 142
Kuan-tzu
, 105
Kuan Tzu
, 35~37, 40-4l, 42, 45-46, 170, I83
Kuang-hsii (cft'ing emperor)
, 168
. _
Kuang hui ts 'ang t' ien (Broad Grace Granary f ields)y^
^
92, 9^
^
Kuang-tsung (Ming emperor)
,146
Kuang-wu (Han emperor) 7G
57, 69 ,
,,
,
K'uang shui (mining tax)
-iM 4^ »
144-145, 24l
Kubilai
H .
118;'120, 121, 122
Kung (tax in kind) ^
, 31, 53, 122, 240
Kung, Prince

,
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Kung p'j (Board of Works) X
121
Kung shang shui (artisan-merchant tax) X
56-57, 68,
106, 119
K'ung Tzu (Confjjcius)
33~3^
Kuo Sung-t'ao
^ ^
,166
Kwangsi ^
m
Kwangtung'^
, 55, 89, 107, 133, 1^8, 179, 198-199
Labor, free, 236, 238-239, 2k0, 241, 242
Labor, productivity of, 166, 242
Labor service tax. Cf. Li yi. For Ch'ing dynasty Cf. Yao
Land reform, 61, 173-175* Cf. also Ching t' ien. ChUn t~^n
Land registers. Cf. Cadastral surveys, Huang chi, Huang ts'e.
Pa i ts'e, yU 1in ts'e
Land tax. CfT
ien fU
Landlordism, 39"40, 50, 63, 66, 70, 73, 74, 76-77, 91, 96-97,
123, 173-174,224-225. Cf. also Manors and manorial ism
Lao Tzu
35
Lead, 103
Legalism. Cf. Fa chia
, 143
L (one-hundred-family unit)
_
(profit)
,
14,
33,
35
L
U_ (rituaDJ-f
35
Ch'eng |:
,1 10
Ching-neng f
, 9, 233-245
Hung-chang f
% , I60, 162, 164-165, 171, 173, I86, I87,
199
^
J ^
K'o-yunq ,£ fi
, 87
K'uei f
, 37
Tzu-ch'enj Jr 1S
, 146-149, 224
iHH (tax)y^
160, 163, 167, 171, 194, 195. 196
___Z* (labor service tax)^;^'^, 31, 74, 81, 83, 86, 92, 94-95,
IM, 114, 117, 118, 121, 141, 142-143, 193-194, 235-236,
238, 241
Liang Ch ' i-ch'ao
, 164, I69-I70
Liang dynasty (Southern)
, 67-68, ^
Liang shui fa (double tax method)
, 74-75, l4l
Liao (dynasty)
, 16, 103, 109, 110, 111, 115-117, 209
Liao Shih (Liao History)
^ , 111
Liaotung ^ ^ , 80, 1447 157, I60, 211
Lieh Tzu
, 35
Linan
Hangchou
Lin Tse-hsu,^.^^
, 159
Lintzu SoJ,
, 54
Lingnan ^
, 240
Liu Hui
, 66
Liu Ming-cf'uan"
, 193
Liu Pang
Cf. Kao-tsu (Han emperor)
Liu-Sung_dynasty
3^
, 66, 67-68
Liu Yen
, 87, 213
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Liu Yi JV iii- ,100
Loyang
, 25, 30, 43, 54, 63, 71, 8l, 8?, 147, 206
Loess soi1, 25, 28
Loom, 154
43
Lu, ancient state of LuChihf^J'^^
,75
Lungch'iian kPln fi. J_ VT?
101
Lu Pu-wei^^ "T ^ » ^3
Ma Chien-chung
, 166-167
Ma Tuan-1in ig
67,
70, 75, 86
JUfi)
Macao
f'j , 133
Madagascar, 102
Madras, 55
de Mai11 a, P. J. ■M. A., Histoire generale de la Chine, 112-113
Malay peninsula, 127
Malthusian trap, 14
Manchuria, 63, 111, 157, 160-161, 231
Manchus, 17, 133, 146, 148, 149, 157-158, 176, 211-212, Cf,
also Ch'ing dynasty
Manors and manorial ism, 73, 74, 76-77, 80, 86, 96-97, H8, 125,
129, 131-132, 142, 158-159, 176-177, 203, 204, 207-209, 224225. Cf. also Landlordism
Manors, official, 96, 97-98, 129, 131-132, 176, 192. Cf. also
Kuan t'ien
Manure, 40,213
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 54
Maritime Customs of late Ch'ing, 195-197
Market exchange reform. Cf. Shih yi fa
Market taxes. Cf. Kuan shih chih shui, Kunq shang shui
Markets, 29, 102-103, 132, 217, 226-227, 234, 236
Marxism, I3, 26, 175, 236
Master households. Cf. Chu hu
Mathematics, 15, 28, 41, 51, 66, 82, 99-100, 121, 136, 219, 221
Mean fellow. Cf. Hsiaojen
Medicine, 15, 51, 121,218-219
Mediterranean Sea, 80
Meiji Restoration, I58, I98
Mencius. Cf. Meng Tzu
Meng Tzu (Mencius) ^ ^ , 14, 34-35, 37-38, 45-46, I49
Mercantilism, 157, 164, 166-167, 169, 170
Merchant-managed government supervised industries, 164, I7I, I8I,
186, 187
Merchants, 14, 33"34, 38, 42, 52-54, II9-I20, 132, 171, 179, 186,
190, 216, 217, 228, 233, 239, 240. Cf. also Commerce
Metallurgy, 15, 19, 22, 41. Cf. also under names of specific
meta1s
Metamorphosis, period of, 16, 18, 33-46
M i Chou
I , 103
^
v.
Mien hang ch'ien (guild exemotion tax)
• 35
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Migration, 16, 69
Military colonies. Cf. T'un t'ien
Military, Sung centralization of, 108-109
Military tax. Cf. ChUn fu
Militia. Cf. Minping
Mill, John Stuart, 170
Millet, 28
Min, kingdom of
,215
Min Pao (People's Journal) ^
, 200
Minping (militia) ^
, 109, 206-207
Minsheng (People's Live'l ihood)^
:as historical viewpoint, 13
173-175; during specific periods, 57~59, 86-87, IO8-IIO,
122-123, 1^5-149, 197-201
Mingchou 0^ #|, 8l, 103
Ming (dynasty)
, I5, 16, 17, 19, H4, 121, 125-149, 157,
210-212, 221-223, 239-243, 244 ,
Ming Hu i Tien (Ming Statutes) 0/:) ^
, 143
Ming Shih (Ming History) 0jjj ^ , 144
Mining, 161, 164, 182, 241
Mining tax. Cf. K'uang shui
Modernist ion, factors moving China's economy toward, 158-175
Mohism
35
Monetary economy, 90, 241-242
Money, paper, I9, 215-216, 232; Sui-T'ang, 84-85, 234; Sung,
104-105; Chin, 117; Yuan, 120; Ming, 125, 131, 136-140, 143,
222; Ch'ing, 168, I7I, I89-I9I, 228
Money, specie, 214-215; ancient, 18, 29-30, 42-44; Ch'in-Han,
48, 52, 54-55, 60-61; Age of Disunion, 65-66, 68, 69, 71;
Sui-T'ang, 84, 234; Five Dynasties, 85-86; Sung, 95, 103,
104, 237-238; Liao, 117; Chin 117; Ming, I36-I38, 222;
Ch'ing, 166, 168, I7I, 172, I88-I90, 228
Mongolia, 115
Mongols, 17, 19, 98, 120, 128, 210, 211. Cf. also YUan dynasty
Monopolies, private, 80. Cf. also Commerce
Monopolies, state, 35-36, 52-53, 106-107, 117, 120, 121, 126,
170, 235
Monsoons, 80
Mu (Chou king).|^ Jt. , 30
^
Mu yi fa (voluntary labor service law)
92 94-99
142, 239, 241
4
^
^
Mulberry land. Cf. Sang t'ien
Mus1im merchants, 120
Mythical period, 16, 18, 21-24
Nanking ||) f. , 67, 125, 132, 134, 140, 164, 186, 200, 243
Nan Pei ch'ao (Northern and Southern dynasties)
67-71, 205-206
^
Nant'ung
172
Navigation techniques, 15, 19, 100, 115
Neo-Confucianism, 109, 223

^

, 16
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Neolithic life, 21, 183
Newspapers, 213
104
Nien hao Wes'" period) f ^
,
147
'
N i nghs ia
Ningpo’:5' StT
’28, 132
Niuchuang '-f jji , 187
Nomads, 16, 1/, 57, 58. Cf. also Barbarians, names of particular
groups
Northern and Southern dynasties. Cf. Nan Pei ch'ao
Northern Chou (dynasty) JL
, 71 , 89~90
Northern dynasties, 69“71 ,
Northern Han (dynasty)
, 89
Northern Wei (dynasty^, 69"70, 74
Nungchia (Agrarians) yg.
, 37“38
Nurhachi f ^, 157, 158, 188
Odes, Book of. Cf. Shih Ching
Odoric, Friar, 120
Official. fields. Cf. Kuan t'ien
Ogodei g 'll’j ^ , 112, 113
Opium War, 20, 158, 159"l60, 180, 197, 198
Opium, legalization of, 196
Ou-yang Hsiu
91, 94
Overseas students, 162, 164, 165, 186
Overseas voyages and trade, 45, 65, 68, 80-82, 85, 125,
127-129, 133, 220, 222. Cf. also Commerce
“Paean to the God of Money." ^.^Cf. Ch' ien shen 1 un
Pai chi (white registers)
, 67
Paleolithic life, 21
Palmerston, Lord, I60
P'an-keng (Shang king), 26
Paochra^lf , 70, 71, 92, H8,,177, 184, 193
Pao ch'uan (treasure ships) '0
, 128
Pao ma fa (horse breeding system)
, 92
Pao mai~(contract purchase)^/ ^ , 240
Paper, 51, 198
Paper money. Cf. Money, paper
PascaI, Blaise, 100
Pawnbroking, 68, I78
Pearl River
, 179
Posrls ^2
Peasantry, 26,50-51, 57, 70, 74, 96-99, 129, 177-178, 217Cf. also Agriculture, Manors and manorial ism
Peking JLj. , II5, 125, 132, 134, l40, 147, 148, I85, 243.
Cf. also Yenching
Peking-Hankow railroad, I85
Peking Man, 21
People's Livelihood. Cf. Minsheng

Periodization of Chinese economic history, 15~16
Perkins, Dwight, 230
Persia, 30, 5h, 80, 102, 127
Philippines, 65, 133-134
Pj_ (tt) , 28
51, 66
P i Sheng m ^ , 100
Pienchou
Cf. K'aifeng
^
Pien huan (convenient exchange)
, 84-85
Pienl iang '-p ^ . Cf. K'aifeng
Pin manufacture, 156
Piracy, 132-133, 134, 223
Plows, 40, 49, 213
Po Kuei^ i , 3^
Political school. Cf. Chengchih chia
Polo, Marco, 102, 120
Population figures, 25, 49, 50, 64, 86, 170, 177, 197, 213,
220, 225, 231
Porcelain, 15, 19, 51, 84, 85, 101, 103, 115, 135-136, 179,
183, 227, 238
Portugal, 133, 159
Postal systems, 45, 55, 79, 114, 127, 140, 166, 168, 182, I87
Pottery, 21. Cf. also Porcelain
Pounding machine, 152
Preparation Granaries. Cf. Yupei ts'ang
Printing, 15, 19, 83-84, 85, 100, 115, 198, 218, 238
Private dependents. Cf. Ssu shu
Private property in farmland, 37, 39-40, 48, 50, 61, I67, 177
Productivity, agricultural, 230
Profit. Cf. U_
Public works, 226
Pumps, water, I5I, I52
Purchase of office, 58
Pure Talk, Cf. Ch'ing t'an
Putting-out, 226-227, 24l
"Queen Mother of the West", 30

Railroads, I60, 164, I65, 166, 168, I71, I8I, I85-I86
Red Sea, 55, 102, 127
Reestablishment, period of, 16, 18-19, 73~87
Renewal, period of, 16, 19, 89-IIO
Revival, period of, 16, 19, 125-149
Ricci, Matteo, I36
Rice, 28
Righteous Granaries. Cf. Yi ts'ang
Rites of Chou. Cf. Chou Li
Ritual. Cf. U_
River transport, 45, 55, 79, 179, I86, 213-214
Roads, 30, 44, 101-102, 114, 213, 229
Rockets. Cf. Huochien

266

Rome, 5^, 55-56, 65, 204, 205, 206
"Rushing bandit." Cf. Ch'uang tsei
Russia, 157, 160-161, 179, 196, 212
Russo-Japanese War, 161
Ryukyu (i s 1 ands)
132-133
Salaries, official, 42, 76, 138
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Southeast Asia, I9, 45, 55, 65, 66, 80, 103, HI, 114, 128,
133, 215
Southern dynasties, 67-68
Spain, 133
Spencer, Herbert, 170
Spinning machines, 153, 220, 240
Spring-Autujnn Era. Cf. Ch'un Ch'iu
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Su^9Yat-sen 0 <f> ih , 13-14, 53, 113, 161, 170, 172-175,
Sung Chiang -JS jX, 1 10
Sungchiang
, 240
Sung (dynasty)
, 16, 19, 89-HO, 127, 131, 207-209, 215,
216, 222, 236-239, 243-244
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Sung Shih (Sung His tory);|! '^ . 109
Supply and demand, laws of, 37, 53

268

Szechwan 'i3 O) , 44, 45, 54, 55, 58, 63, 68, 89, 102, 104, 107,
144, 148, 149, 171, 215, 238
Ta Hsia X
, 54
Ta Hsueh (The Great Learning) f\. '^ , 169
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Tientsin
, 162, 171JT5t
T'ien fu (field tax)
, 31, 56, 65, 66-67, 71, 74-75, 85,
91, 117, 122-123, 126, 141-142, 191-193
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, 9I
Yi (barbarian tribe) ^ ,^57"58, 60
Yichou^ »•)-) , 68
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